POLIS
reflects

Edition #1

Unheard Crises



Berlin, January 2021,
Published by Polis180 in cooperation with Designers for Diversity e.V.

POLIS
reflects

Preface

Dear reader,

We are proud to present the first issue of PolisReflects on "Unheard Crises". Amidst the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, other, more silent crises are often overlooked. At the same time, ongoing tensions have been exacerbated in many contexts around the world. For this first issue, we therefore invited student authors to shed light on an Unheard Crises of their choice.

We are grateful to continue the work of the former student-led journal iReflect, published by "IB an der Spree e. V.", offering students a forum to share academic insights in the topics they are passionate about. PolisReflects picks up this goal and aims to make these insights heard, in academic debates and beyond. To integrate different views and methods, we decided to publish an artist piece in each issue. A two-phase anonymous peer review supports students in developing their research and publication skills. Thereby, PolisReflects follows the mission of Polis180 to empower young people in foreign and European policy debates.

The seven outstanding articles in this issue are the best proof that young voices have a contribution to make. They reflect the diversity ofUnheard Crises around the world, thematically, geographically, and in their theoretical approaches. Two papers examine the vulnerable position of refugees in Europe. One discusses the exclusionary consequences of regime complexity (Anna-Lena Rüland), whereas the other analyses their sexualisation in pornographic imaginaries (Alexander Gertz). Another set of papers sheds light on contested water resources in Asian geopolitics and more locally in Saudi Arabia (Luisa Boll; Pauline Raabe). Three further papers focus on the transformation of politics by actors and angles that are frequently marginalized in crises: women, citizens, and the post-colonial perspective (Karolin Tuncel; Carla Ulrich; Tamara Pataki), whereas Ronald Pizzoferrato's contribution explores life under structural violence in Caracas through visual ethnography.

We hope you enjoy the read!

The Editorial Board of PolisReflects

Edition #1
Unheard Crises

Content Code:

Essay

Interview

01

Crisis and Sexual Exploitation: The Case of Refugee Pornography

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Abstract

In recent years, refugee pornography experienced an upsurge in popularity. Thereby, it uses the mode of crisis as a narrative tool to justify sexual exploitation. The goal of this paper is to untangle the construction of such pornography as a racial fetishization of the veil serving as an extension of the sexualization of the "Oriental" body during the colonial era. To open entry points for an academic debate, I will put it into relation to concepts such as exoticization, othering, and sexuality. First, I want to explore current academic debates on pornography, specifically on the interrelations between politics and porn. Next, I want to analyze the popularity of refugee pornography in the case of Germany and find possible correlations between trends in popularity and political events. To find an explanation for the latter, I want to turn to postcolonial studies, more specifically, to a feminist approach towards Orientalism. Further research is of importance, given the popularity of this peculiar combination of crisis and sexual exploitation.

Keywords: Pornography; Refugee; Racial Fetishization; Postcolonial Feminism; Oriental Body

Introduction

Picture the following scenario: A young woman wearing a hijab applies for work. While she is sitting in an office, the white, middle-aged man she is supposed to have the interview with enters the room. As she explains her desperate need for this job due to her being a refugee, he suddenly starts to approach her and forcibly puts her hand on his crotch area. As she reacts visibly repellent and takes her hand away, he begins to voice his desires verbally and offers her money in exchange for sexual intercourse. Intimidated by his actions, she reluctantly agrees to his demands. This leads to brutal sex in which the man subjugates her and, afterward, leaves the money on the table and leaves the room without a word.

What may seem like a tragic fragment of a single life deeply affected by war and conflict and forced to seek refuge in another country only to be commodified by foreign patriarchal structures, is, in fact, the narrative of a pornographic movie. According to the data by UNHCR (2018), 68,5 million people worldwide are forcibly displaced. Many take dangerous routes to other countries in search of a better life free of suffering. In the course of this dynamic, a heated political, cultural, and social discourse erupted worldwide. Germany is no different in this regard, where the term "refugee crisis" ("Flüchtlingskrise") gained immense popularity in recent years. In the course of this, Rodríguez (2018) assessed that "the refugee has been reduced to a potential worker" and that "asylum policies seem to be turning into a new way of regulating and controlling racialized labour migration" (Rodríguez 2018: 25). This labour relation, however, does not apply to female refugees, nor does it apply to the sphere of the sexual, the fantasies, and the fetish.

When the two photographers Nelles and Al-Badri first introduced the term "refugee porn" while presenting their project "We refugees", they meant a different dimension than the one I will be presenting throughout my essay, namely the high-polish recordings by professional producers showing fleeing people and overcrowded lifeboats (Wiedemann 2015). In this case, however, I want to refer to refugee pornography quite literally, meaning a pornographic movie depicting a female refugee, both real or acted, performing sexual intercourse with a usually white man in exchange for food, housing, or money. Therefore, the mode of crisis, expressed in the role of the refugee, becomes a vital part of a plot, underlying the exploitation of her position of vulnerability through the implied act of rape. This pornographic content can be found on websites like xhamster, Pornhub, and Redtube and can be manually searched through these websites´ search functions. Within the past few years, there has been a gradual increase in similar movies being uploaded on these websites. Additionally, following this trend, older videos have been re-uploaded and rebranded to contain the word "refugee" within the title. The following is a selection of titles which can be found on these websites:

- *This teen Arab refugee is looking for someone who will help her and give her a room to stay. She was offered by a horny boss some money and a room if she can fuck with him. (20.348.037 views[1])*
- *Watch this hungry Arab refugee asked for some food and money and leads to a hot hardcore sex. (5.509.616 views)*
- *Refugee applies For Job Ends Up Fucking For Cash. (8.956.007 views)*
- *Junger arabischer Flüchtling braucht eine Bleibe und ich leihe einen helfenden Schwanz ("Young Arab refugee needs a place to stay and I lend a helping dick"; 3.304.958 views)*

Throughout this paper, I want to explore possible explanations of how one person's grim reality can transform into another person's pleasure. Therefore, I will relate this phenomenon to concepts such as exoticization, othering, and sexuality. First, I want to explore current academic debates on pornography, specifically on the interrelations between politics and porn. Next, I want to analyse the popularity of refugee pornography referring to Germany within my examples and find possible correlations between trends in media popularity and political events. To find an explanation for the latter, I will revert to postcolonial studies and the feminist approach towards Orientalism which will highlight the symbolic significance of the veil in these movies.

Pornography and Politics

Current Debates

In the following section, I will consider the current discussions surrounding pornography, especially when it comes to the intersection between pornography and politics. I will do so by analyzing the popularity of refugee pornography in the case of Germany. As archaeological discoveries from all over the world suggest, pornography has accompanied humankind throughout almost all of its existence and geographical locations. The sexually explicit frescoes in the city of Pompeii, the sculptures on the temples of Madhya Pradesh and Eugéne Pirou's 1899´s Coucher de la Mariée, the world's first known softcore erotic movie (Head 2018), all show us humanity's universal fascination with sexuality and its urge to manifest this fascination in a wide range of historically changing depictions. Nevertheless, the history of pornography never followed a stringent line of evolution but instead always proved to be a discursive battlefield in which societies bitterly fought over the question of how to socially define this phenomenon.

The most recent example in the Western hemisphere of wide debates concerning the social status of pornography is the so-called "porn wars" (also known as "sex wars", "lesbian sex wars" or "feminist sex wars"). Their roots can be traced back to the 1970s when activists MacKinnon and Dworkin advocated for the prohibition of the production of pornography in the US based on their understanding of it as a consequential subordination of women. However, they were debunked with the liberal response that pornography is an act protected by the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Hence, an intense philosophical debate spurred, where issues of subordination, empowerment, liberation, and the dignified depiction of human sexual experience were explored (Dworkin 1989; Novaes 2017; Tong 1982). Although losing its initial intensity, the debate continues to this day as researchers explore the impact of new technological innovations on our understanding and consumption of pornography and its effects on our physical and mental health (Chedekel, 2012).

A scientific subfield of this debate completely lost in time, however, is the research of the intertwining of pornography and politics, be it the research on the correlation between political alignment and porn consumption or studies concerning politicized pornography. In-depth studies analyzing these issues thinned out from the 1990s onwards and used methodologies which are outdated and, therefore, are not applicable to current pornographic phenomena (for example the categorization into "Religious Conservative", "Liberal" or "Antipornography Feminist" in Cottle, Searles, Berger and Pierce´s analysis published in 1989).

The digital revolution made pornography accessible as never before and transformed it into a large source of traffic on the internet (for example from July 2009 to July 2010, about 13 percent of Web searches were for erotic content; Ruvolo 2011). Over the years, a wide range of new possibilities emerged for the industry, leading to the creation of new categories of pornography, even introducing Virtual Reality devices. Although the implementation of a (usually makeshift) story is quite common in pornography, designed to provoke a stronger identification and engagement between the viewer and the actors and, therefore, a more intense sexual experience, the case of refugee porn is particularly interesting, combining a range of political, cultural and social statements within the story.

Refugee Pornography in Germany

Before engaging with this matter academically, one must ask oneself if this phenomenon is socially relevant enough. Especially in the realm of pornography, customer demands are often very diverse, yet not all of them make research a gainful endeavour. To answer this question regarding the consumption of refugee pornography in Germany, statistics can provide a general insight. The data for the following figure has been provided by xhamster, the second biggest online provider of pornographic material in the world (siteworthtraffic 2019), with an estimated traffic of 1.03 Billion sessions (a coherent time period a user spends on the website) per month (rank2traffic 2019).

Figure 1 (as seen right) shows the monthly share of search requests for the term "refugee" relative to the total number of clicks on the website in Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Usually, users search for pornographic content in English. However, even if a German user types in the keyword "Flüchtling" ("refugee"), it will automatically be translated within the system. Clearly recognizable in this figure is the overproportional presence of search requests from Germany. This can partly be explained by the fact that the second most visitors to this website come from this country (11,8 percent; rank2traffic 2019). However, the United States ranks first with 20,6% of the total visits while having far fewer search requests for "refugee". Although xhamster does not provide absolute numbers, researchers of ZeitOnline estimated the number of search requests for "refugee" to be around 800,000 per month during peak seasons on xhamster (Amjahid 2018). Keeping in mind that this number refers to only one of many pornographic websites, the total number of search requests will be far higher.



Figure 1: Monthly share of search requests for „refugee" relative to the total number of clicks

We can see four major spikes in Germany's search requests: in December 2015, March 2016, October 2016 and September 2017. If we contemplate relevant political events over these search request spikes, we arrive at the following results:

1. The strongest indication for a possible correlation with political events can be traced back to December 31, 2015, when North African men allegedly sexually assaulted white German women in Cologne´s main train station. This event "reactivated the dichotomy of civilization and barbarity" (Rodríguez 2018, p. 17), sweeping through German mass media and producing a political shift away from the hospital Willkommenskultur (welcome culture) and strengthening German right-wing dynamics and movements.

2. In March 2016, the Balkan route, which until then hosted the biggest stream of refugees coming to Germany, was closed off. On March 20, an agreement between the EU and Turkey came into force, stopping refugees from traveling to Greece through Turkey. Consequentially, this month's news broadcasts were filled with pictures of desperate people trying to cross the borders and overfilled detainment camps (Hanewinkel 2016).

3. October 2016 was marked by a massive amount of racist assaults. Incendiary attacks took place in Jüterborg, Naumburg, and Neubrandenburg. In Potsdam, anonymous perpetrators attacked a Mosque, injuring four people. Further assaults happened in Schwerin, Bautzen, and Sangershausen (Rafael 2016).

4. In September 2017, the federal election took place in which the Alternative for Germany (AFD) heavily relied on migration and asylum issues in their election campaign. The streets were plastered with election posters proclaiming racist statements mainly directed towards Muslims, e.g. "Burka? Wir stehen auf Bikinis" ("Burka? We fancy Bikinis"; Kamann 2017; Amjahid 2018). This potential correlation indicates a situation in which contemporary political events evoke xenophobic and Islamophobic resentments in German citizens, which they then translate into the most private realm of their lives, their sexuality. Nevertheless, how can we explain this particular dynamic?

With a feminist take on pornography, Novaes (2017) analyses the question if feminist pornography is a form of propaganda. Thereby, she distances herself from the originally Marxist, power-laden, and negatively connotated notion of the concept. Instead, she utilizes a more neutral definition proposed by philosopher Sheryl Tuttle Ross: ´Propaganda is a message used with the intention to persuade a socially significant group of people, on behalf of a political institution, organization, or cause´ (Novaes 2017: paragraph 7). Following this definition, Novaes concludes that feminist pornography is indeed a form of propaganda, as its producers have a political agenda, namely the promotion of certain norms and values in society through the distribution of pornographic material showing a sensual,

01

sexual exchange between two partners. This definition, however, cannot be applied to refugee porn. Although highly political, it seems unlikely that the producers try to promote the right-wing ideology of racial superiority in their videos. Instead, in a market-based economy, the supply of movies featuring such a narrative increases through the popularity among its consumers. In fact, even older videos dating back to before the so-called "refugee crisis" got rebranded with new titles and new descriptions, now allegedly starring refugees or featuring a story in which a refugee gets subordinated and sexually exploited by a white man.

A good example of the "forces of the market" shaping this trend and promoting producers to create movies with such narratives or actors is Antonio Suleiman (The Local Voices 2016). Fleeing Syria at the age of 19, Antonio came to Germany in 2012 with the hope to work as an actor. However, after many failed attempts to enter the job market due to his refugee status, he turned to the porn industry in a last desperate resort to fulfil his dream. After participating in a few movies, he decided to become a porn producer himself and actively promote his porn movies as "refugee porn made in Germany" (Amjahid 2018: 1). Although his self-proclaimed goal is to "challenge other´s perceptions" (The Local Voices 2016: paragraph 1) and present the "Syrian body" as something that "can have sex and does not only exist in order to die" (The Local Voices 2016: paragraph 9), the movies themselves still feature similar patterns of female subordination being present in most pornography. Indeed, one may argue that his stance towards his work and the way he presents it is only possible because he is a man. Conversely, women participating in such movies are being dominated in a way that forces them "to submit themselves to that normalizing white, male gaze that makes them subaltern, voice-less victims" (Giuliani 2016:16). Hence, it condemns them to be penetrated by the hegemonic discourse, in the case of porn, figuratively and literally through the sexual act itself.

This section investigated present discussions on pornography and assessed that research on the intertwining of pornography and politics faded in the last 20 years. This development appears unfortunate, as the digital revolution made pornography accessible as never before and with it, provided a plethora of new pornographic categories, thereby also including highly politicized ones such as refugee porn. As shown by the statistics, this phenomenon is very popular in Germany and, hence, highly relevant for research. Additionally, the data suggests a correlation with political events, indicating that numerous German citizens translate current xenophobic and Islamophobic discourses into their sexual lives. If this occurring trend is not being promoted by political institutions and actors, but instead, originates from consumer demands and is being fulfilled by producers in search of profit, the question remains why this movement from the social to the sexual sphere takes place. What are the motives for people typing in the term "refugee" in the search engine of a pornographic website? Of course, one cannot look into the heads of these individuals. Neither would it be adequate to drift into the sphere of speculation void of any scientific purpose. If we, however, embed this phenomenon into a larger theoretical framework we can find patterns that serve as conscious- and subconscious motives that overlap all of these individuals' decisions to watch refugee porn. Let us, therefore, resort to some postcolonial scholars.

The Urge to Unveil

Towards a Feminist Orientalism

In the following section, I outline the theoretical framework that I will then apply to refugee pornography. First, I sketch out relevant ontological and epistemological elements of postcolonial studies. Next, I present some intersectional studies combining Orientalist and feminist thoughts, which I then relate to the phenomenon mentioned above.

Generally, postcolonial studies, similar to postmodernism, aim to deconstruct (usually binary) concepts to reveal the underlying power relations, thereby engaging with and questioning frameworks such as language, power, truth, and subjectivity. In its essence, postcolonialism proclaims that although Western colonialism began in 1492 and formally ended in the second half of the 20th century, the colonial relations of this era still exist. This is argued to be the case as the colonial forces did not just exert physical and military violence onto the colonized subjects, but also epistemic and ideological power (for example Linebaugh and Rediker 2001). Unlike neo-colonialist thinkers, who focus more on the material aspects of the continuation of colonial relations (Nkruma 1965), postcolonial scholars analyse the cultural conflict in which the Western colonial powers enforced their view of history, values, and norms which they regarded as universal. Thereby, they presented the West as civilized, rational, and enlightened, hence, colonialism as a mission of civilization, fighting against traditions, myths, and regression persisting in the non-Western parts of the world (Bowden 2018). Yet, postcolonial thinkers emphasize that this is not solely a "top-down" phenomenon but affects the colonialist with the same intensity as it affects the "other" (O´Hagan 2002).

Talking about the foundations of the postcolonial school of thought, no path leads past its creator Edward Said (Juan, Jr 1998). Studying the relationship between the West and the so-called "Orient", Said (1978) concluded that the West as an epistemic community conceptualized the "Orient" as inferior, exotic, anti-modernist, and backward to legitimize its supremacy. In this context, knowledge about the "Orient" always served to stabilize the balance of Western hegemony. This led to a symbiosis between imperialism and the production of knowledge, as every interaction with the "Orient" first required information about it. Therefore, the notion of the "Orient" does not just belong to the past of the modern Western world but is, as one of the "others" (next to a range of other cultures), an inseparable part of the self-perception of the West (Kamali 2017).

While the introduction of the "Orient", as well as its significance for the West and the ensuing cultural conflict, are helpful tools to rudimentarily conceptualize refugee pornography, it still suffers an important shortcoming. Namely, Said's original Orientalism is lacking a gender perspective, not incorporating the implications of this cultural conflict for women. Even more so, it does not consider the implications resulting from the different understandings of sexuality. Nonetheless, this was not solely a phenomenon in studies about Orientalism, but pervaded the early stages of postcolonialism as a whole as many Western feminist writers assumed "privileged" access that postcolonial subjects would have to such a research topic and, instead, assumed a position of "comfortable ignorance" towards this academic field (Mohanty 1988; Ashcroft 1989; Parashar 2017).

Nonetheless, through the years, this gap was filled by feminist writers. In this context, Yegenoglu's book Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism (1998) remains a groundbreaking work. In a classic postcolonial fashion, it "explores the discursive dynamics that secure a sovereign subject status for the West. It is about the cultural representation of the West to itself by way of a detour through the other" (Yegenoglu 1998: 1). However, the value of her work lies in the fact that it provides "an analysis of Orientalism that does not relegate the question of sexual difference to a sub-field in the analysis of colonial discourse as this study focuses on the unique articulation of sexual and cultural difference as they are produced and signified in the discourse of Orientalism" (Yegenoglu 1998: 1). The focal point of her analysis lies in the concept of the "veil", especially in the act of the "unveiling". According to her, the veil serves as a barrier "between the body of the Oriental woman and the Western gaze" (Yegenoglu 1998: 39). While numerous research projects around the veil focus on it as an object, emphasizing its oppressive properties (Mernissi 1991; Ahmed 1992), or arguing for its liberating purpose (El Guindi 1999; Hasan 2016; Lentin 1998; Ruby 2006), this book, in turn, focuses on the veil as a signifier of "Oriental" women, presenting them, as well as the "Orient" itself, as mysterious and exotic. This arouses the West's fantasies to penetrate the veiled surface of its "otherness", eager to "unveil" the "Oriental" woman and the knowledge that the "Orient" holds - if necessary, by force. This desire, she concludes, is constitutive of the Western hegemonic, colonial identity itself. Through this dynamic, the "Oriental" woman got sexualized and the veil became a "fetishized" object (Vivian 1999). Thus, the West projected it anachronistically onto a (sexual) context in which it did not exist as a category of thought beforehand.

Liberation, Emancipation, Conquest

How do these theoretical reflections now relate to refugee pornography? First and foremost, the popularity of this phenomenon elucidates the impression of the de-historicized, depoliticized and heavily culturized, as well as racialized Islam dispositive Attia (2010), describes. This culturalization stems from the colonial binary and still underlines our discourse around refugees, further fuelling the distinction between "us" and "them" and fusing the Arab ethnicity and Islamic religion into one category of thought, thereby creating a mythological "IslamLand" (Abu-Lughod 2013: 68) which has the "figure of the victimized Muslim woman" (Abu-Lughod 2013: 70) as its main feature. Due to the interrelatedness between (perceived) cultural and sexual differences, which Yegenoglu describes, the popularity of politicized porn as in the case of refugee pornography becomes clearer, as this politicization is just superficial and reveals a deeply ingrained perception of cultural differences stemming from a colonial mindset underlying Western societies. As seen in most cases, mass media (here in the form of internet pornography) functions as the most efficient agent in the reproduction of the image of the "other" (Kamali 2017). In the narrative of these movies, the "Orientalist" binary of the "gatekeepers and victims" (Kamali 2017: 8) serves as an underlying, meaning that the male refugee is assumed to be patriarchal, aggressive and incompatible with modern humanist Western societies, while the female refugee is a poor victim of traditional culture.

In this context, two (by no means mutually exclusive) possibilities arise on how refugee porn can be interpreted: First, the white man can live out his revenge fantasies stemming out of his fear of racist topoi like "foreign infiltration" ("Überfremdung"), miscegenation, or the "rape of white women" by Muslim men. These fantasies can now be satisfied through the observation of a white man sexually assaulting a Muslim woman that is perceived to be "exotic" and therefore, adding a form of fetishized conquest to the narrative. Increased search behaviour for this pornography such as the one shown above after the events in Cologne indicates this dynamic.

In another interpretation, the white man in the movie acts like the emancipator, liberating the female refugee in a material sense (by offering her money, food, housing in exchange for sex) and also liberating her sexually as he shows her experiences which her "misogynistic" cultural background denied her. However, the white man relies on misogynistic practices himself, subordinating the woman and dominating her in a manner usual in hardcore pornography and rape culture, thereby, rebutting the implied intent to save "brown women from brown men" (Spivak 1993: 93). In this vein, the subaltern position of the woman, for instance her belonging to a voice-less social group, is also shown verbally throughout the narrative: In the scenario given before the rape itself, the man speaks much more than the woman, who is generally

limited to verbally agreeing to his proposals (implying her consent for the ensuing sexual act). On the other side, the male part of speech is equally telling: In almost every case examined, the man offers the woman a form of compensation, thereby implying a "fair exchange" between both individuals. More importantly, it even suggests a form of empowerment which is being utilized quite frequently by the West with regard to Muslim women: As, for example, the US government employed the social empowerment of Afghan women to justify its military intervention in Afghanistan (Abu-Lughod 2013), or the French employed the cultural empowerment of Algerian women (through the liberation from the veil) to justify its colonization of Algeria (Fanon 2004), the white male in the movie employs the economic empowerment of the refugee woman to justify her sexual subordination. In all three cases, "empowerment" acts as a cover for exploitation and violence, once again closely intertwining the underlying themes of liberation and conquest.

In essence, this act can serve as a primal example of how the West once again constructs its own identity by a way of a detour through the "other" as a sexist mindset is being used to free a woman from the "sexist other" in whose creation the West had an enormous role to play in. As Fisher (2012) demonstrates in a historical analysis of the Western imperialist agenda in the "Orient", the colonial powers often used the so-called "patriarchal bargain", buying "the submission of men by offering them absolute power over women" (Fisher 2012: 8). Now, in the postcolonial era, the white man can look at the "Orient", describe it as inherently sexist, and offer the liberation of its subjects through hyper-sexualization. As Schaper, Beljan, Eitler, Ewing, and Gammerl (2018) write:

"One important framework for all kinds of sexualized exoticism and exoticized sexual relations was European imperialism, which very directly gave political significance to cultural imaginations that helped to establish, justify and maintain relations of power and (sexual) exploitation. Many of these survived into the post-colonial era and gained new social, economic and cultural significance within an increasingly globalized world" (Schaper et al. 2018: 4)

The Significance of the Veil

In all the examined cases, the actresses participating in these movies wear one object which is of special significance for the narrative – the veil. Usually being a Hijab or a Niqab, this piece of cloth is the only signifier proclaiming that the woman is a refugee from a Muslim-majority country. As mentioned above, this serves as a perfect example of the process that Yegenoglu describes as the Western urge to "unveil" the "Oriental" woman. "Within a theory of the gaze, where the power of objectification can be traced back to an omniscient viewer, the options of resistance left to the objectified are framed within a binary opposition: Either the veiled woman resists the colonial gaze by remaining veiled, or she relents to the gaze by unveiling" (Vivian 1999: 131). In the case of refugee pornography, the woman subjugates herself to the Western gaze by making herself visible and liberates herself through hyper-sexualization. Often, the woman also retains the veil on her head and divests the rest of her clothes. This serves as a reminder of the narrative the observer is watching, namely that the raped woman is specifically Muslim. In the case of the Hijab, this allows the viewer to see the woman´s facial expressions. The case of the Niqab, however, creates certain special implications:

Fanon (2004) explores the importance of the veil during the French colonization of Algeria. He notes that, although, as mentioned above, the veil was being used by the French to justify the occupation, it also deeply unnerved them. This, he concludes, stems from two facts: First, a veiled woman withdrew from the colonial administration built upon classification and order, therefore, gradually turning the veil into a symbol of resistance. "This woman who sees without being seen frustrates the colonizer" (Fanon 2004: 48) as her thoughts, which might as well be insurgent, remain hidden from the occupant. Second, it cultivates the colonizer's desire to unveil the woman as, unconsciously and due to his European socialization, he concludes that the veil must hide some unseen beauty that justifies the concealment in the first place.

All these deliberations come together in the pornographic movie in which the actress leaves the niqab on her head while exposing the rest of her body. Her face which could express pain, sadness, or anger, does not matter. Neither do her hidden thoughts scare the raping man nor the viewer. Even if she thinks of resistance, feels aversion or disgust, it is too late. Epistemologically speaking, the act of revealing the naked body in these contexts produces knowledge, which is that of the final colonial victory. As the woman unclothes herself, she is forced to overstep a certain cultural barrier, for instance the unavailability of the Muslim body to the Western gaze and, hence, unveils the "Orient´s" mysteries through the white man´s force and persuasion. As the penetration ensues soon thereafter and culminates in the male orgasm, the "Orient" has been defeated.

Conclusion

In this paper, I used the theoretical framework of a feminist-Orientalist intersection and applied it to refugee pornography. That way, I untangled the construction of the currently popular concept of refugee pornography as a racial fetishization of the veil serving as an extension of the sexualization of "Oriental" bodies during the colonial era. Through this lens, refugee pornography is just a further example of the culturized and racialized Islam dispositive and is supposed to exemplify the cultural differences to the West while at the same time developing clear hierarchies on top of which the white man sits – either as the enforcer of revenge stemming out of the observer's fantasies or as a saviour. In the narrative perpetuated by agents such as the porn industry, the Muslim woman, just as the "Orient" itself, is subjugated to the Western gaze, making herself visible and "liberating" herself in the eyes of the white male observer through hyper-sexualization, while at the same time showing her subaltern state in the patriarchal hierarchy through the act of sexual domination by the white, male porn actor. Most significantly, the veil remains the pivotal point in the narrative, signifying the woman as a Muslim refugee. Thereby, the woman suffers threefold discrimination in the form of patriarchal rape culture, cultural and religious discrimination in the form of Islamophobia, and white colonialist supremacy.

As statistically shown above, this phenomenon is very popular in Germany and, hence, highly relevant for academic research. The possible correlation to political events indicates the need for new debates on potential interrelations between politics and pornography and the possible influence on one another. Additionally, the themes and processes mentioned above open the doors for more in-depth intersectional postcolonial and feminist studies. Psychologically speaking, this category of porn also raises questions about the real-world implications of the woman's objectification and the effects on the perceived cultural difference. In this field, concepts such as the "Sexualized Body Inversion Hypothesis" (Cogoni et al. 2018) or "destructive ambivalence" (Oglov 1991) could be applied to refugee pornography to provide potential answers on that matter. Additionally, it should be noted that this sexual fetishization of the "other" stemming from colonial times is by no means restricted to the "Oriental" body alone. Holmes (2016), for example, analysed the sexualized language in the colonial history of the Americas and the Atlantic slave trade (for example the description of the New World as the "virgin land" by colonizers, "suggesting the land's passive and submissive nature, awaiting the conquest of men."; Holmes 2016: 1) which was followed by the hyper-sexualization of black people, attributing them over proportionally large genitalia and a feral sex drive. This raises the question if these sentiments translate into pornography as well and produce similar dynamics which, in turn, could disturb integration processes and fuel right-wing attitudes.

Finally, studies on the global political economy could further open their range of analysis towards the "desire economies" (Agathangelou 2004) and scrutinize the material consequences of such pornography, namely place this phenomenon into the framework of globalizing social relations producing the sexualization and commodification of female migrant labour. After all, questions left unanswered in this paper which would relate to this field are: Who profits from this form of pornography? Where are they located? Which methods do they use in its production/how consensual is its production? How do they advertise it and with the help of whom?

In precis, refugee pornography offers a plethora of questions for scholars in social sciences and humanities alike and should be further examined if we want to find ways to combat the discursive constructions underlying this trend.

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Footnotes:

[1] All views as of 02.04.2019

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02

Travel Regime over Refugee Regime: How the EU Circumvented its Duties to Accept Refugees During the Migrant Crisis

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Abstract

For the past decades, global migratory pressures have steadily increased and provided both the Global North and South with several new challenges. Using the concept of regime complexity as a theoretical framework, this article examines how states of the Global North and South have dealt with these challenges. On the basis of an in-depth study of the 2015 European migration crisis, this article argues that the European Union (EU) has drastically restricted access to asylum for refugees by addressing the crisis through the travel regime instead of through the refugee regime. It further contends that this has had an important impact on the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the main body governing the refugee regime. Further research should investigate whether other states of the Global North have reacted similarly to growing migratory pressures and investigate what impact this has had on the institutions at the heart of the refugee regime.

Keywords: Refugee Crisis, Regime Complexity, Regime Shifting, UNHCR, IOM

Introduction

Until early 2020, when Turkey opened up its borders with Greece and led many migrants to try to enter the European Union (EU), the EU-Turkey deal of 2016 had been rather successful in reducing the influx of migrants reaching Europe. Back in 2015, when the number of people seeking asylum in Europe skyrocketed to 1.26 million, the deal was the smallest common political denominator that all EU Member States could agree on (European Parliament 2017). Prior to the negotiation of the agreement, Member States were split over the question of how the high influx of migrants should be handled. Southern European States, such as Greece and Italy, were unevenly burdened when thousands of refugees reached their shores in 2015 and called the EU for help and support. As entry points of arrival they were responsible for processing asylum requests under the Dublin Regulation (European Commission N/S-b). When the numbers of asylum seekers outgrew their state capacities and a wave of secondary movement[1] reached Northern European States, like Sweden and Germany, the EU finally sprang to action to address the sharp rise in arrival numbers.

In the first months of 2015, the European Commission hastily developed various crisis-response mechanisms (Collet and Le Coz 2018: 10). Amongst these was the EU-Turkey deal, which states that "irregular migrants arriving in Greece after 20 March 2016 are to be returned to Turkey, and that the EU is to resettle one Syrian for every Syrian returned from the Greek islands" (Collet and Le Coz 2018: 19). The deal is probably one of the most controversial parts of the EU response to the migrant crisis. International Organisations (IOs), activists, and scholars alike heavily criticize it (see: Human Rights Watch 2016; Gogou 2017). In the pertinent academic literature on the topic, scholars often investigate the deal's consistency with international law and its impact on refugees (see: Poon 2016; Lehner 2019; Peerboom 2019). Surprisingly few of them analyse the deal using a comprehensive International Relations framework. This paper seeks to close this research gap by asking whether regime complexity can help explain the EU's response to the refugee crisis of 2015.

The argument I put forward in this paper is twofold. First, while a lack of political will of certain Member States to agree on an effective refugee distribution mechanism considerably influenced the EU's overall reaction to the refugee crisis of 2015, I argue it is desirable to analyse Europe's response to the high influx of refugees using the concept of regime complexity. This approach has, so far, been largely ignored in the context of the 2015 migrant crisis. I contend that the overlap between the refugee and the travel regime enabled the EU to engage in regime shifting. By doing so, the EU has been able to address the migrant crisis through the travel instead of through the refugee regime. The shift from the refugee to the travel regime enabled the EU to effectively close its borders to stop the high influx of asylum seekers. Second, I argue that this has had significant implications for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the main body governing the refugee regime. Due to the controversial nature of the EU-Turkey deal, the institution played a limited role in managing the influx of migrants coming to Europe. By presenting this argument, I criticize the dominant assumption in the literature on the refugee regime complex that the UNHCR remains relevant in times of institutional proliferation by expanding its mandate to other refugee-related issue areas (see: Betts 2009; Betts 2010b; Betts 2010a; Betts 2013). While the organisation can perhaps sometimes oppose a regime shift, in the case of the 2015 refugee crisis the UNHCR limited its involvement in the EU-Turkey deal to retain its moral standing. As a result, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) dethroned the UNHCR as the leading relief institution in the 2015 EU migrant crisis.

This paper is divided into three parts. In the first section, I present four propositions that Alexander Betts puts forward in his article, "The Refugee Regime Complex", on which I base my own argument (Betts 2010b). In the second part, I show that Betts' propositions help to explain the EU's approach to the 2015 migrant crisis. In the last section, I illustrate what consequences the EU-Turkey deal, as part of this approach, has had for the UNHCR. Finally, I summarize the most important findings from the paper and outline where further research on the consequences of regime complexity for refugee protection is needed.

The Travel-Refugee Regime Complex

In his article "The Refugee Regime Complex" (2010b), Alexander Betts describes the institutional overlap between the refugee and the travel regime and explains what consequences this overlap has for the protection of refugees and the organisation at the heart of the refugee regime.

Betts starts his article by giving a short overview of the historical development of the refugee regime in the aftermath of World War Two. At the time, the UNHCR was the only institution designed to oversee the resettlement of refugees (Betts 2010b: 13). This quickly changed with rapid institutional proliferation within and beyond the UN. As a result, some of the newly created institutions and treaties in other regimes, such as the human rights and labour migration regime, overlapped with the refugee regime, leading to the emergence of a refugee regime complex (Figure 1). Betts defines such a regime complex as an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions that include more than one institutional agreement or authority and whose co-existence may lead to regime complexity (Alter and Raustiala 2017: 5). Institutional overlaps like those between the refugee and the humanitarian regime do not necessarily lead to conflict. In fact, they can even be complementary, for example, when migrants receive both Internally Displaced Person (IDP) and UNHCR protection. In the case of the refugee and the travel regime, however, the overlap resulted in irreconcilable contradictions that ultimately had important and negative implications for the protection of refugees (Betts 2013: 70 ff.).



Figure 1: Overlaps between the refugee regime and other regimes creating the refugee regime complex; own illustration according to Betts (2010b)



Figure 2: Regime overlap; own illustration according to Betts (2010b)

Like the refugee regime, the travel regime consists of several institutions and treaties. Originally, their aim was to facilitate international travel and border crossings, for example, through the standardization of passports, which helped inspectors at border controls to quickly find the information they needed (Koslowski 2009: 16). With time and ever-growing numbers of travellers and border crossings, new challenges arose for border control officials. Due to an increasing number of individuals attempting to enter destination countries without authorization during the 1980s and 1990s, states began to stiffen their border controls. Travel was even further restricted in the 2000s after terrorist attacks committed by foreign nationals shook cities like New York City and Madrid (Koslowski 2009: 23). The attacks led to the wide-spread perception that irregular immigration could pose a national security threat[2]. As a response to this alleged threat, many states adopted stricter visa and border control policies (Koslowski 2009: 22).

Though the refugee regime and the travel regime seem unrelated at first glance, they overlap in one specific area: the access to spontaneous arrival asylum. This overlap establishes a new regime complex, which Betts calls the travel-refugee regime complex (Figure 2). Both the travel regime and the refugee regime claim authority over access to spontaneous arrival asylum, which has far-reaching consequences for the people applying for asylum and the institutions at the core of the refugee regime.

In Europe, for example, migrants are traditionally able to apply for asylum once they reach European territory (Betts 2010a: 76). A state's legal and normative obligations to an asylum seeker only apply once he or she has claimed territorial asylum (Betts 2010b: 26). Access to European territory, however, has progressively been restricted through the travel regime. Particularly since 9/11, when visa and border controls were toughened in many states, it has increasingly served states to securitize South-North migration[3]. Specifically irregular migration, which states have perceived as a potential national security threat following the above mentioned terrorist attacks in the 2000s, has been restricted (Betts 2010b: 24). Because of tighter controls and entry requirements, it has become harder for migrants to reach European territory and to apply for asylum in the EU. With the securitization of travel, states have thus begun to perceive and respond to migration as an issue at the heart of the travel instead of the refugee regime. This has enabled EU Member States to partially circumvent an individual's access to asylum. In the International Relations literature, this shift from one regime to another, depending on a state's preferences, is referred to as 'forum shopping' or 'regime shifting' (Betts 2010b: 14)[4].

Betts' four propositions

Based on these observations, Betts derives four propositions about states' responses to migratory pressures and the UNHCR's future as the major relief organisation at the centre of the refugee regime, which are detailed below.

1. By handling spontaneous arrival asylum through the travel regime over the refugee regime, states – particularly those in the Global North – limited the access to their territory without overtly violating international norms created to protect refugees (Betts 2010b: 16). As a result, migrants are often stranded in states of the Global South that they initially only wanted to pass through.

2. States of the Global South have responded to this regime shift of Northern States by reducing their own commitment to asylum towards third country nationals. This ultimately leads to even higher migration flows worldwide (Betts 2010b: 16).

3. Instead of contributing to refugee protection by granting asylum, States of the Global North increasingly engage in "burden-sharing." This means that they contribute to the protection of refugees in Southern States, for example, through financial contributions to IOs, such as the UNHCR or IOM. Betts assumes that Northern States only do so when refugee protection in Southern States coincides with their economic or security interests (Betts 2010b: 19 ff.).

4. States of the Global South and IOs are affected by Northern States' regime shifting. Regime shifting specifically impacts the UNHCR, which is at the core of the refugee regime complex. The organisation's authority and mandate are gradually being undermined because states increasingly address migration through the travel regime. The UNHCR can oppose this international trend by adopting three strategies: mandate expansion, issue-linkage and de-coupling (Betts 2010b: 29 ff.).

The EU's Approach to the 2015 Migrant Crisis

In this part of the paper, I describe how the EU reacted to the high influx of refugees in 2015 and examine to what extent Betts' propositions apply to Europe's response to the migrant crisis.

Regime Shifting Through the Securitization of Irregular Migration

When the numbers of asylum seekers peaked in the summer of 2015, reactions from the public, European politicians, and media outlets were mixed. The picture of the lifeless three-year-old Alan Kurdi, who drowned in the Aegean, for example, provoked a huge public outcry (Guiraudon 2017: 157). Humanitarian themes equally made up a big chunk of the Italian press coverage of the migration crisis (Berry et al. 2015: 8). Throughout 2016, however, after several terrorist attacks had hit major European cities, public and media discourse changed in tone and increasingly conflated migration with terrorism (Galantino 2020: 16). Both the human suffering on Europe's outer borders and growing public security concerns pressed the EU to swiftly respond to the high influx of migrants.

The European Commission adopted the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) shortly after the asylum requests in Europe peaked in the spring of 2015 (Carrera et al. 2015: 3). In the EAM, the EU identified six immediate policy actions aimed to manage the influx of migrants more effectively. Amongst other things, the EU proposed a temporary and emergency-driven relocation mechanism for asylum-seekers within the EU, increasing emergency funding to frontline EU Member States, and a relocation mechanism for 20,000 refugees from outside the EU (Carrera et al. 2015: 4). In addition, the EAM put an emphasis on protecting EU external borders by establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy Operation in the Mediterranean to dismantle traffickers' networks, strengthening Europol's joint maritime information operation in the Mediterranean, and tripling the EU External Border Agency's (FRONTEX) capabilities and budget (Carrera et al. 2015: 4). In October 2015, EU leaders further agreed to develop an integrated border management system that would go beyond the original mandate of FRONTEX to properly secure EU borders (European Council 2018). The Permanent Representative Committee granted this extended FRONTEX mandate nine months later and justified its decision by claiming that this would empower the border agency to patrol EU borders more effectively (European Council 2016).

In parallel to securing its external borders, the EU negotiated an agreement with Turkey to prevent irregular migrants from reaching European territory via the Eastern Mediterranean Route in March 2016. By signing the deal, Turkey effectively assured to close its frontiers to keep migrants from entering the EU. It also agreed to take back every person, including asylum-seekers, arriving irregularly to the Greek islands (Council of the EU 2016). In return, the EU accepted to resettle one Syrian refugee from Turkey for each irregular migrant the country took back (Guiraudon 2017: 158). The agreement is thus effectively a one-for-one swap and came at a high cost for the EU. In addition to resettling one Syrian for every irregular migrant Turkey takes back, the EU promised an initial €3 billion to help Turkey cope with the high numbers of Syrian refugees residing on its territory (Carrera et al. 2015: 8). It further guaranteed Ankara an upgrade of the EU-Turkey Customs Union as well as an accelerated visa liberation and EU accession process (Collet and Le Coz 2018: 19-20). Since coming into effect, the Turkey deal has been heavily criticized: Human rights activists and lawyers claim that the EU bypasses the norm of non-refoulement, which prohibits states from returning refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they have reason to fear persecution, by declaring Turkey a safe third country (see: Amnesty International 2016; UNHCR 1977). They further denounce the EU for not distinguishing between persons that might have a right to asylum and those who do not by returning every irregular migrant to Turkey (see: Poon 2016; Toygür and Benvenuti 2017).

By considerably securitizing its outer borders to manage the high influx of refugees in 2015, the EU clearly shifted from addressing the issue of spontaneous arrival asylum through the refugee regime to handling it through the travel regime. This regime shift enabled the EU to prevent potential asylum seekers from claiming territorial asylum in Europe. Since the EU's decision to send all irregular migrants back to Turkey under the refugee deal does not allow for a distinction between individuals who have a right to asylum and those who do not, European states make it harder for asylum seekers to find refuge in Europe. Therefore, EU Member States have been able to reduce their commitment to international obligations to protect asylum seekers. Instead of accepting all migrants who are eligible to asylum, from 2016 onwards the EU only accepts refugees who have reached Europe legally or under the "one-in, one-out rule" specified under the Turkey deal. This behaviour fits Betts' first proposition according to which states use the travel regime to restrict access to their territory to prevent migrants from applying for territorial asylum.

Southern States Reducing Their Readmission Commitments

During the 2015 refugee crisis, States from the Global South reacted to the regime shifting of European states, but in a different way than anticipated by Betts. Instead of reducing their own asylum commitments, in some cases Southern States have instead increasingly obstructed deportations of their own nationals by not cooperating with the responsible administrative bodies in European host countries (see: Gathmann and Weiland 2017; Bewarder et al. 2016). Prominent cases of unsuccessful deportations, such as that of Anis Amri, put pressure on the EU to improve readmission processes in the countries of origin (Smale et al. 2016). Southern States, however, only slowly started to cooperate more effectively with the EU on this issue. Improved readmission processes in countries of departure in the Global South were eventually the result of lengthy diplomatic negotiations and an EU tactic to offer these countries monetary incentives to combat so-called "root causes"[5] of migration.

So, while Betts rightly assumed that Southern States would react to the regime shifting of Northern States, in the case of the EU migrant crisis they did not respond in the way he expected. Instead of reducing their own commitment to asylum, states of the Global South curtailed their readmission commitments. They obstructed readmissions in some cases because the regime shifting of the EU redistributes the costs and responsibilities at their expense as countries of departure in the Global South have to shelter growing numbers of refugees who are stuck on their territory because popular migration routes to Europe have been closed off by the EU.

Refugee Protection Through Burden-Sharing?

The EU's securitization of its outer borders in the wake of the migrant crisis was coupled with a strategy of externalizing migration policies, which has already been part of the EU's response to ever-growing migration movements long before the migrant crisis of 2015 took place (see: Betts and Milner 2006; Triandafyllidou 2014).

Sticking to this strategy amidst the 2015 crisis, the EU intensified efforts to stop migration movements before they could reach Europe by pledging money to both countries of departure and transit states in the Global South. As early as May 2015, the Commission combined the EAM with diplomatic efforts by then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini to try and move Turkey, Western Balkan countries, and African countries and organisations towards closer cooperation to manage refugee flows and address the causes underlying irregular migration (European Commission 2015). Six months later, EU leaders met with their counterparts from Africa to discuss migration issues at the Valetta Summit on Migration (European Council 2018). During this meeting, both sides addressed the causes of irregular migration and agreed to improve cooperation on return, readmission, and reintegration. In the following months, the EU did not only promise considerable financial support to Turkey so it could provide effective protection to the three million Syrian refugees residing in the country, the Commission also agreed to fund migration-related projects in North Africa on several occasions. The 2017 Malta Declaration, for instance, determined that €200 million of the

EU Trust Fund should be invested in migration-related projects in Libya (European Council 2017b; Rossi 2019: 375). One of the Declaration's priorities was to "ensure adequate reception capacities and conditions in Libya for migrants, together with the UNHCR and the IOM" as well as "supporting the IOM in significantly stepping up assisted voluntary returns" (European Council 2017a). A meeting between the African Union and the EU in November 2017 led to a mutual promise to fight the "root causes" of irregular migration. During the meeting, the EU agreed to invest €44 million in projects that young Africans should benefit from (European Council 2017). Though the declared aim of the significant EU investments into African States and Turkey was to address the underlying causes of migration towards Europe, a considerable amount of the money was diverted to security-related projects. In Libya, for example, EU money was also used to reinforce maritime surveillance and anti-smuggling capabilities of the local coast guard (Rossi 2019: 375; SOS Mediterranee 2020). EU investments into migration-related projects in Africa were thus closely linked to the Commission's emphasis on border security matters. According to Betts' third proposition this behaviour is typical for Northern States that only begin to engage in refugee protection in Southern States when migratory movements from the region might potentially threaten national security.

The Role of the UNHCR in the Migrant Crisis

For the UNHCR, the EU's approach to the migrant crisis and especially the EU-Turkey deal posed a major dilemma. As the principal institution of the refugee regime, its main task is to oversee states' implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and to provide vital assistance to refugees in need (Betts 2009: 71; UNHCR N/S). This "supervisory responsibility" for a normative treaty formally links the UNHCR to the refugee regime (Betts 2010b: 33). Due to its supervisory function, the organisation itself acquired a normative character, which eventually gave it moral authority over refugee-related matters. While this moral authority often helps the UNHCR to persuade states that are reluctant to host refugees to comply with international obligations, it also prohibits it from taking part in activities that are morally, ethically, or legally questionable.

Betts recognizes that such activities and regime shifting from the refugee to the travel regime can lead to a net reduction in cooperation on migration between Northern and Southern States and possibly even to a weakening of international refugee protection norms (Betts 2010b: 25). Yet, he does not assume that these developments might also erode the UNHCR's moral standing within the refugee regime and limit its scope for action. Instead, he expects that the UNHCR can and will remain relevant to states by expanding its mandate and activities to regimes that border the refugee regime. The EU migrant crisis and the EU-Turkey deal, however, show that in some cases the UNHCR cannot make use of these "survival" strategies as this would lead to a public loss of face for the organisation.

Fearing exactly such a damage to its reputation, the UNHCR was quick to question the refugee deal's legality and feasibility in the wake of the 2015 migrant crisis. Even before the deal was signed in the spring of 2016, the UNHCR expressed concerns as to how its implementation would affect the protection of refugees. A week before the summit in Brussels, where the EU-Turkey deal was to be negotiated, the organisation issued a statement in which it distanced itself from the deal's outline (Spindler and Clayton 2016). When the deal was agreed on in March 2016, the UNHCR's immediate reaction was to publish another public statement, in which it denounced the deal for breaching international and European law by collectively expelling migrants from Greece (Deutsche Welle N/S). Due to this alleged breach, the UNHCR announced to redefine its role in the refugee crisis, especially on the Greek islands (UNHCR 2016a). In another statement from March 2016, the organisation clarified that it was neither part of the deal, nor assisting with or involved in returns or detentions of refugees (UNHCR 2016b). Its more cautious appraisal of the EU-Turkey deal is in line with the role the pertinent literature on EU external governance ascribes to the UNHCR. In this literature strand, it is viewed as an institutional counterweight to and watchdog of EU migration policies (see: Lavenex 2016). Yet, despite its role as a monitor of EU migration policies and its criticism of the Turkey deal, the UNHCR reaffirmed its commitment to assist Greek authorities in the development of an adequate reception capacity (UNHCR 2016b). This is unsurprising since the UNHCR's complete withdrawal from the migrant crisis would likely mean that the organisation becomes obsolete to the EU.

While the UNHCR criticized the Turkey deal for its breach of legal and humanitarian norms, the IOM was quick to praise its "huge impact" on reducing the number of refugees arriving in Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean Route (IOM 2018). Contrary to the UNHCR, it did not reduce its involvement in the deal, but actively participated in its implementation (Hassan and Geiger 2016). As early as May 2016, the IOM began with the resettlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey to the EU (IOM 2016). Since then, the IOM has gradually expanded its role in the migrant crisis and also started to help Turkey supply refugees residing on its territory with vital assistance (see: IOM 2017; IOM N/S). While the logistical aspects of refugee relief, such as resettlement, have historically always been part of the IOM's core tasks, its relief assistance in Turkey has traditionally been a core responsibility of the UNHCR. The organisation's greater involvement in and more positive assessment of the Turkey deal are consistent with its portrayal as a subcontractor and transfer agent of EU principles in the literature (Lavenex 2016).

Contrary to the IOM, which has increased its cooperation and involvement in European migration-management processes without questioning their moral and ethical implications, the UNCHR contests the Commission's proposed security measures in the Mediterranean (Rossi 2019: 377-378). For the agency, an involvement in these measures compromises its capacity to continue to function as a counterweight to the EU's focus on border protection (ibid.). This demonstrates that the UNHCR is not always able to redefine its role after a regime shift by states has occurred, especially in situations where its own reputation as a normative organisation is at stake.

Conclusion

Two of four of Betts's propositions apply to the EU's handling of the high influx of refugees in 2015: the first and third proposition. His first proposition, according to which Northern States limit refugees' access to their territory through regime shifting, holds in the case of the EU's migrant policies. By signing the Turkey deal and further securing its borders amidst a high influx of refugees arriving in Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean Route in 2015 and 2016, the EU has made it nearly impossible for refugees to claim asylum on European territory. Betts' third proposition has also proven to be applicable to the EU case study. It has shown that the EU itself is not strengthening refugee protection through providing asylum, but instead allocates important funds to regions which host many refugees and migrants from third countries. According to the EU, these investments are first and foremost supposed to improve the local socio-economic situation so that people do not migrate. In fact, however, they are also used to finance security-related projects. This behaviour corresponds with Betts' assumption that Northern States only alleviate the situation of migrants and refugees in the Global South when it suits their economic or security interests.

The proposition that Southern States react to Northern States' waning will to host and assist refugees by reducing their own commitment to grant asylum only partly applies to the 2015 refugee crisis. Though Betts is right to assume that Southern States do react to the regime shifting of Northern States, in case of the EU migrant crisis they did not reduce their own commitment to asylum. Instead they obstructed deportations of citizens that have not been granted refugee status in Northern States. Turkey's decision to open up its borders in early 2020, however, might indicate an important turn with regard to Southern States' commitment to asylum towards third country nationals: When President Erdogan opened the borders to Greece he not only used refugees as political leverage to press the EU to take side with Turkey to end a standoff with Russia in Syria, he also used the opportunity to signal his country's declining will and capacity to accommodate millions of refugees.

Only Betts fourth claim does not hold for the 2015 migrant crisis. The case study of the EU migrant crisis showed that the UNHCR is not always able to redefine its role when states shift from the refugee to the travel regime. Though it might sometimes be possible for the UNHCR to employ certain "survival" strategies to oppose regime shifting, the organisation was unable to make use of any of these during the migrant crisis of 2015. A greater involvement of the UNHCR in EU migration policies, which are partly in conflict with international and EU law, could damage its international reputation as a moral authority over refugee-related issues.

Overall, the analytical concept of regime complexity depicts a useful approach to analyse and explain the EU's response to the 2015 refugee crisis. Yet, in the case of the EU study, the approach is analytically limited as it does not allow to consider the complex intergovernmentalism which is characteristic of the EU. It is, however, precisely this interplay between national and supranational interests which guides and constrains the Commission's scope for action. Empirically, this study only provides insight into a very brief period. It would thus benefit from an in-depth study of how the EU managed migratory flows before and after the refugee crisis of 2015. Future research should moreover examine whether Betts' propositions also apply to other world regions. For example, it would be interesting to investigate whether Betts' propositions apply to North America's response to growing migratory flows from South America. In addition, further studies should shed light on the question of whether states from the Global South do indeed reduce their commitment to asylum. A case study of Jordan's and Libya's response to high refugee influxes might be particularly telling in this context. Finally, it might be worth examining whether only states of the Global North have engaged in regime shifting amidst refugee crises or whether developing states are also limiting access to their territory for refugees.

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Footnotes:

[1] The movement of migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, who for different reasons move from the country of their arrival to another country to seek protection or permanent resettlement elsewhere (European Commission N/S-a).

[2] Even though in the case of the 9/11 attacks 17 of the 19 hijackers entered the US on a tourist visa (Koslowski 2009: 21).

[3] I use the term "securitization" according to Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde who define it as "the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat to have substantial political effects (...) to break free of procedures or rules s/he would otherwise be bound by (...)" (Buzan et al. 1998: 25).

[4] Scholars do not always clearly differentiate between these two phenomena. To avoid conceptual ambiguity in this paper, I make use of Alter and Meunier's (2009) distinction between forum shopping and regime shifting. According to the two authors, forum shopping is a short term strategy, whereas regime shifting aims to "reshape the global structures of rules" and is thus a long term strategy (Alter and Meunier 2009: 16).

[5] The idea of managing migration through addressing "root causes" is controversial. It stems from the assumption that migration can be prevented by alleviating poverty and creating economic incentives. Researchers, however, have shown that socio-economic development in poor countries tends to increase rather than decrease migration (see: Carling and Talleraas 2016; Clemens 2014). Critics of the notion of "root causes" argue that the international community should refrain from using the term since it does not address migration because of humanitarian concerns but because suffering people might become mobile (Carling 2017: 2).

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02

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03

Forensic Architecture:
Digital Citizen Intelligence in the Age of Urban Warfare

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Abstract

Forensic Architecture is an emergent investigatory practice and the name of a multidisciplinary research collective founded in 2010. They produce architectural evidence around human right violations and environmental destruction perpetrated by states and public actors. By integrating human rights research within architectural frameworks and technological innovation, they have developed a unique set of methods. Extending the discipline of open source intelligence, they empower victims to become agents of investigation. How effective is this approach for investigating contemporary political and environmental conflicts, and addressing state violence? Based on all investigations published by Forensic Architecture until March 2019, this article aims to evaluate the judicial and communicative impact of their work. It demonstrates that their effectiveness in courts is comparably low, and argues that their main quality is instead symbolic: with their investigations, they expose disinformation strategies, shape narratives around current conflicts and contribute significantly to a critical public discourse

Keywords: Human rights investigation; open source intelligence; spatial evidence; forensics; research architecture

Introduction

In the 21st century, most conflicts unfold in cities (Bernard 2016), and most victims die in buildings (Weizman 2017: 57). The built environment therefore holds traces of violence, and can be a valuable clue for those who wish to elucidate them. Leading the way in this discipline is the research collective Forensic Architecture. It was founded by the architect Eyal Weizman in 2010 and involves a multidisciplinary team of architects, software developers, filmmakers, journalists, artists, scientists and lawyers. Based at Goldsmiths, University of London, they investigate human right violations and environmental destruction undertaken by states and corporations, and produce evidence for civil-society groups, prosecutors and media organisations (Weizman 2017: 64). What defines their approach is their study of buildings as "sensors" (Weizman 2017: 52). To them, the built environment is a dynamic fabric that records social and political phenomena, and it does so especially clearly in the case of violence.

Beyond this "hyperesthesia" of buildings to the eruptive violence of warfare (Weizman 2017: 52), buildings can also embody a subtler form of violence: the creeping violence of architecture, when it is used to solidify oppression. This means there is a necessity to establish causality beyond the direct, physical determinants of architectural defects, and to look for their origins in politics, society or economy.

In turns, architecture can therefore be the backdrop against which violence occurs, the instrument of violence, and for Forensic Architecture, the mode of research and presentation. At the same time, urban areas are media-saturated places. The widespread availability of smartphones and social media platforms means that acts of violence rarely go unrecorded. Thus, while communication technologies may not have the powerful anti-repressive potential they were once bestowed with (Morozov 2011), they do play a significant role in human rights research. Evidence is now more accessible than ever, as is the forming of collaborative networks. This leads to a fundamental change in power dynamics: victims of violence are evolving from being objects, to agents of investigation. This type of user-generated content, and publicly available data in general, are the second pillar of Forensic Architecture's research.

Situated at the intersection of open source intelligence, architecture, technology and design, Forensic Architecture's approach opens up new perspectives for human rights advocacy. How effective is this method for investigating contemporary political and environmental conflicts and addressing state violence? This article formulates the hypothesis that due to the power dynamics in which it operates, Forensic Architecture's overall effectiveness remains limited when looking at legal accountability and law enforcement. Much more pertinent is its symbolic potential, both through the intervention in public discourse and in the long-term shaping of the narratives around contemporary conflicts. This will be demonstrated by first providing context on human rights investigation, then introducing the theoretical framework of Forensic Architecture's research. By analysing the spaces in which their evidence is presented, and providing an account of its reception, it will then evaluate the judicial and communicative impact of their work. Conclusions are drawn based on the empirical support of all investigations published by Forensic Architecture until March 2019.

Recent developments in human rights investigation

From the "era of the witness" to the "forensic turn"

In the first stage of post-World War II investigation, trials were conducted mainly on the basis of official or seized war documents (Bois et al. 2016: 121; Keenan and Weizman 2012), since Holocaust survivors were considered to be too traumatized to issue rational accounts. It is only with the 1961 Eichmann trial that survivor testimonies became central to the elucidation of human rights violations - a development coined "the era of the witness" by Wieviorka (2006). Especially during the Cold War when human rights groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Médecins Sans Frontières emerged, conflicts were told through human stories that went beyond the simple account of facts. This allowed to bypass the ongoing clash of antithetical ideologies and foster empathy, but it also depoliticized suffering (Weizman 2017: 81).

From the 1980s onwards, Weizman observes a "forensic turn": a methodological shift towards material evidence and the natural sciences, translating into an increased attention to the body, and medical records (Weizman 2017: 82; see also Weizman 2014: 21-24). Why? Because the witnesses of the worst atrocities are those who are dead (Levi 1988: 83). Starting in the 1980s, grave exhumations became a way to expose mass killings and identify missing persons. Multidisciplinary teams of archaeologists, anthropologists and pathologists contributed to the increasing use of osteological findings as legal evidence (Weizman 2017: 79).

Beyond bones and human remains, other objects were mobilised as evidence not as a positivistic alternative to human testimony, but rather a complement, equally subject to indeterminacy.

Forensic Architecture draws on all three paradigms and looks at "intersections of material and media analysis with new forms of testimony" (Bois et al. 2016: 121) with a focus on spatial analysis. They produce evidence from a juxtaposition of matter, buildings, ruins, cartographic and photographic material as well as user-generated content.

Open source intelligence

The work of Forensic Architecture also builds on the discipline of open source investigation. While its origins are disputed – intelligence has always drawn on publicly available information – the widespread availability of digital data has certainly led to its expansion. Wirtz and Rosenwasser (2010: 736) describe open source intelligence as "insight gleaned from publicly available information that anyone can access by overt, non-clandestine or non-secret means to satisfy an intelligence requirement". Eldridge et al. (2018: 393) specify this definition by adding that typically, "this information is not self-generated by the actor engaged in collection".

While in the past, practitioners were sometimes struggling to collect as many witness accounts as possible, testimonies are now available immediately and in large quantities through digital media. The challenge now lies in their overabundance (Weizman 2017: 115; Bois et al. 2016: 18). As many as seven thousand pieces of media can be generated from the events of a single day, as seen in the investigation of "The Bombing of Rafah"[1] (Weizman, 2017: 165-212). Next to Forensic Architecture, the availability of user-generated content as a source of evidence has given birth to a wide array of investigatory practices: crisis mapping (Ushahidi[2]), violence documentation (Syrian Archive[3]), participatory fact-finding (Map Kibera[4]), circumvention of censorship (Tor Project[5]). Through what is called "citizen intelligence", victims of violence are evolving from being objects to agents of investigation, challenging state impunity[6].

However, there are a few potential weaknesses that must be noted. Aronson (2016: 445-447) has pointed out two fundamental issues: the potential non-representativeness of data (i.e. the difficulty to determine the place, extent and frequency of the incidents documented online) as well as the methodological collection of the data which does not necessarily meet scientific criteria[7]. Finally, falsification of digital media and "deepfakes" generated by artificial intelligence remind us that untruthfulness is the biggest potential weakness of social media-based evidence. Verifying the legitimacy of digital content is thus a crucial step of which the importance cannot be stressed enough.

Forensic Architecture's research principles

Truth as a common resource

As a research organisation that assembles evidence of state crimes for civil society groups, Forensic Architecture seek to "reverse the forensic gaze" (Weizman 2017: 9). This repurposing of forensic methods was first titled "counter-forensics" by Sekula (1993) and is described by Weizman as such: "While forensics is a state tool, counter-forensics, as we practice it, is a civil practice that aims to interrogate the built environment to uncover political violence undertaken by states." (Weizman 2017: 64). It is therefore a critical, "counter-hegemonic" practice (Weizman 2014: 11) that challenges truth monopolies.

By its very nature of civil society organization, Forensic Architecture does not have access to the same quality and quantity of technologies and information as their object of investigation. Rather, they rely on publicly available information, operating at the "threshold of detectability" (Forensic Architecture 2014: 752). Counter-forensic evidence is not "hard" and indisputable truth; it may hide behind a shadow, an indistinctive sound, a blur. This threshold is inseparable from the materiality of the recording media, and it is largely conditioned by state powers, who may for example regulate the resolution of satellite imagery. Because of these material ambiguities, Weizman sees a necessity for their work to be political, "driven by a desire to change the way things are" (Weizman 2014: 30). This "sensitivity to the materiality of politics", to the destruction and pain it can inflict, goes along with "a heightened aesthetic state of material sensitivity, tuned to weak signals" (Weizman 2014: 30).

Furthering their intent to put forensics "in the hands of the people" (Weizman, quoted in Zeiba 2020), they generally share their tools openly. Examples are the free software "PATTRN", which they created in 2014 to enable first-hand witnesses and victims to produce basic reporting of acts of violation (Bernard and Policinski 2016: 35), or "Timemap", which offers an adjustable timeline tool. The latter comes with the extension "Datasheet Server", a data-mining tool.

Forensic Architecture also trains fellow investigators or citizens. At the Centre for Research Architecture at Goldsmiths, University of London, they offer workshops, conferences and seminars. Furthermore, they publish extensive videos of nearly all their investigations, describing their methods step-by-step for others to learn from their procedure, as can be seen in the 37-minutes long video reporting on the murder of Pavlos Fyssas in Greece in 2013[8]. Investigations like "Destruction and Return in al-Araqib"[9] and "The Destruction of Yazidi Cultural Heritage"[10] have also seen them training activists on the ground, working hand in hand with the people affected by violence and thus making the production of evidence a "collective social practice" (Weizman, quoted in Zeiba 2020). The results are then published on Forensic Architecture's various media channels, creating public repositories of state-led violence. These help citizens understand complex events, aiming to establish truth as a common resource (Tate Britain, 2018).

Architecture and innovation

Another element central to Forensic Architecture's practice is their multidimensional approach to architecture. Over the course of the 20th century, warfare moved from the trenches to the urban environment. Now, most conflicts unfold in cities, home to more than half of the world's population. A contemporary example is Raqqa, one of the many battlegrounds of Syria's civil war: an estimated 70 percent of the city had been destroyed by April 2019 (Blue 2019). The domestic and civilian space have become targets of armed conflicts, dissolving the barrier between citizens and combatants (Kazan 2014: 161). Besides this immediate violence of warfare, Forensic Architecture also looks into the slow, more subtle violence of architecture: "crimes committed on drawing boards and by buildings and infrastructure – a violence that is incremental, slow, and ever-present" (Weizman 2017: 134). This echoes the research Weizman has done in his earlier work[11].

Architecture can also be a method of research, which truly defines Forensic Architecture's approach to human rights investigation. Their method portfolio is broad and involves techniques such as digital spatial modelling, physical reconstructions, effects-based analysis and situated testimonies. By integrating the human figure into architectural frameworks, they "create a synthesis between testimony and evidence" (Weizman 2017: 58), allowing to bypass the opposition between the emphatic, emotion-loaded "era of the witness" and the scientific gaze of the forensic investigator. The team constantly develops new tools and methods, which is related to its funding by the European Research Council, a grant that aims to benefit innovation and accounts for Forensic Architecture's largest financial backing (Ngo 2017). Weizman therefore calls his agency "a lab for the development of new evidentiary techniques. [...] The minute that our techniques and technology become more mainstream, we need to move on" (quoted in Holmey 2020).

Architecture is also employed as a mode of presentation. In order to portray complex events captured from multiple perspectives at different times, Forensic Architecture developed the "architectural image complex". It is a way of articulating evidence into a digital spatial environment (Weizman 2017: 100). This 3D representation can be navigated spatially and through a timescale. It allows to recognise dynamic relations and simultaneities between disparate, chaotic pieces of evidence. It also makes the conclusions of the investigations easier to follow (Bois et al. 2016: 125). This method of composition thus surpasses both the archive, the montage and

the linear comparison of before-and-after representations, which do not allow interactive navigation (Weizman 2017: 100).

Reception and overall potential

Judicial limits

Open source and citizen investigation have recently grown in acceptance within legal processes. In 2017, the International Criminal Court issued the first arrest warrant to be based largely on evidence collected from social media (Irving 2017). Forensic Architecture has shown its work in national and international courts such as the Israel High Court[12] and the European Court of Human Rights[13], and collaborated with the United Nations[14]. It was successful in a few cases. A 2012 petition to the Israeli High Court against the construction of a wall in the area surrounding the Palestinian village of Battir[15], to which they had contributed a digital model, was successful (Forensic Architecture 2015). After their investigation on "Airstrikes on the al-Jinah Mosque"[16], a report by the United Nations' Commission of Inquiry on Syria concluded that US forces had violated international humanitarian law. In the "White Phosphorous"[17] case, the Israeli military declared it would no longer use these munitions in densely populated areas (Forensic Architecture 2012).

Nevertheless, the use of social media-based evidence in international criminal courts has remained limited (Hiatt 2016). Courtrooms have yet to adapt their tools and procedures to make sense of these investigations. As for Forensic Architecture, its evidence has often been rejected or ignored. Their investigations on "The Killing of Tahir Elçi"[18] and "Torture and Detention in Burundi"[19] have yet to receive a formal response, while their findings on "The Killing of Bassem Abu Rahma"[20], "Airstrikes on al-Hamidiah Hospital"[21], "Chemical Attacks in Douma"[22] have been categorically disputed by those they considered guilty. Accused individuals and organisations will refer to errors and omissions (such as in "The Ali Enterprises Factory Fire"[23]). In general, findings based on digital media, reconstructions or simulations have "almost always encountered objections" (Weizman, 2017: 75). As a result, a precise description of the methodology has become an integral part of each report in an effort to counter technical objections.

In other cases, their analysis may be inconclusive or fragile. In the case of "The Killing of Tahir Elçi"[24], it is a single testimony that reduces the investigative time frame and plays a critical role in developing the investigatory conclusions (Forensic Architecture 2019). This is a bold decision, considering that the temporal precision applied in this case is granular to the level of single seconds – a scale which might be imperceptible for human memory? Other times, the available material does not offer sufficient accuracy for drawing conclusions ("Nil'in case"[25]). Finally, their hypotheses may not prove to be true – as in "The Grenfell Tower Fire"[26], of which the investigation page, calling for video material from witnesses, has not been updated in over a year.

Furthermore, when investigating state violence, judicial forums may reach their limits. A forum never stands alone, but rather is embedded in institutional, legal, (geo-)political contexts:

> *Forensic activists must examine the politics of the forums in which evidence is presented. No forum is neutral. Each is a product of and situated within a specific political reality, and each operates according to different sets of protocols. Each forum differently frames evidence's condition of visibility - what can be said, shown, and heard. (Weizman 2017: 68-69)*

In undemocratic systems, jurisdiction of state-led crimes may not exist. Defending rights from within such legal and political frameworks can reveal itself ineffective at best, counter-productive at worst (Weizman 2017: 69). And the right forums may not yet exist at the moment where human right violations are taking place: some specific frameworks (such as the Rwanda court, or International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) are created in retrospect, making structural violence especially hard to address while it is still occurring. Another challenge in counter-forensics is that many conflicts are extraterritorial – meaning, they take place outside the effective reach of state jurisdiction. When the judicial infrastructure and sovereignty is disintegrated or unclear, it is difficult to point out and adjudge human right violations (Weizman 2017: 69). Finally, legal processes can be instrumentalised and supplant sustainable political action[27]. This shows that law-oriented handlings of human rights violations are not enough; they must be part of larger political and social transformations: "the legal cases are only as good as the political processes of which they are part", (Weizman 2017: 69).

Overall, the judicial effectiveness of Forensic Architecture is comparably low. Many of the cases they have been working on are part of complex, ongoing multinational conflicts. With thousands having died in the Syrian conflict, the outlay and time scale of their work – spending weeks meticulously examining a single air strike – may seem disproportionate, even futile. At this level of efficiency, and within the power dynamics of counter-forensics, it is unrealistic to believe the investigations of Forensic Architecture currently play a substantial role in adjudication. Nevertheless, their development of new tools and methods is a benefit for the general public independently of that. And since law is a "living construct" (Cole 2015), professionals and experts are confident that legal frameworks will progressively open up to the potentials of citizen- and technology-led investigations (Cole 2015).

Symbolic power

From a legal standpoint, the effectiveness of Forensic Architecture and their methods is therefore disputable. However, their communicative strength and media presence suggests that there is another, more adequate criterion by which to judge their relevance as it relates to contemporary conflicts. In general, forensic work evolves around three sites of operation: the field where the object of investigation is located, the laboratory where the material is processed into evidence, and the forum[28] where the evidence is presented (Weizman 2017: 66). For Forensic Architecture, this forum can be an institution of justice such as a court, but also spaces of discourse and education such as museums, media, citizens' tribunals, conferences or scientific literature. By collaborating with, and appearing in influential platforms outside of courts, they shape the narratives built around current conflicts, raise public awareness and contribute significantly to the international discourse.

Forensic Architecture have exhibited their work at some of the most prestigious museums and cultural events: documenta14 in Germany[29], Biennale de Venezia 2016 in Italy[30], the UK Institute of Contemporary Arts in 2018[31] and more, often as an opportunity to interrogate architecture's relationship with media and to situate their work within a broader political and cultural context. In 2018, Forensic Architecture was shortlisted for the Turner Prize, one of the UK's most important art prizes (Searle, 2018).

Besides cultural venues, Forensic Architecture has a strong media presence and appears regularly in outlets across the globe, such as The Guardian, ARTE, Al Jazeera, The Telegraph India or The Times of Israel. They cooperate directly with certain media platforms or human rights organisations to conduct their investigations, such as the New York Times ("Chemical Attacks in Douma"[32]), Watch the Mediterranean Sea ("Death by Rescue"[33]) or Amnesty International ("Torture and Detention in Caroon"[34]). In three exemplary cases, they presented their findings in civic forums such as citizens' tribunals or truth commissions ("Living Death Camp"[35], "Destruction and Return in al-Araqib"[36], and "The Murder of Halit Yozgat"). Similarly, Eyal Weizman and his team are frequent speakers at conferences and lectures including at re:publica, the World Economic Forum or the Architectural Association. They have also authored extensive literature presenting their theoretical framework and methodology. Besides the Turner Prize, they have been nominated for and won several awards across disciplines ranging from design, journalism, to technology. As one of the most vocal groups in citizen intelligence, they contribute actively to a critical public discourse. Even if their investigation volume is small, they are effectively monitoring state violence and holding perpetrators to account in the communicative realm, if not in the judicial. Their work has often sparked debates, amplifying the resonance of singular incidents, such as with their investigations "Killing in Umm al-Hiran[37]" or "The Murder of Halit Yozgat" , both followed by interventions from state officials and non-governmental organisations. Their work can also be evaluated within broader phenomena around truth and disinformation. Weizman sees the so-called "post-truth" denial of facts and of their verification as a new form of propaganda:

> *It does not aim to persuade or tell you anything, nor does it seek to promote the assumed merits of one system over the other [...] but rather to blur perception so that nobody knows what is real anymore. [...] In the face of governments' increasing difficulties in cutting data out of circulation and in suppressing political discourse, it adds rather than subtracts, augmenting the level of noise in a deliberate maneuver to divert attention. (Weizman, 2019)*

This is a form of propaganda that does not seek to produce its own facts but deconstructs the very notion of truth as a criterion to which rhetoric would be subordinated. The work of Forensic Architecture therefore seems especially valuable in exposing these strategies, and filling the void with systematic, transparent evidence. With their methods of remote investigation, they can do so even when ground access to conflict zones is restrained. They value their work as an act of resistance, separately of its success in courts[38].

Finally, beyond truth for truth's sake, investigating obscured cases and amplifying the voices of witnesses who may have risked their lives recording an incident is also a way of paying respect: "It felt odd to investigate the killing of two teenagers when more than five hundred Palestinian children were being killed, but it was our way to respect every young life lost", says Weizman (2017: 162).

Criticism

While being largely acclaimed for their work, Forensic Architecture have been occasionally questioned for their motives, qualifications and unconventional methods. The fact that many team members are "motivated by political commitments" (Weizman 2017: 74) makes them particularly vulnerable to ad-hominem attacks. The cases they select align with the political claims they aim to defend. In some cases, this political positioning is used to disqualify their research. It is a strategy that Weizman (2019) refers to as the "contaminating factor": critics will identify an association with "a person, an organization, a political affiliation, a video, or even a funder" that is disputed in some way, and thus claim that "the entire network and the information it produces is tainted and meaningless" (Weizman 2019).

Furthermore, while the cultural forums where Forensic Architecture present their work offer freedom and accessibility, their role in forensics is ambivalent. Critiques call out the fact that distressing material should not be used as voyeuristic entertainment; and that criminal evidence runs the risk of being commo-

dified by a competitive art economy (Harper 2018). This may weaken their credibility as human rights investigators. Unlike courtrooms, art shows do not select based on the criterium of truthfulness; rather, they welcome subjectivity and aesthetics. Holger Bellino of the German Christian Democratic Party (CDU) considered their investigation of "The Murder of Halit Yozgat"[39] as an artistic project, rather than serious evidence[40]. Similarly, after their report on "The Use of White Phosphorus in Urban Environments"[41], they were met with the scepticism that architects do not possess the "relevant expertise in relation to conflict analysis" (Weizman 2017: 75).

The distrust against their use of "special effects", of "trickery", demonstrates, once again, conflicting opinions around the concept of truth. Does it exist independently, waiting to be found, or does it need to be produced and staged (Weizman 2017: 74)? Mégret (2016) argues that facts are not absolute, rather, they are tied to the pre-existence of constructed notions and labels. What we consider facts is based on whether they fulfil the criteria arbitrarily constructed around them:

[Facts] are better seen as a category of understanding rather than a thing in itself. [...] This is not to say that facts cannot describe something that happened or something that is but simply that "facts" are not the same thing as the things they refer to. They are necessarily construction of the mind based on certain detectable clues. (Mégret 2016: 35)

In empirical research, truth is not immediate; it is tied to a certain range of probability. This is especially the case in forensics, where objects are made to speak through what Weizman calls "forensic speech": a relation between the object, the expert, and the forum (Weizman 2017: 67). The truth of the object is therefore mediated through the speech of a human being. As a result, the "subjective probability" – the credibility of the speaker – is closely tied to the "objective probability" – the authenticity of the object (Keenan and Weizman 2012: 23). As noted in a review of their exhibition "Counter Investigations" at London's Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA), Forensic Architecture take great care to "produce their own [...] aesthetics of objectivity, which, ironically, has the goal of persuading us of its objectivity." (Charlesworth 2018).

Conclusion

In Forensic Architecture, architecture is extended into both a critical practice and an operative device. It is alternately the object of investigation, the method of research and the mode of presentation. Considering that modern warfare often takes place in urban spaces, this approach appears to be an indispensable addition to human rights investigation. In the first place, architecture functions as a sensor through which materiality is analysed to reveal human right violations as they relate to space, or more broadly, the (geo-)political, social and military forces shaping the world today. As Weizman observes, the organisation of space is a crucial mechanism of power (quoted in Kastner 2009). In its operative meaning, architecture is synonymous with spatial analysis. Like "archaeologists of the present" (Forensic Architecture 2014: 743), they analyse deliberate transformations of the natural and built environment. This reflects a recent methodological shift in judication towards materiality and forensic methods of research. Finally, architecture is a way to organize and synthesize multiple forms and pieces of evidence. This evidence is then presented in a multitude of forums: courts, cultural spaces, media outlets, investigation reports, online platforms. Each forum is defined by different possibilities as to what can be shown and achieved.

Forensic Architecture's mode of research is both highly innovative and adaptable to multiple scales and timeframes of violence – from the human body to the city, from the split second to several years. By involving citizens and victims, they make evidence gathering a collective practice. But how effective is it? Characterized by meticulous procedures, comparatively long investigative timespans, and a judicial validity that constantly needs to be re-negotiated, their ability to produce tangible results remains questionable. However, their evidence has been successfully admitted in a few cases, creating precedents which may lead to a wider acceptance in the future. By sharing their tools and techniques freely, they also extend the scope of what these can achieve. On the other hand, the above analysis of how their work is received outside courts shows very productive interventions in the realms of public discourse and knowledge production. With their meticulous analysis, Forensic Architecture is able to expose lies and to offer a nuanced view where confusion has been deliberately manufactured. As a highly communicative organisation, it amplifies unheard voices and directly confronts obfuscation strategies, and thus significantly shapes narratives around some contemporary conflicts. In doing so, they raise important questions around modern-day propaganda, political implications of architecture and accountability for state violence. Where social media has often been denounced for spreading disinformation, they seize its constructive potential and politicize these platforms as media of resistance, ultimately aiming for truth as a common resource.

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Footnotes:

[1] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-bombing-of-rafah

[2] The platform “Ushahidi” was initially developed in Kenya in 2008 in the context of post-election violence and has now been used internationally as a crowdsourcing device in a wide number of cases: https://www.ushahidi.com/

[3] “Syrian Archive” collects and verifies evidence on human rights violations in the Syrian conflict: https://syrianarchive.org/

[4] “Map Kibera” was created in 2009 as the first information project and digital map of the Kibera slum of Nairobi, Kenya: https://mapkibera.org/

[5] “Tor Project” is an open-source software providing encrypted and uncensored access to the internet: https://www.torproject.org/

[6] This evolution has been examined extensively by Aronson, Ball, Land, Mégret and more in Alston and Knuckey (2016 (eds.)), as well as Piracés, Latonero and more in Land and Aronson (2018 (eds.)).

[7] The main argument is that data is not collected in a systematic way under controlled sampling conditions; rather, it is what he calls “convenience data”, used because it is available (P.446). Although the sample can be comparatively big, it does not exclude the risk of distortion through selection bias: for example, instances of abuses towards marginalized victims with limited access to media devices may go unreported (P.447).

[8] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-murder-of-pavlos-fyssas

[9] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/destruction-and-return-in-al-araqib

[10] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-destruction-of-yazidi-cultural-heritage

[11] In 2002, Weizman collaborated with the civil rights organisation B’Tselem to publish a report on human rights in the context of Israeli settlements in the West Bank: Land Grab. Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank. Architecture as a way to solidify oppression was later the topic of his publications Hollow Land. Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (2007) and The Least of All Possible Evils. A short history of humanitarian violence (2017).

[12] “The Killing of Bassem Abu Rahma”, investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-killing-of-bassem-abu-rahma

[13] “Sea Watch vs the Libyan Coastguard” (Forensic Oceanography), investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/seawatch-vs-the-libyan-coastguard

[14] “The Drone Strikes Platform” and associated investigations: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-drone-strikes-platform

[15] “Stopping the Wall in Battir”: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-wall-in-battir

[16] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/airstrikes-on-the-al-jinah-mosque

[17] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/white-phosphorus-in-urban-environments

[18] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-killing-of-tahir-elci

[19] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/torture-and-detention-in-burundi

[20] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-killing-of-bassem-abu-rahma

[21] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/airstrikes-on-al-hamidiah-hospital

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[22] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/chemical-attacks-in-douma

[23] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-ali-enterprises-factory-fire

[24] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-killing-of-tahir-elci

[25] This investigation does not have a webpage, but it is described in Forensic Architecture (2010).

[26] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-grenfell-tower-fire

[27] As in “The Killing of Nadeem Nawara and Mohammed Abu Daher” (investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-killing-of-nadeem-nawara-and-mohammed-abu-daher)

[28] Originally, forensis is Latin for “pertaining to the forum” – the place where people, objects and arguments were presented to a critical public from the realms of economy, politics, law and more. Now, its meaning has evolved and “forensics” mostly refers to the use of science in courts, cf. Weizman 2017.

[29] “The Murder of Halit Yozgat”, investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-murder-of-halit-yozgat

[30] „Death By Rescue: The lethal effects of non-assistance at sea“, investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/death-by-rescue-the-lethal-effects-of-non-assistance-at-sea

[31] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/chemical-attacks-in-douma

[32] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/death-by-rescue-the-lethal-effects-of-non-assistance-at-sea

[33] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/death-by-rescue-the-lethal-effects-of-non-assistance-at-sea

[34] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/torture-and-detention-in-cameroon

[35] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/living-death-camp-staro-sajmiste

[36] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/destruction-and-return-in-al-araqib

[37] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/killing-in-umm-al-hiran

[38] “This is also a form of resistance. When there is an effort to erase those violent events, just the effort to record, to clarify and to debunk the official line, it‘s an act of resistance towards that erasure.” (Christina Varvia, deputy director of Forensic Architecture, quoted in Ravenscroft 2019)

[39] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-murder-of-halit-yozgat

[40] Original quote: “documenta-Beitrag ist kein seriöses Beweismittel, sondern ein Kunstprojekt” (Bellino 2017).

[41] Investigation page: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/white-phosphorus-in-urban-environments

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04

Between cult and culture:
‘Violence’ in Caracas

Words by Viktar Vasileuski
Photography by Ronald Pizzoferrato
Zurich University of the Arts

“What is violence? Why are we violent? Not many of us know how to answer that. But our history is written with violence. (...) To deny violence in our society, is to deny ourselves.”

PLOMO by Ronald Pizzoferrato, 2020

04

In the opening words of the accompanying video to his book ‘PLOMO’, the Venezuelan visual ethnographer, Ronald Pizzoferrato, establishes ‘violence’ at the core of the human experience for a Caraqueño. In his work, it appears as an expression of crisis, as a driver of change, as colonial inheritance; accompanied by specific signs, codes and expressions. ‘Violence’ in Caracas sits somewhere between cult and culture.

Viktar Vasileuski: By definition a ‘crisis’ is a time where uncertainty prevails and the course of history changes. Traditionally, it has a negative connotation. Nonetheless, it is also seen as a source of hope: The hope for a better future, the start of a trans-historical journey. How would you define ‘crisis’ in the context of your work, in the context of Caracas?

Ronald Pizzoferrato: If we talk about the crisis as a, more or less, collapse, then I have to agree. Venezuela is in crisis right now. All our structures, all our institutions are drenched in crisis - it surfaces, it is tangible. But if you look back to the 70s and 80s, the country was in crisis, too: We had many analphabets, people who were deprived of basic health care. But as long as we were regarded as America’s backyard and provided cheap natural resources, the crisis was ignored. Only after the revolution, which undoubtedly led to a system collapse, the West started to see an enemy in us and put the label of ‘crisis’ upon us.

My work ‘PLOMO’ focuses on how the people, particularly in Caracas, deal with such an ongoing state of crisis: in daily life, in communication, in consumption, in culture, in everything. Though, as an inhabitant I would deny that we face a crisis - I would say all that we do is part of our identity, is part of us. Only as a researcher or artist - basically as someone who wants to see how things really are – I can truly acknowledge that.

VV: You see ‘crisis’ as the default setting to the Venezuelan society.

RP: Exactly.

VV: Your work circles around the omnipresence of “violence”. It seems like violence is as much a given for Caracas as creativity for Berlin or the American Dream for Hollywood. Tell me about the violence in your native city.

RP: ‘Violence’ is a tool of change. It changed societies, it sparked revolutions, it was used for the greatest fights for human rights. The French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution – ‘violence’ becomes a way to go forward. The problem with it is: Nowadays, we don’t want to say that ‘violence’ can be so powerful. Neither am I trying to say that ‘violence’ is absolutely necessary in order to achieve drastic change. And still, ten years after societal disruptions happen, we often understand that a certain violent event had a great influence on how things went from there on.

In the Venezuelan context ’violence’ is something omnipresent. We have been colonised by force, religions and beliefs were pushed upon us without us having a say in it, noncompliance or deviance was punished. It became our heritage and our education. And then we reproduced it. Our dictators, our popular uprisings are just ‘updates’ of this history. I like to use the following metaphor for explaining the presence of ‘violence’ in Caracas: First, it was a guest to the city, but now it’s living here. It became a citizen. Not everyone likes it, but it’s there and we create a type of empathy and tolerance towards it.

Actually, this metaphor does not fully catch the essence of the ‘violence’ I am talking about. In Latin America we have a lot of white-collar gangsters, too, who are rarely blamed but are as violent as everyone else. It is not always about the working-class kid who is throwing stones; there is more to that: intersectional violence, knowledge violence, systemic violence, violence due to cultural capital.

VV: Your project seems to be extremely personal. I would even call it intimate. What is your very own experience with violence? How did it become “your” topic?

RP: As a teenager I was very much into graffiti, street culture and the like. I was roaming around the city – from poor to rich places, made friends with kids from different social statuses, saw the differences but many similarities, too. To some extent ‘violence’ was a common language.

Then I studied to become a physiotherapist. While working in a public hospital for two years, I got to know many different people and layers of their lives. It made me curious to dig deeper.

On the side, I was already involved in photography. But to simply take “beautiful” pictures was not fulfilling


el punto 23

– I wanted to research people, their social relations, and meet them “in the field”. Finally, I found out for myself that finding a topic that touches everyone can give me access to people and their lives.

VV: Can you roughly tell us about your methods and practice? What do you think is it that makes visual research strong? What is lacking in the approach?

RP: Visual Ethnography is always about examples. You don’t necessarily come up with results that are universally applicable, but you get a deep understanding of one particular issue. And of course, you cannot do a good investigation without proper background knowledge or some familiarity with the context. In this work, I had both. Still, I am aware that there are things I cannot know. Therefore, I like to employ participatory elements. The subjects and “the field” become part of the research and we arrive at results together. Apart from that, I always try to cut out hierarchies. I’m never like “Hey, I am the photographer, I am the researcher, you have to tell me things”. I rather immerse myself into the livelihood of the people and try to become “one of them”.

Sometimes, this very fact bugs me. I want to put myself into my project and draw my own conclusions. But, I have to hold myself back and let the gathered material speak for itself. Eventually, when working on Venezuela, I benefit a lot from my twofold perspective: I am as much an insider, as I am an outsider. In my opinion, my work really benefits from that. And I can see that when I talk to some Venezuelans, they are so focused on themselves. By the way: Do you know the concept of ‚Oppression Olympics’?

VV: I don’t. But it sounds really interesting.

RP: It is. ‘Oppression Olympics’ happen when minorities compare themselves to other minorities and try to claim that they are worse off. In the context of Venezuelan migration to Colombia, we see a lot of it these days. It’s funny how people who should fight for the same cause are divided this way.

VV: If we think about the overall socio-political crisis Venezuela is facing and is arguably causing a lot of struggle and violence eventually - where does that lead? What’s next for your country?

RP: COVID is not making it easier, that’s for sure. Even Switzerland, where I’m currently based, has its issues. And the real consequences of the pandemic will kick in in one or two years. If I have to imagine a future for Venezuela, or actually the whole Latin American continent, it’s gonna be rough. If I have to say something positive, though: We‘re gonna learn a lot. And I hope that Venezuelans, through migration, through a worldwide crisis, will learn that Venezuela is not the centre of the world; that other nations are facing similar problems.

» It seems like violence is as much a given for Caracas as creativity for Berlin or the American Dream for Hollywood. «

Viktar Vasileuski



» 'Violence' is a tool of change. It changed societies, it sparked revolutions, it was used for the greatest fights for human rights. The French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution – 'violence' becomes a way to go forward. «

Ronald Pizzoferrato

VV: In your work you've employed so-called "netnography". If we revert back to the topic of our issue (the Unheard Crises) - do you see the Internet/Social Media as possible drivers that make the violent crisis of Caracas heard?

RP: It definitely changes how we perceive our crisis. It becomes mediated. If you want to get to know what is happening in Venezuela, you can understand it through social media, not through traditional channels. At the same time, we need to be careful: Especially our parents' generation does not have the literacy to distinguish between real and fake and often falls for conspiracies, or the like. The responsibility to educate them or to correct them is with us in the end.

VV: How do you plan to build upon what you've accomplished? Will you go deeper into the study of the cultural implications of violence for the Venezuelan society? Or is there something else that's close to your heart, too?

RP: The next step is to publish the final artifact of my research: a book. Also, I work on a project with migrants on the Venezuelan-Colombian border. There, I am focused on the objects the migrants carry. I'm asking what they take from Venezuela to Colombia and why. Which meanings do they ascribe to these things? Are the things specific to the person's family? Or to the region where they come from? I want to apply my working methods to this subject next.

05

Feminism in International Security Discourses

Written by Karolin Tuncel

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Abstract

In light of the 20th anniversary of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (WPS), this thesis contributes to understanding the current discursive role of feminism in international security discourses. In a qualitative content analysis of the 8649th meeting of the UNSC on WPS, I analyse how women's/equal participation in peace and security is discursively presented and reproduced. This happens through three main rationales which lay the ground for diverse sub-arguments, namely: rights-based, instrumentalist, and transformative arguments. Concerned by a strong dominance of instrumentalist arguments in the WPS discourse, I pledge for a discursive shift towards a rights-based and transformative thinking of women's/equal participation in peace and security.

Keywords: Feminist Theory, Peace and Security, WPS, Participation, Discourse Analysis

Introduction

The year 2020 is not only marked by a worldwide health crisis and its implications, but it also marks the 20th anniversary of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1325. Together with its nine following resolutions and additional documents, this resolution forms the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. Twenty years after resolution 1325, this thesis shall contribute to assessing the current role of feminism in international security discourses. The WPS agenda, being the UNSC's "institutional response to radical claims" (Charlesworth 2008: 359), appears to be the best site for this. Having brought women as agents in the institutional security discourse for the first time (Cohn 2008: 198), the WPS agenda is considered "the most significant international normative framework (…) promoting women's participation in peace and security processes" (True 2016: 307). In stepping back from technical details in the WPS agenda, my objective is to reflect upon the current role of these "radical claims" (Charlesworth 2008: 359), upon the direction of the agenda as a political project. Rather than assessing the implementation[1] of women's/equal participation[2], I am interested in its conceptual foundations, that is: the discourse around why women's/equal participation in security is being promoted. Consequently, this thesis shall contribute to understanding different feminist approaches to the WPS agenda by analysing the UNSC's most recent debate on WPS, its 8649th meeting. This was held "in preparation for the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325" (UNSC 2019a: 1). Therefore, it is a suitable sample to assess the overall direction of the agenda with regard to women's/equal participation.

This paper does not focus on crises in specific countries of conflict, but it rather draws attention to the ongoing "crisis" in current international conflict-solving structures. In using a poststructuralist lens, I suggest that discourses are sites of power which have a direct effect on political happenings (Foucault 1988: 74). This means that I, like Cohn (2008: 197), assume that the WPS discourse has a direct effect on political practices of international security. Consequently, an analysis of the way of arguing for women's/equal participation contributes to understanding two important things. First, arguments for women's/equal participation cannot be pronounced without implying how, by whom and in what this participation is being imagined. And understandings of participation determine what this participation looks like in practice (Whitworth 2004: 126f.; O'Reilly 2013: 7; True 2016: 317). As Gibbings puts it: "(A) particular way of speaking at the UN shapes the possibility of action and limits a supposed freedom of political participation" (2011: 526). Secondly, analysing the arguments for women's/equal participation reveals why the speakers support this participation, and thus is an important step to understand their ambitions in the WPS agenda as a political project. Thus, an analysis of the discourse around women's/equal participation contributes to deconstructing the current discourse around the aim and direction of the WPS agenda as a whole. These two aspects are entwined. If, for example, someone pledges for women's participation because "women bring peace", then this argument implies both how this participation is being imagined (women should participate in a way that women can contribute to peace), and why this participation is considered important (gaining peace is considered the objective of the WPS agenda, and women should participate as long as they contribute to this). Therefore, from a poststructuralist lens, arguments for women's/equal participation are not only arguments; by (re)producing different visions of this concept, they implicitly lay a foundation for firstly forms of participation in practice, and secondly the direction of the WPS agenda. Following this theoretical perspective, this thesis is guided by the research question: How is women's/equal participation discursively presented and reproduced in the 8649th UNSC meeting? The short answer is: Most of the statements made instrumentalise women's/equal participation for other ends. This is problematic, since it lays the foundation for limited spaces of participation and adds a conditionality to participation claims.

But in order to answer the research question properly, one first needs to clarify: what is women's/equal participation, and what kinds of feminist participation claims exist? In 2.1, I therefore conceptualise women's/equal participation in the context of this paper. Since I am interested in the overall ambitions of the WPS agenda, I follow a broad understanding of participation. In 2.2, I develop the theoretical framework for the following analysis, answering the first out of three subquestions: How do feminist scholars argue for women's/equal participation in international security? I discuss the rationales in feminist scholarship representatively for feminist rationales in international security discourses since, in most cases, feminist scholarship works closely with feminist activism (Gayer and Engels 2011: 13).

Chapter 3 offers a qualitative content analysis of the 8649th UNSC meeting under the second sub-question: How frequently and in which forms are the different rationales discussed in 2.2 presented in the 8649th UNSC meeting? Since the UNSC builds its decisions on negotiations and compromise (Heathcote 2018: 382f.), the debates of the UNSC are the central space where the UNSC's positions are developed. The 8649th meeting in particular is the most recent debate of the UNSC on WPS and thus the closest one can get to the current state of the discourse. The method qualitative content analysis enables a structured analysis of the discourse, by systematically identifying speakers' patterns of argumentation and measuring the frequency of these patterns. For this, I segregate the different arguments for women's/equal participation discussed in the analytical framework (2.2) into categories of analysis. After having clarified the analytical procedure in 3.1, I discuss the overall findings of the analysis (3.2), and the findings within each analytical category (3.2.1 - 3.2.3).

In the conclusion I debate the function of the discussed arguments as a reproduction of how we think participation, putting the findings from the 8649th meeting in the overall context of the WPS agenda. I also briefly refer to contributions from Nina Bernarding, Director at the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, whom I had a chance to interview for this thesis (see 6.1).

2. Women's/Equal Participation in Peace and Security

2.1 Disentangling Women's/Equal Participation

In order to enable a more precise discussion of women's/equal participation, it appears necessary to first clarify: whose participation, what kind of participation, and the participation in what is meant? Generally speaking, the concept women's/equal participation does not refer to different participation practices (since this would not serve the objective of this thesis), but it is rather a collective term for the diverse forms of feminist involvement with international security. This broad conceptualisation enables us to think of arguments for concrete forms of participation and arguments for the importance of the WPS agenda together.

While most of the arguments discussed in 2.2 work with a clear distinction between men and women, some – including myself – see this distinction itself as a contradiction to feminist ideas. I therefore add the term equal – meaning the equal participation of all social groups – to the term women. This does not only raise awareness to my involuntary reproduction of the social category women in this thesis[3], but it also enables a broader conceptualisation of participation which is not limited to women's participation, but includes men, children, activists, civil society – shortly: everyone. Still, since the WPS agenda is centred around women, this paper (involuntarily) mainly deals with arguments for women's participation. Participation here goes much further than the participation pillar of UNSC resolution 1325: it means taking part in international peace and security processes, by actively influencing and shaping them. This can be either on an international level, meaning the participation in different UN bodies, or on a local level, referring to a (not necessarily institutionalised) participation of the people in situations of conflict. Feminist arguments for women's/equal participation include both descriptive and substantive participation. In Pitkin's (1967) words, descriptive representation describes women's physical presence, whereas substantive representation refers to the presence of women's demands[4]. This means that the concept of women's/equal participation is not limited to the physical presence of all social groups; it also entails the influence of feminist ideas. As Simic (2014: 186, 195), Ellerby (2016), Goetz and Jenkins (2016: 220) and Pfaffenholz (2019) demonstrate, we have to be aware that the descriptive participation of a group does not necessarily lead to their substantive participation.

This thesis discusses arguments for women's/equal participation in the specific context of international security discourses. In acknowledging that concepts of peace and security deserve a deeper discussion, I understand security as a "historically shifting set of social and political practices" (Gheciu et al. 2018: 11) to overcome the diverse forms of direct and structural violence. The arguments discussed in 2.2 reproduce various understandings of security, which however will not be further examined in this thesis.

To sum up, women's/equal participation in this thesis refers to the equal participation of all social groups, often explicitly women, as well as the presence and influence of feminist ideas, in diverse social contexts related to security. Chapter 2.2 discusses with which presumptions and in which ways feminist scholars argue for this participation.

2.2 Feminist Arguments for Women's/Equal Participation

After having clarified the meaning of women's/equal participation in this thesis, this chapter answers the first sub-question: How do feminist scholars argue for women's/equal participation in international security? Feminist scholarship follows three different main lines of reasoning; rights-based arguments, instrumentalist arguments and transformative arguments. Rights-based arguments demand women's/equal participation based on a human-rights logic. Instrumentalist arguments aim at improving the UNSC's work by using feminist ideas, thinking within the existing UNSC structures. Transformative arguments pledge for participation in order to deconstruct and transform the existing UNSC structures. These three main rationales enable diverse arguments, some of which again lay the ground for more specific sub-arguments.

Some feminist scholars[5] frame women's/equal participation as a human right. All people, including women, have the right to participate in everything that concerns them, including security issues. As a consequence, there is no need to justify this participation. No matter what the outcome is, everybody has a right to participate. An interesting rationale linked to this are religious arguments for women's participation: Horst (2017: 398ff.) talked to women who argue for their participation based on Islamic women's roles: It is their right and religious duty to participate in building peace.

Rights-based arguments are maybe the most powerful, but at the same time the most imprecise way of arguing for women's/equal participation; on the one hand, rights-based participation is not bound to any condition and can be used as a "one fits all" argument for everyone's descriptive and substantive participation on all levels. On the other hand, however, a rights-based approach leaves the question open of what this participation implies for the ones participating as well as for the structures in which they participate. It is not directly linked to any aspirations which could come true together with this participation. In addition, O'Reilly (2013: 7) warns that rights-based arguments for women's participation can be easily instrumentalised by the UNSC as a way to deal with its lack of legitimacy.

Instrumentalist arguments denote all arguments which aim at improving the UNSC with feminist ideas, thinking within the existing structures. The term instrumentalist refers to the fact that feminist theory is being used as an instrument – not as an end in itself – to improve the work of the UNSC. Also, instrumentalist arguments have in common that they are based on difference feminism, working with a clear distinction of men and women, and aiming at revaluing female traits.

The most common instrumentalist argument for women's/equal participation is the women bring peace argument. It links gender equality to successful peacekeeping, claiming that women are more peaceful than men and that consequently, women's participation leads to more sustainable peace (Ellerby 2013: 455; O'Reilly 2013: 1, 6; True 2016: 308; Pfaffenholz 2019: 4ff.). Within this narrative, Fukuyama (1998) argues from an essentialist mindset that women are more peaceful than men by nature, and Ruddik (1998; 2009) develops the concept of maternal thinking as an alternative to militarist peacebuilding. Some constructivists, however, trace this claimed peacefulness back to women's upbringing and to gender norms (De La Rey and McKay 2006; Anderlini 2007; Pfaffenholz 2019: 11). Additionally, women are said to bring peace due to better mediating styles (O'Reilly 2013: 5), and by deploying different peacekeeping techniques than men (Whitworth 2004: 126). According to Anderlini (2008: 55f.), women identify more easily with women from the enemy side, because women from both sides share the experience of being oppressed.

While women bring peace arguments address women's character, different perspective arguments target the content of their participation. They claim that women's participation brings in a different perspective and agenda, and thus enables the UNSC to do more effective work. As Whitworth (2004: 124) shows, this way of arguing is closely connected to the concept of gender mainstreaming. Different perspective arguments lay the ground for two sub-arguments. Firstly, Anderlini (2008: chapter 3, 5), Gibbings (2011: 528) and Pfaffenholz (2019: 3) argue that women have different needs than men, and that the UNSC can meet these needs only through women's participation. The different needs argument becomes then an instrumentalist argument when these often essentialised[6] women's needs are framed as a reason for why women should participate. Secondly, different perspective arguments appear in a capitalist market logic, selling women's perspectives as an "untapped resource"[7] of valuable knowledge (Cohn 2008: 201; Gibbings 2011: 529). O'Reilly, for example, writes: "(O)ne source of fresh perspectives and alternative approaches remains largely untapped: women" (2013: 1), and Anderlini gives examples of "what women saw that men could not" (2008: 166). Whitworth (2004: 136f) portrays women's participation as a chance for the UN to improve their work by gaining access to "gender information". This "gender information", or "gender expertise" (O'Rourke 2014: 16), does not necessarily imply the descriptive participation of women.

International women for locals arguments claim that women's descriptive participation on the international level influences the local level positively. This lays the ground for two sub-arguments. The role model sub-argument constructs international women as role models for local women (O'Rourke 2014: 10f). Whitworth (2004: 127), for example, argues that the more women are in the international personnel, the more local women will join peace committees. Secondly, what Heathcote (2018) calls protective participation frames women's participation as a means to reduce sexual violence. According to Odanovic (2010: 73) and Stiehm (1999: 56), international women peacekeepers have better access to local women and can therefore better help local women who experience sexual violence. Simic (2010: 190; 2014: 188) sees in this rationale the UNSC's attempt to save its own reputation rather than "saving" women. And, most importantly, the protective participation sub-argument leaves the structural dimension of sexual violence untouched (Whitworth 2004; Simic 2010; Pratt 2013).

However, there are also rationales in feminist scholarship which tackle women's/equal participation from a structural perspective. I classify all arguments that aim at deconstructing and transforming the existing international security structures[8] as transformative arguments. Feminist scholarship increasingly investigates the role of men and masculinities in peace and security (Gayer and Engels 2011:14,16; Ellerby 2013: 442; Zürn 2020). Charlesworth (2008: 351, 359) and others criticise that there is no clear distinction in the WPS discourse between gender, being a social category of power dynamics, and the social group of women. This imprecision leaves the role of men in international

security mostly unquestioned. According to O'Reilly (2013: 9) and Horst (2017: 396), an important reason for the lack of women's participation is that some powerful men do not want to share their power with women. Therefore, we should stop speaking about women, peace and security, and start speaking about men, peace and security. This includes explicitly acknowledging men's overrepresentation (Heathcote 2014: 52,58; 2018: 382), as well as asking about hegemonic masculinities and the UNSC's complicity in gendered violence (Heathcote 2018: 391). Tickner (1995) makes the important point that unlearning masculinity is possible, and that this is the only way to enable a comprehensive thinking of security.

Closely linked to the critique of masculine structures, Whitworth (2004: 137), Cohn (2008: 197f), Gibbings (2011: 532), Demetriou and Hadjipavlou (2018) and others reject an understanding of participation as women's inclusion into a militarist system (Cohn 2008: 198f). Instead, the WPS agenda should present anti-militarist alternatives to the UNSC's current policies. Anderlini (2008: 54ff.) and Ellerby (2016: 138f.) show what these alternatives could look like, giving examples of women's resistance to militarism in areas of conflict. Anti-militarist arguments are built on the normative standpoint that "the use of violence should be of deep concern to feminist actors" (Heathcote 2018: 387). The difference between instrumentalist women bring peace arguments and transformative anti-militarism arguments is that the former understands women's participation as a means to solidify existing militarist security structures, whereas the latter aims at transforming these structures into non-militarist ways of building peace.

According to Orford (2010: 282), arguing for women's participation only within the boundaries of already set projects undermines the transformative potential of the WPS agenda. In the logic of Hunt's (2006) concept of embedded feminism, Brunner (2011), Heathcote (2018: 386ff.) and others warn from a co-option of feminist ideas into the existing UNSC structures. Counter-terrorism, for example, is brightly mentioned in WPS resolutions, while the WPS agenda does merely play a role in the UNSC's counter-terrorism resolutions (Ní Aoláin 2016). One important feminist objective within the WPS agenda is therefore to fight the co-option of feminism in the UNSC.

Horst (2017: 402) criticises that local realities are mostly absent in the international WPS discourse. Accordingly, Kapur (2005) and Heathcote (2014; 2018) argue that the discourse on WPS is driven by culture essentialism, meaning that the UNSC imposes gender assumptions about women in areas of conflict instead of acknowledging the diversity of local gender norms. They criticise international narratives which understand participation as an elitist project while victimising women in the Global South (Heathcote 2018: 392). Pratt applies Spivak's (1988: 92) postcolonial critique of "white men saving brown women from brown men" to the WPS discourse and writes: "The international community positions itself as the savior of the 'brown women' from the 'brown men,' evoking the language of colonialism" (Pratt 2013: 775f). One more transformative argument for women's/equal participation is therefore the objective to decolonize the UNSC.

The last transformative argument for women's/equal participation is to deconstruct gender binaries. As long as we think in a male – female binary and link this to a war – peace binary, we can neither reach peace nor gender equality (Charlesworth 2008: 357; Ellerby 2016: 138ff; Horst 2017: 397). Some feminist scholars therefore pledge for abandoning the men – women dichotomy in the security discourse. This would enable us to address the inequities among women and across genders (Cohn 2008: 202; Pratt 2013: 774; Heathcote 2014: 53; Horst 2017: 398 Pfaffenholz 2019: 10f), and to include non-binary people in the participation discourse, who still do not have a voice in the WPS agenda (Hagen 2016). Zürn (2020) suggests abolishing the category women and to replace it with a more complex model of power relations. This would also abrogate existing implicitly gendered hierarchies between institutions, namely the hierarchies between the male military and UNSC on the one hand, and the female civil society and NGOs on the other hand (Hagen 2016: 319). The following chart summarises all arguments discussed in this chapter, which at the same time form the categories of analysis for the following chapter.



Figure 1: Arguments for Women's/Equal Participation in Peace and Security

3. Qualitative Content Analysis of the 8649th UNSC Meeting principles

3.1 Analytical Procedure

Inspired by Mayring (2015), I conduct a qualitative content analysis of the UNSC's 8649th meeting on WPS. Before discussing the results of this analysis, I want to briefly clarify which analytical steps I took. Initially, I created a codebook (see 6.2) where I deductively formulated indicators for each of the arguments discussed in 2.2. I gave each indicator a letter (e.g. "argues that women have better mediating styles than men" = indicator G). In order to enable a differentiated discussion of the presence of specific arguments, I created indicators not only for the three main rationales, but also for all arguments and sub-arguments. As a next step, I scanned the two documents of the 8649th UNSC meeting for arguments for women's/equal participation, and collected the arguments found in tables. In these tables, each argument listed has an indicator behind the quote so that one can retrace why a specific argument has been classified for example as an instrumentalist argument (e.g. a quote is an instrumentalist argument, because it "argues that women have better mediating styles than men" (= indicator G), and (G) indicates the "women bring peace" argument, which is an instrumentalist argument). I collected the arguments of state representatives and these of the briefers (including Ms Salah) in separate tables, so that one can compare their ways of arguing for women's/equal participation. Since Ms Salah is the only briefer who is not affiliated with any international organisation, I paid specific attention to the frequency distribution of her arguments for women's/equal participation.

Coded statements from	Rights-based arguments	Instrumentalist arguments	Transformative arguments
State representatives	17 %	59 %	24 %
Briefers	11 %	47 %	42 %
Ms Salah (activist)	14 %	29 %	57 %
Total (all statements)	16.5 %	57.5 %	26 %

Table 1

The most obvious and most relevant finding of the conducted qualitative content analysis is that instrumentalist arguments for women's/equal participation strongly dominate the discourse in the 8649th meeting. The table shows the overall results of the analysis. With 57.5% of the total sum of 212 coded statements, there are more instrumentalist arguments stated than rights-based (16.5%) and transformative (26%) arguments together.

Both state representatives and briefers use mainly instrumentalist arguments for women's/equal participation, and even though Ms. Salah argues differently, this has almost no effect on the overall discourse. In stepping into a more detailed analysis, the following subchapters examine which sub-arguments within these three rationales are hegemonic and which ones barely play any role in the 8649th debate.

3.2.1 Rights-Based Arguments

Out of the three main rationales, rights-based arguments are the least frequent in the debate. This does not necessarily mean that the power of rights-based approaches is as little as the results suggest. Rights-based arguments are not as easy to identify as instrumentalist or transformative arguments: If one regards the need for women's/equal participation as an obvious matter of course, then one might either not see the need to argue for this, or consider an argument for women's/equal participation as a threat of putting a natural right up for discussion. Thus, it is in the nature of rights-based arguments that they are often not pronounced. There are speakers in the debate who do not mention any arguments for women's/equal participation or for the importance of the WPS agenda at all. For example, Mrs. Chatardová (Czech Republic) only reports on their national achievements and initiatives with regard to the WPS agenda (UNSC 2019b: 6), leaving unclear why she supports it. She might not bring any arguments for women's/equal participation because she follows a rights-based approach, but it is just as likely that Mrs. Chatardová does so for other reasons (such as a lack of time). We simply cannot not tell.

Fortunately, there are also clearly rights-based arguments in the debate: Fourteen statements frame women's/equal participation as a normative objective or responsibility, and 16 statements refer to it as a human right. Five out of 35 as rights-based coded statements explicitly refuse to put women's/equal participation up for discussion, such as Ms. Quiel Murcia (Panama):

"(…) it is unacceptable to continue debating and questioning neither the leadership of women and their right to hold high-level positions nor the equal participation of 100 per cent of the population in any sphere of political, social and economic life (…)." (UNSC 2019b: 10)

To sum up, only 16.5% of all statements have been coded as rights-based arguments. These frame women's/equal participation as a right, and the WPS agenda as a normative responsibility. Since it is difficult to measure rights-based approaches, there might be more rights-based thinkers in the debate than a qualitative content analysis can show. Having this uncertainty in mind, we can say that rights-based arguments are present, but do not play a key role in the debate.

3.2.2 Instrumentalist Arguments

With 122 statements, instrumentalist arguments make up 57.5% of all coded statements. Thirty-four of these are generally instrumentalist arguments that frame women's/equal participation as a means or precondition for achieving peace and security. Women bring peace arguments are the most prominent sub-argument not only within the instrumentalist rationale, but among all sub-arguments across the categories: they make up 26% of all coded statements. Thereby, women's/equal participation is understood as the inclusion of women into the existing masculine and militarist system:

"We are not speaking empty rhetoric when we refer to the participation of women — we have women here from our various armed forces in South Africa and our police service who have served in peacekeeping missions." (UNSC 2019a: 15)

I identified 24 different perspective arguments, the majority (17) of them focussing on women as an "untapped resource". Monsignor Charters (Holy See), for example, speaks of women's expertise which needs to be "harnessed" (UNSC 2019a: 5). With four statements, women's needs arguments are much less prominent than untapped resource arguments. With 9 coded statements, the hierarchisation between international and local participation plays, at least explicitly, a rather less prominent role. However, one observation discloses that the narrative of international women helping local women might implicitly be much more powerful than explicitly stated: During the entire debate, speakers refer to "women" in the third person. In assuming that a vast majority, but at least some of the speakers identify as "women", I ask: Why don't they include themselves when speaking about "women"? To give an example, the president, Mrs. Pandor, states: "Women are tired of us talking" (UNSC 2019a: 15). This sounds convincing, but whom does she mean by "women" and whom does she mean by "us"? The discursive use of "women" might be a rhetorical means or simply the UN's diplomatic language. But at the same time, it appears to me as an implicit othering; the construction of "women", who are not present in the debate, for whose participation the speakers argue, but which the speakers themselves do not identify with.

Throughout the debate, women's/equal participation is mainly explicitly framed as a women's issue, and "women" are talked about as if they were somewhere far away from the UNSC. Arguments that women were needed to build peace, and that the UNSC could benefit from women's or gender knowledge, are the leading narratives in the discourse.

3.2.3 Transformative Arguments

Only 55 of all coded statements can be considered transformative arguments. In eight passages, state representatives generally pledge for critical thinking and transformation in international security. Although this number is obviously very low, we can here see some imprecise, but at least existent movement towards a transformative understanding of women's/equal participation in peace and security. The need to challenge masculine structures is with 27 coded statements by far the most prominent transformative argument. Unfortunately, structural inequalities, misogyny, and violent masculinities are often framed as cultural problems which are far away from the UNSC. Mr. Mlynár (Slovakia) is one of the only two speakers who explicitly raise awareness to the existing masculine structures within international institutions by saying:

The root causes of women's chronic under-representation in peace talks, and, broadly, in the security sector, include discriminatory laws and practices, institutional obstacles, gender stereotyping and the existence of predominantly masculine structures within the system. (UNSC 2019b: 2)

Interestingly, with regard to anti-militarist arguments in the debate, we can observe a clear difference between state representatives and briefers: While anti-militarist arguments make up only 3% of state representatives' statements, the equivalent percentage is 21% for briefers' statements. While state representatives are mostly silent about the need for anti-militarist approaches to security, one of the briefers, Ms. Mlambo-Ngcuka, criticises the existing militarism:

"Feminist organizations' repeated calls for disarmament, arms control and shifting military spending to social investment still go unanswered. It seems easier to use arms than to deliver clean water (…)." (UNSC 2019a: 6)

I could find only one statement, by Mrs. Tripathi (India), which tackles the co-option of feminist ideas in the agenda, demanding to "ensure that this agenda is not used as a ploy for furthering interterritorial ambitions" (UNSC 2019b: 13). And even though this statement matches with indicator Q, it only accuses one (unnamed) delegation of co-opting the WPS agenda and does not aim at commenting on the discourse around women's/equal participation in general. We can therefore say that the risk that the UNSC co-opts feminist ideas is not at all discussed in the 8649th meeting. Similarly, with three coded statements, the postcolonial objective to decolonise the UNSC plays almost no role. The need to "also attend to the issue at home" (UNSC 2019a: 22) and to "ensure equality among states" (UNSC 2019a: 30) are not more than tentative hints to colonial structures. The only statement (by Ms. Abdelhady-Nasser) where "measures of colonization" (UNSC 2019b: 32) are explicitly mentioned, refers to the conflict in Palestine.

Six statements have been coded as arguments to deconstruct gender binaries. These mainly follow intersectional approaches, stressing the diversity of the group "women", and demand that the "women and peace and security agenda must be a whole-of-society enterprise and not just left to women" (UNSC 2019b: 4). I see this as a spark of hope in the discourse, especially within an agenda that carries the word "women" in its name. However, the feminist objective to deconstruct a male – female binary in thinking peace and security seems to not (yet) have reached the UNSC discourse. Interestingly, the participation of civil society plays a prominent role during the debate, being mentioned 34 times (e.g. UNSC 2019a: 33). Civil society is explicitly framed together with "women", and so implicitly thought to be feminine. This confirms Hagen's (2016: 319) observation that institutions are gendered, and that civil society's role is understood as a women's issue.

The analysis has shown that the meeting entails a diverse spectrum of arguments for women's/equal participation. However, rights-based and transformative arguments only play a subordinate role. Women's/equal participation is focussed on "women", and dominantly understood as women's inclusion into the existing masculine and militarist structures. Instrumentalist arguments, and especially the narrative that women's/equal participation is a precondition to reach security, dominate the debate.

Conclusion

We have seen in the case of the 8649th meeting that women's/equal participation is mainly presented as a means for the UNSC to reach security. Even among the briefers – with the exception of Ms. Salah – we could see mainly instrumentalist narratives of thinking women's/equal participation.

If we look at the overall WPS discourse since resolution 1325, we could interpret this dominance of instrumentalist narratives in the 8649th meeting as an evidence that feminism in the UN discourse has over the time evolved "from a critical to a problem-solving tool" (Whitworth 2004: 139). However, this conception might be misleading. Cohn (2008: 196f.) asserts that the WPS agenda never was framed as an anti-militarist or feminist project: Almost all NGOs which lobbied for resolution 1325 distanced themselves from feminism and anti-militarism, and they were concerned to appear as apolitical as possible[9]. Since the very beginning of this political agenda, the denial of transformative aspirations might have been a conscious lobbying tactic, and instrumentalist arguments for women's/equal participation might have been the only peaceful way for feminists to be heard by the UNSC at all (Cohn et al. 2004: 138; Simic 2010: 190; Pratt 2013: 775).

Nevertheless, acknowledging the use of instrumentalist arguments in that specific context does not mean to me that the ways of arguing for women's/equal participation do not matter as long as they make participation possible (Cohn 2008: 201). As discussed in the introduction, the way of arguing for women's/equal participation always implies a vision of what this participation looks like and of the roles that the participants will play; I see the coded and analysed statements not only as a presentation of arguments, but as a reproduction of the concept of participation within this particular context and herewith as a way to determine the purpose of the WPS agenda. This reproduction might be conscious or subconscious, explicit or implicit, but in the end, it creates political practices and realities. I pledge for a transformation of the existing international security structures, and I am convinced that this can only happen in a transformative discourse.

An instrumentalist thinking ensures women's/equal participation only as long as it is beneficial for the UNSC (O'Rourke 2014: 21f.). It reduces a gender dimension to an "add-on", and forecloses pivotal questions such as: Which issues do we consider to be relevant for international security? And are we using the right means and processes to tackle these issues? A rights-based approach, however, enables participation which is not bound to any conditions. And a transformative approach bears the potential for the ones participating to question existing structures and to transform understandings of and practices in international security. To sum up, if the WPS agenda is to transform the UNSC's work, the first step for a transformative discourse must be abandoning instrumentalist narratives.

I disagree with Whitworth (2004) who claims that an instrumentalist argumentation in the past has foreclosed any transformative intervention. Would the UNSC have been more open for transformation before resolution 1325? I do not think so. Compared to what the UNSC's gender awareness looked like before 2000, I consider the WPS agenda as a great success, and some even celebrate it as an important tool for local women (Demetriou/Hadjipavlou 2018). Nonetheless, now that feminist ideas have a foot in the door of a masculine institution, it is our[1] task to distance ourselves from an instrumentalisation of these ideas and to actively promote a transformative agenda – not only when speaking about the UNSC, but within the discursive spaces of power that feminists now have access to.

There are many important questions left to discuss, such as: What about excluded people who do not support the objective of their participation? or: What could a transformation of international security structures look like in practice? But I want to close with one last thought which accompanied me through my whole working process: I have chosen security discourses as one sight of investigation in analysing the discourse around feminist demands. However, I sometimes question how helpful my approach can be to changing things for the better. I have never lived as a – fill-in any marginalised person here – in a situation of armed conflict. My knowledge is solely theoretical and acquired from an extremely privileged position. Am I (and most of the people whose contributions I have read and discussed here) in the right position to comment on this discourse? My last demand from the WPS agenda is simple, yet still unrealised: Let us stop speaking about excluded groups and about conflicts as if they were somewhere far away. Let us listen to those who have been excluded for too long, and to those who are directly affected by the decisions made.

References

Footnotes:

[1] This has already been examined elsewhere (True 2016; Horst 2017).

[2] A conceptualisation of this will follow in chapter 2.1.

[3] Dittmer (2011) reflects upon the difficulties of doing research as a feminist scholar in male institutions, arguing that by working within male hegemonies, feminist scholars inevitably reproduce gender dichotomies and hierarchies.

[4] For a more differentiated conceptualisation of women's participation, including formal and symbolic representation, see also Phillips (1998, 2001), Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) and Nazneen (2016).

[5] namely: Reilly 2007; Charlesworth 2008; O'Reilly 2013: 5; O'Rourke 2014: 11-12; True 2016: 308; Heathcote 2018: 384; Pfaffenholz 2019: 2.

[6] O'Rourke (2014: 6), Heathcote (2014: 52; 2018: 381, 385) and others warn from essentializing women's needs and pledge for giving space to their diversity.

[7] Here, the citation marks do not mark a quote, but my personal critical distance to this concept.

[8] I write "closely linked" here, because Tickner (1995) and others, including myself, explicitly think militarism and masculinities together.

[9] Among the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGOWG), only the Hague Appeal for Peace and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) committed to anti-militarism, and the WILPF was the only explicitly feminist NGO.

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05

Appendix

Codebook

	Argument from theoretical framework	Indicator	Example from the 8649th UNSC meeting
A	Rights-based arguments	Frames women's/equal participation as natural / human right	Women and men have exactly the same right to take part in decisions concerning their future. (UNSC 2019a, p. 31, right column)
B	Rights-based arguments	Frames women's/equal participation as normative objective / responsibility	It is imperative to secure women's full right to participation and decision-making at all stages of the peace process (1st, 19, r.)
C	Rights-based arguments	Refuses to justify the need for women's/equal participation	(...) it is unacceptable to continue debating and questioning neither the leadership of women and their right to hold high-level positions nor the equal participation of 100 per cent of the population in any sphere of political, social and economic life (2nd, 10, r.)

Table 2: Indicators for rights-based arguments

Appendix

	Argument from theoretical framework	Indicator	Example from the 8649th UNSC meeting
D	Instrumentalist arguments (general)	Frames women's/equal participation as an instrument / a condition for peace and security	(...) there is no more effective instrument for the promotion of peace and international security than the empowerment of women (1st, 29, l.)
E	Women bring peace (general)	Links women's/equal participation to successful peace	(...) women improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions (1st, 3, l.)
F	Women bring peace: Peaceful women	Refers to women's peacefulness	women (...) are more likely to advocate for accountability and services for the survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. (1st, 23, r.)
G	Women bring peace: Successful mediators	Argues that women have better mediating styles than men	Including women at the peace table can also increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement, as women are often viewed by negotiating parties as honest brokers. (1st, 23, r.)
H	Different perspective (general)	Argues that women's participation brings in a different perspective	Women are in fact not only part of the solution, but have also been influential in serving as a source of inspiration (1st, 26, r.)
I	Different perspective: Different needs	Argues that women's needs can only be met through women's participation	The specific needs of girls and women must be included in the strategies of those missions. Missions must incorporate women (...) (2nd, 18, l./r.)
J	Different perspective: Untapped resource	Emphasizes women's knowledge / skills / expertise / resources	(...) advocate for the full deployment and use of women with tremendous skill that are committed to the agenda (1st, 7, l.)
K	International women for local women (general)	Distinguishes between two types of women: women as saviours and women as victims	The women leaders (...) must work in their civil society role as partners for the implementation of urgently needed assistance programmes for women in remote areas. (1st, 12, l.)
L	International women for local women: Protective participation	Argues that international women protect / rehabilitate local victims of violence	(...) support for victims and prevention initiatives need to be bolstered in the provinces. To this end, it is necessary to increase the number of women Blue Helmets deployed on the ground in the communities. (1st, 11, r.)
M	International women for local women: Role model	Argues that international women's/equal participation can be a role model for local women's/equal participation	As an international role model, it is imperative that the United Nations conduct itself in accordance with the SDG 5 and the women and peace and security agenda. (2nd, 17, r.)

Table 3: Indicators for instrumentalist arguments

05

Appendix

	Argument from theoretical framework	Indicator	Example from the 8649th UNSC meeting
N	Transformative arguments (general)	Pledges for critical thinking /transformation in peace and security institutions	We are facing a challenge that requires a transformative and sustained effort over time. (2nd, 20, l.)
O	Challenge masculine structures	Addresses structural / cultural inequalities	The root causes of women's chronic under-representation in peace talks, and, broadly, in the security sector, include discriminatory laws and practices, institutional obstacles, gender stereotyping and the existence of predominantly masculine structures within the system. (2nd, 2, r.)
P	Anti-militarism	Pledges for disarmament / overcoming violence	Feminist organizations' repeated calls for disarmament, arms control and shifting military spending to social investment still go unanswered. It seems easier to use arms than to deliver clean water (1st, 6, r.)
Q	Fight cooption of feminism	Warns from instrumentalising the WPS agenda for other interests	(…) ensure that this agenda is not used as a ploy for furthering interterritorial ambitions. (2nd, 13, l.)
R	Decolonise the UNSC	Addresses power inequalities between states / Criticises the victimisation of women from the Global South	(…) the equality required to tackle the root causes of conflicts and their increasing complexity goes well beyond gender equality. It also encompasses and reflects the need to ensure equality among States and the right of all States to sustainable development. (1st, 30, l.)
S	Deconstruct gender binaries	Pledges for the rights / equal participation of all social groups, not only "women"	The women and peace and security agenda must be a whole-of-society enterprise and not just left to women. (2nd, 4, r.)

Table 4: Indicators for transformative arguments

Appendix

	Total number of statements coded with this indicator	Statements by state representatives	Statements by briefers	Statements by Ms Salah (included in briefers' statements)
A	*16*	14	2	1
B	*14*	14	-	-
C	*5*	5	-	-
D	*34*	32	2	-
E	*47*	44	3	2
F	*4*	4	-	-
G	*4*	4	-	-
H	*3*	3	-	-
I	*4*	4	-	-
J	*17*	15	2	-
K	*3*	2	1	-
L	*5*	4	1	-
M	*1*	1	-	-
N	*8*	8	-	-
O	*27*	23	4	1
P	*10*	6	4	2
Q	*1*	1	-	-
R	*3*	3	-	-
S	*6*	6	-	-

Table 5: Frequency of Indicators

06

Reicht der Elefant dem Drachen das Wasser?

Eine systematische Analyse des Einflusses von Machtasymmetrie auf den Wasserkonflikt zwischen China und Indien am Brahmaputra zwischen 2013 und 2019

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Abstract

China ist ein durstiges Land, das dringend Wasser benötigt – und zwar viel davon. Um seinen Wasser- und Energiebedarf zu decken, greift es sukzessive durch Dämme und Umleitungen in tibetische Flüsse ein. Eine Reihe von Externalitäten heizen dabei Konflikte mit anderen Flussanrainerstaaten an. Die zunehmende Wasserknappheit in Asien – sowie in anderen Teilen der Welt – erfordert ein tieferes Verständnis für grenzüberschreitende Wasserkonflikte. Auf der Grundlage des Analyserahmens der Hydro-Hegemonie untersucht dieser Artikel, wie Machtgefüge grenzüberschreitende Wasserkonflikte prägen, die noch keine Anzeichen eines Krieges vorweisen. Dazu wird als Fallstudie das hydro-hegemoniale Verhalten Chinas gegenüber Indien am Brahmaputra betrachtet. Der Artikel liefert zwei wichtige Erkenntnisse, die auf Aspekten des Wasserdatenaustauschs und des Bilateralismus beruhen. Erstens nutzt China seine überlegene Machtstellung gegenüber Indien für eine Strategie der dominanten Kontrolle über die Wasserressource. Zweitens tragen das Fehlen eines soliden, institutionellen Datenaustauschs und mangelnde Transparenz chinesischer Staudamm-Aktivitäten zu einem sich intensivierenden Konflikt bei.

Schlagwörter: Hydro-Hegemonie; Grenzüberschreitender Wasserkonflikt; Machteinsatz; China; Bilateralismus

Introduction

„It is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle“

Mandela, 1994

China und Indien erheben traditionell Anspruch auf den Status eines regionalen Hegemons – China in Ost-, Zentral- und Südostasien und Indien in Südasien. Zu ihrem Einfluss und ihrer Macht trägt auch die Rolle bei, die sie in vielen Flusseinzugsgebieten Asiens innehaben. China kann als „upstream superpower“ (Nickum 2008: 227) bezeichnet werden, da mehrere große, grenzüberschreitende Flüsse, darunter der Brahmaputra (auf Tibetisch Yarlung Ysangpo), in der tibetischen Hochebene entspringen. Die Wasserversorgung beider Länder birgt vor diesem Hintergrund ein enormes Konfliktpotential. Im Kontext des Brahmaputra-Beckens beispielsweise werden die Beziehungen zwischen Neu-Delhi und Beijing trotz einiger Bereiche der formalen Kooperation als konfliktbehaftet wahrgenommen, ohne bisher militärisch eskaliert zu sein. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei – wie in den meisten internationalen Wasserkonflikten – die Frage der gerechten Verteilung der Nutzung grenzüberschreitender Gewässer (Wolf 1999: 3).

Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, hinsichtlich dieser Frage die akteursorientierte Verhaltensdynamik zwischen Konflikt und Kooperation (als zu erklärende, abhängige Variable) im Brahmaputra-Becken bei einem asymmetrischen Machtverhältnis (als unabhängige Variable) zwischen den beiden Anrainern China und Indien zu betrachten. Solche Überlegungen sind wesentlich für die Forschung der Internationalen Beziehungen, da Machtverhältnisse innerhalb zwischenstaatlicher Interaktionen einflussreich sind und aufzeigen können, wie Kosten und Nutzen, als Ergebnis solcher Interaktionen, verteilt sind (Williams 2019: 83). Es ist daher von Nutzen zu untersuchen, welche Rolle Machtasymmetrien in zwischenstaatlichen Wasserkonflikten spielen und inwiefern sie entweder zur Stabilität oder Konfliktintensivierung beitragen.

Die Machtdimension von Wasserkonflikten wurde bereits vielfach erforscht. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht jedoch erstmals anhand einer qualitativen Fallanalyse den Einfluss von Macht im Wasserkonflikt zwischen China und Indien entlang des Brahmaputras zwischen 2013 und 2019 auf Basis des Konzepts der „Hydro-Hegemonie“ (Zeitoun und Warner 2006). Es wird aufgezeigt, wie sich Chinas Macht im politischen Verhalten am Brahmaputra manifestiert. Die gewonnenen Forschungserkenntnisse sind von besonderem Interesse für betroffene Akteur*innen, Analyst*innen und Politikberatungen, da sie auf das Risiko hinweisen, dass die chinesische Hydro-Hegemonie auch zukünftig die betroffenen Regionen in Indien bedroht. Aus dem dargelegten Forschungsinteresse leitet sich folgende Fragestellung ab: Wie hat sich die Machtasymmetrie zwischen China und Indien auf das Verhalten des Hydro-Hegemons und auf die daraus resultierende Konfliktintensität am Brahmaputra zwischen 2013 und 2019 ausgewirkt?

Im folgenden Theorieteil wird die konzeptionelle Grundlage von Hydro-Hegemonie erläutert. Der dritte Abschnitt befasst sich mit der Methodik dieser Arbeit. Im vierten Abschnitt wird der Analyserahmen angewandt, um das hydro-hegemoniale Verhalten der chinesischen Regierung am Brahmaputra zwischen 2013 und 2019 zu untersuchen. Im letzten Abschnitt werden die wichtigsten Ergebnisse zusammengefasst und darauf aufbauend weitere Forschungspfade empfohlen.

2. Hydro-Hegemonie

Auf der Grundlage früherer Beiträge zum Zusammenhang von Machtasymmetrie und zwischenstaatlichen Konflikten haben Zeitoun und Warner (2006) einen analytischen Rahmen entwickelt, der das Konzept der Hydro-Hegemonie definiert und dazu dient, dieses in seiner Komplexität zu erfassen. Er soll dazu dienen, grenzüberschreitende Wasserkonflikte mit einem Fokus auf Machtasymmetrien systematisch zu analysieren und zu erklären, wie die Kontrolle über Wasserressourcen nicht durch Wasserkriege oder institutionalisierte Kooperation, sondern durch alternative Strategien der Machtausübung erreicht wird. Das Konzept definiert einen Hydro-Hegemonen als den Anrainerstaat eines Flusses, der die Kontrolle hat, Spielregeln, die Art der Interaktion zwischen den Anrainern und das Ausmaß, in dem die Vorteile der Flüsse mit schwächeren Partnern geteilt werden, festzulegen (Zeitoun und Warner 2006: 438). Der Analyserahmen wird im Folgenden in groben Zügen vorgestellt.

2.1 Machtasymmetrie - Säulen und Ressourcen der Hydro-Hegemonie

Die Konfiguration eines hegemonialen Verhältnisses wird durch die relative Macht des Hydro-Hegemonen gegenüber anderen Anrainern konstituiert. Es ist diese relative Macht, die die Übernahme von Kontrolle über die Wasserressource gewährleistet. Max Weber beschreibt Macht als „jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht“ (Weber 1980: 28). In internationalen Beziehungen drückt sie sich in der Fähigkeit eines Staates aus, die Agenda und die Form der Interaktion gegenüber anderen Staaten zu bestimmen. Laut Lukes (2005: 15) können folgende drei Dimensionen von Macht unterschieden werden: strukturelle Macht, auch „hard power“ genannt; Macht über politische Agendasetzung, also die Fähigkeit „Spielregeln“ festzulegen; und Macht über Ideen, die dazu befähigt, Diskurse und Narrative zu bestimmen.

Strukturelle Macht ist nach Lukes die offensichtlichste Form von Macht. Zu ihr zählen im Kontext von Hydro-Hegemonie, neben militärischer und ökonomischer Überlegenheit, auch eine geographisch vorteilhafte Flussposition sowie das Potenzial, den Nutzen der Wasserressource voll auszuschöpfen (Zeitoun und Warner 2006: 436). Aus dieser Dimension ergibt sich die Möglichkeit des Staates, mit materiellen Mitteln – zum Beispiel durch die Mobilisierung finanzieller Mittel – Tatsachen zu schaffen. Die zweite Form der Macht bezieht sich auf das Setzen der politischen Tagesordnung, das Diktieren der Diskussion und die Fähigkeit durch Autorität und Legitimität Zielpunkte zu verschieben (Bachrach und Baratz 1962; Lukes 2005). Sie vergrößert sich laut Zeitoun und Warner (2006: 449) umso stärker, je reichhaltiger sich die Basis an internationalen Verbündeten gestaltet. Die dritte Dimension, die Macht über Ideen, wird durch die Sprache ausgeübt, die Akteur*innen in formellen Verhandlungen, in Nachrichten und Medien und in der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit verwenden. Dadurch können Themen in einer Weise präsentiert werden, die leicht akzeptierbar oder schwer anfechtbar ist (Zeitoun et a. 2011: 163). Die letzten beiden Dimensionen gelten als soft power und treten häufig kombiniert auf.

2.2 Form der Hegemonie - Kooperation oder Dominanz

Die Untersuchung von Zeitoun und Warner (2006: 437) zeigt, dass sich zwei Formen von Hydro-Hegemonen unterscheiden lassen, wie sie ihrer Kontrolle über die Wasserressource Ausdruck verleihen. Demnach können Hydro-Hegemonen entweder eine positive, integrative Führung ausüben, um kooperative Ergebnisse für alle zu gewährleisten („leadership buttressed by authority“) oder negatives, dominantes Verhalten an den Tag legen, das zu Konflikten führt („leadership buttressed by coercion“). Die meisten Konfigurationen von Hydro-Hegemonie „fall somewhere between the poles of enlightened leadership and oppressive domination“ (Zeitoun und Warner 2006: 439).

2.3 Strategien und Taktiken

Zeitouns und Warners Konzept geht davon aus, dass Hydro-Hegemonen zur Kontrolle über Wasserressourcen auf Strategien wie resource capture, integration oder containment zurückgreifen (Zeitoun und Warner 2006: 444). Welche Strategie angewandt wird, variiert je nach politischem Kontext (Zeitoun und Warner 2006: 555). Im Gegensatz zu der unilateralen Strategie des resource capture erfordern die Strategien des containment und der integration in der Regel ein Engagement mit anderen Anrainern (vgl. Abb. 1). Eine Strategie des containment kann darauf abzielen, die Konkurrenten entweder einzubinden oder sie in einer möglichst asymmetrischen Position einzudämmen. Zur Ausführung dieser Strategien wendet der Hegemon Taktiken bzw. „compliance-producing mechanisms“ (Zeitoun und Warner 2006: 450) zur Herstellung von Konformität an. Dazu zählen coercive (Druckmittel), utilitarian (Anreize), normative (Verträge) und hegemonic (Konstruktion von Wissen) compliance-producing mechanisms. Sie werden durch die Ausnutzung bestehender Machtasymmetrien innerhalb eines schwachen internationalen Kontexts ermöglicht (Zeitoun und Warner 2006: 444).



Abb. 1: Der Analyserahmen von Hydro-Hegemonie (Zeitoun und Warner 2006)

2.4 Folgen der Interaktion und Intensität des Konflikts

Die jeweils angewandte Strategie stellt die Beziehung zwischen den Anrainerstaaten und dem Grad der Konfliktintensität in dem Flusseinzugsgebiet her. Das Verhalten von Hydro-Hegemonen bestimmt demnach die Form der Interaktion der Anrainer, das Ergebnis dieser Interaktion (in Bezug auf die Wasserverteilung) und die Bandbreite des Konflikts, der in einem Flussbecken besteht, wie in Abbildung 1 mithilfe der Water Event Intensity Scale (Yoffe et al. 2001: 1112) dargestellt wird.

3. Methode

Aufbauend auf dem skizzierten konzeptionellen Hintergrund wendet die folgende Untersuchung den akteursorientierten Analyserahmen auf ein ausgewähltes Fallbeispiel an. Hierbei wird untersucht wie sich Chinas Machtasymmetrie mit Indien in seiner Wasserpolitik am Brahmaputra zwischen 2013 und 2019 ausgedrückt und auf die Konfliktintensität ausgewirkt hat. Die folgenden Abschnitte enthalten Schlüsselinformationen über Chinas Rolle als Hydro-Hegemon, die in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur noch nicht ausreichend erforscht ist. Der Ansatz ist in erster Linie qualitativ und stützt sich auf eine umfassende Literaturarbeit. Die Analyse basiert auf zwei Typen von Quellen über das Fallbeispiel: (1) Primärquellen wie Vereinbarungen, Erklärungen, Karten und Regierungsdokumente; und (2) Sekundärquellen wie Kommentare, Online-Zeitungen sowie die wissenschaftliche Literatur zum Thema.

Das Jahr 2013 bietet einen sinnvollen Ansatzpunkt für die vorliegende Konfliktanalyse, aufgrund entscheidender Geschehnisse, die sich in dem Jahr vollzogen haben, wie im folgenden Abschnitt erläutert wird. Darüber hinaus wird der Zeitraum als Umbruch Chinas zurückhaltender Außenpolitik hin zu einem zunehmend selbstbewussten, durchsetzungswilligen Ansatz gewertet. Charakteristisch dafür ist die Lancierung Chinas „Belt and Road Initiative“ (BRI)[1] im besagten Jahr, durch die sein globaler Einfluss erheblich ausgebaut wurde (Dave und Kobayashi 2018: 278).

4. Wasserkonflikt Indiens und Chinas am Brahmaputra von 2013 - 2019

Das Brahmaputra-Becken ist eines der bedeutendsten Flusseinzugsgebiete Asiens. Das Becken ist reich an biologischer Vielfalt, mit einem riesigen Potenzial für die Entwicklungvon Bewässerungstechnologien, Lebensgrundlagen, Erzeugung von Wasserkraft und Schifffahrt (Barua, Vij und Zulfiqur Rahman 2017: 2). Der Yarlung Ysangpo entspringt den oberen Ebenen des tibetischen Plateaus und fließt von dort nach Indien. Als Konsequenz steht das Land der Mitte im Zentrum der Wassersicherheit Indiens. Aufgrund seiner kategorischen Haltung bezüglich der eigenen Souveränität und Autonomie hat die chinesische Regierung kaum institutionalisierte Mechanismen

für die gemeinsame Bewirtschaftung von Flüssen mit seinen Nachbarn (Liu 2015: 7). Angesichts politischer Sensibilitäten historischer Art, der chinesisch-indischen Grenzstreitigkeiten sowie der indischen Opposition gegen Chinas BRI gilt das Verhältnis der beiden Anrainerstaaten seit vielen Jahren als belastet (Yuan 2019: 1).

4.1 Machtasymmetrie zwischen China und Indien seit 2013

Wie bereits angedeutet, wird Chinas Hydro-Hegemonie gegenüber Indien durch Beijings Kontrolle über die wasserreichen Gebiete Tibets ermöglicht. Chinas geografische Position ist von höchst strategischer Bedeutung für das Land, da es durch diese gegenüber dem Anrainer Indien einen enormen Vorteil bei der Kontrolle über die Wasserressource genießt. Wie Zeitoun und Warner (2006: 436) betonen, stellt die flussaufwärts gelegene Uferposition jedoch nicht den entscheidenden Faktor für die Charakterisierung eines Hydro-Hegemons dar. Es ist die relativ vorherrschende Rolle Chinas in den drei oben genannten Dimensionen von Macht, die die Volksrepublik gegenüber Indien seit 2013 zu einem erstarkenden Hydro-Hegemon werden lässt.

Strukturelle Macht

Mit Blick auf die erste Dimension, strukturelle Macht, besteht seit 2013 eine erhebliche Asymmetrie zwischen Beijing und Neu-Delhi, in Bezug auf die Bevölkerungszahl, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und die militärische Stärke, wie in Abbildung 2 illustriert. Indien ist darüber hinaus wirtschaftlich, asymmetrisch vom Land der Mitte abhängig. China ist Indiens drittgrößtes Exportzielland, wobei Indien gegenüber China nur Rang sieben einnimmt (India Briefing 2019). Indiens Handelsbilanzdefizit gegenüber China stieg im Analysezeitraum von ca. USD 31 Milliarden in 2013 auf rund USD 53 Milliarden in 2019 (Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2020). Diese Handelsbilanz untermauert Beijings überlegene Verhandlungsposition wesentlich.

Die Kontrolle über die Erhebung und das Teilen von Wasserdaten stellt einen weiteren Machtfaktor Chinas dar. Wasserdaten werden in der Regel innerhalb der Grenzen des Territoriums eines Landes gesammelt. Dies macht sie zu einem Instrument des Machtspiels, wenn es darum geht, Informationen ganz oder teilweise zu teilen oder sie gar nicht für Anrainer zugänglich zu machen (Barua et al. 2017: 5). Große (Wasser-) Infrastrukturprojekte in benachbarten Ländern sind ebenfalls ein Ausdruck von struktureller Macht, was die BRI seit 2013 zu einer sichtbaren Demonstration des zunehmenden chinesischen Einflusses in Südasien macht (Yuan 2019: 10) und dem Land der Mitte hilft, die zweite Dimension von Macht auszuüben.

Macht über politische Agendasetzung und internationale Unterstützung

Indien ist traditionell der regionale Hegemon Südasiens, wobei China diesen Status seit 2013 zunehmend streitig macht. Nicht zuletzt durch die BRI dehnt sich der chinesische Einfluss auf das aus, was Indien als seinen geopolitischen Hinterhof reklamiert (Yuan 2019: 2). Die Entwicklung chinesischer Wasserkraftprojekte in Südasien und deren politische Implikationen stellen eine sichtbare Demonstration dieses Einflusses dar. Infolge der massiven Infrastrukturprojekte in der Region haben sich die Beziehungen zwischen Beijing und dem gesamten süd- und südostasiatischen Raum seit 2013 neu orientiert und deuten auf eine neue, chinazentrische sozioökonomische Ordnung hin, in der die Volksrepublik die Spielregeln festlegt (Williams 2019: 90).

Indien hat seit ihrer Lancierung eine ablehnende Haltung gegenüber der BRI. Bezeichnenderweise weigerte sich die indische Regierung, an den ersten beiden BRI-Foren im Mai 2017 und 2019 teilzunehmen. Die Regierung begründete dies wie folgt: „[C]onnectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality" (Ministry of External Affairs India 2017). Andere südasiatische Staaten, wie Afghanistan, Bangladesch, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal und Pakistan, haben seit 2013 diversen BRI-Projekten in ihren Ländern zugestimmt (Ghosal Singh 2019). Dieser Wettbewerb zwischen Indien und China zeigt sich exemplarisch im Ringen um Einfluss an Orten wie Nepal (Williams 2019: 89). Indien betrachtet Nepal als einen Puffer zwischen sich und China und hat lange von engen Handels- und Wirtschaftsaktivitäten profitiert. Im Jahr 2017 unterzeichnete Nepal eine Absichtserklärung (MoU) für die Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen der BRI (MoFA Nepal 2017) sowie für die Entwicklung des Budhi-Gandaki-Wasserkraftprojekts, für das die chinesische Gezhouba-Gruppe verantwortlich sein sollte (Spross 2018).

Indien und Nepal haben eine Geschichte von Disputen über grenzüberschreitendes Wasser, wobei viele gemeinsame Vereinbarungen über die hydraulische Infrastruktur von Nepal als ungerecht angesehen werden (Mirumachi 2015: 61). Das Land der Mitte stellt daher einen alternativen Partner für das grenzüberschreitende Wassermanagement in Nepal dar (Murton et al. 2016). Dies hat auch Auswirkungen auf die Wasserströme flussabwärts nach Indien. Das Beispiel Nepals ist exemplarisch dafür, wie die chinesische Regierung durch ihren wachsenden Einfluss seit 2013 stetig an Verhandlungsmacht gewinnt: Beijing baut durch sein internationales Verhalten, wie im Kontext der BRI, seine Macht aus, um Spielregeln in der Region festlegen zu können. Es wird deutlich, wie Chinas Interaktionen im Kontext der BRI zunehmend die grenzüberschreitende Wassergovernance in Südasien steuert. Dieser Trend färbt gleichzeitig auf die dritte Machtdimension der Volksrepublik ab.

Macht über Ideen

Durch die BRI hat sich die chinesische Regierung seit 2013 bemüht, ihre Außenpolitik um das Narrativ einer ökonomisch-integrativen Ausrichtung zu gestalten. Die BRI wird von Beijing als Initiative zur offenen und inklusiven regionalen Entwicklung angepriesen (MoFA People´s Republic of China 2019). Infolgedessen scheint Beijing die Wasserbeziehungen der südasiatischen Region neu definieren zu wollen, entlang eines Narrativs der wirtschaftlichen Integration und der inklusiven Entwicklung von Infrastruktur, wobei es sich selbst dabei in dessen Zentrum profiliert (Williams 2019: 89). Williams (2019: 88) betont, dass Indien zum Eigenschutz seit 2013 versucht, diesem wirtschaftlichen Narrativ ein solches gegenüberzustellen, das Chinas geopolitische Motive in der Region in den Vordergrund stellt und Sicherheitsaspekte unterstreicht. So erklärte Neu-Delhi bezüglich des ökonomischen Korridors zwischen China und Pakistan (CPEC): „no country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity" (Ministry of External Affairs India 2017). Indiens propagiertes Narrativ scheint sich zwischen 2013 und 2019 in der Region nicht gegenüber Chinas durchgesetzt zu haben. Obwohl Chinas hegemoniales Narrativ den Diskurs in Indien selbst nicht dominieren konnte, hat es in anderen südasiatischen Ländern zur Wissenskonstruktion beigetragen, was dem Land der Mitte in dieser Machtdimension in der Region einen leichten Vorteil gegenüber Indien eingebracht hat. Diverse westliche Länder, allen voran die USA, haben sich Indiens Bedenken angeschlossen. Vor dem Hintergrund der hier aufgezeigten Machtasymmetrie befasst sich der nächste Abschnitt mit Chinas Aktivitäten in Wasserangelegenheiten gegenüber Indien am Brahmaputra zwischen 2013 und 2019.

Country	GDP per capita (US$)	Population	Military Spending (US$ in billion)
China	9,770.8	1,392,730,000	239,2
India	2,010.0	1,352,617,330	66,2

Abb. 2: Power Distribution among China and India as of 2018 (Eigendarstellung)

4.2 Chinas Verhalten als Hydro-Hegemon am Brahmaputra

Obwohl Beijing und Neu-Delhi durch ihren Einfluss das Potenzial haben, multilaterale Zusammenarbeit in Asien zu initiieren, verfolgen sie beim Thema Wasserkooperation grenzüberschreitender Flüsse in erster Linie einen bilateralen Ansatz (Liu 2015: 359). So hat keines der beiden Länder die UN-Gewässer-Konvention ratifiziert, die seit 2014 die Nutzung transnationaler Flüsse regeln soll. Es hat seit 2013 jedoch zwei MoUs zwischen Indien und China bezüglich des Brahmaputras gegeben. Wie im The Hague Report (2017: 27) erläutert, betrifft das erste MoU Beijings Bereitstellung von hydrologischen Informationen über den Brahmaputra während der Hochwassersaison (zwischen Mai und Oktober), während sich das zweite mit der Stärkung der Zusammenarbeit befasst.

Die Unterzeichnung des ersten MoUs geht auf das Jahr 2002 zurück und wurde in den Jahren 2008, 2013 und 2018 verlängert. Es kann als Reaktion auf ein Geschehen im Juni 2000 betrachtet werden, als in Tibet ein Damm brach und im indischen Arunachal Pradesh stromabwärts eine Sturzflut verursachte. Die Überschwemmungen führten zu 30 Todesopfern und verursachten erhebliche Schäden an indischer Infrastruktur (Climate Diplomacy 2018). Aufgrund des fehlenden hydrologischen Datenaustauschs zwischen den beiden Ländern war sich Indien der herannahenden Flut nicht bewusst. Indien nutzt seitdem die von China erhaltenen Informationen bei der Formulierung von Hochwasservorhersagen und zahlt jährlich etwa 850.000 chinesische Yuan (etwa 120.000 USD), um die Kosten für die Bereitstellung dieser Informationen zu decken (Central Water Commission and Bureau of Hydrology and Water Resources 2014). Dies steht im Gegensatz zu Chinas Abkommen mit Bangladesch, das die Daten auf Grundlage einer Absichtserklärung über die Bereitstellung von hydrologischen Informationen von 2008 kostenlos erhält (Den Hague Institute for Global Justice 2017: 75; Siddique 2015). Dies deutet darauf hin, dass Chinas hydro-hegemoniale Strategie von dem jeweiligen Land abhängt, mit dem es interagiert, was ein Fall von Streitigkeiten ist und den Spielraum von Machteinsatz zwischen Flussanrainern verdeutlicht.

Zusätzlich zum MoU bezüglich hydrologischer Daten unterzeichneten Indien und China 2013 ein MoU über die Stärkung der Zusammenarbeit an grenzüberschreitenden Flüssen. Das MoU versucht dies durch einen bestehenden Mechanismus auf Expertenebene zwischen den beiden Ländern und durch gemeinsames Notfallmanagement zu erreichen (Ministry of External Affairs India 2013). Die indische Regierung hat darauf aufbauend versucht weitere Mechanismen zur Transparenzschaffung hinsichtlich der chinesischen Aktivitäten am Brahmaputra zu etablieren – jedoch

ohne Erfolg. Im Jahr 2013 schlug der indische Premierminister, Manmohan Singh, während eines bilateralen Treffens auf dem BRICS-Gipfel dem chinesischen Ministerpräsidenten die Einrichtung eines gemeinsamen Mechanismus zur Bewertung der Art der Bautätigkeit im Autonomen Gebiet Tibet, in Form einer Wasserkommission, eines zwischenstaatlichen Dialogs oder eines Vertrags zur Behandlung von Wasserfragen zwischen den beiden Ländern vor (PTI 2013). Laut Amano (2015) hat Indien China auch um die Bereitstellung von Daten über die Trockenzeit gebeten. Keiner dieser Vorschläge wurde von China angenommen. Stattdessen hat Beijing seine Kontrolle über die Wasserressourcen für enorme Investitionen in Staudämme am Yarlung Tsangpo genutzt. Um seinen Wasser- und Energiebedarf in den dicht besiedelten Ebenen des Nordens zu decken, hat Beijing seit 2013 sukzessive durch den Bau von Dämmen und Umleitungen in die tibetischen Flüsse im Süden eingegriffen (Den Hague Institute for Global Justice 2017:33). Die Volksrepublik braucht dringend Wasser: Wie Chinas Vizeminister für Wasserressourcen 2011 erklärte, steht das Land vor einer „increasingly grim“ Wasserknappheit (Moore 2013).

Ein weiterer Anreiz für China, in Wasserkraftwerke zu investieren und damit zunehmend grenzüberschreitende Flüsse aufzustauen, ergibt sich aus seinen Klimaschutzverpflichtungen (Den Hague Institute for Global Justice 2017: 33). Gemäß des 12. und 13. Fünfjahresplans Chinas wird die Wasserkraft als Kernstück des chinesischen Plans zum Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien gefördert (Gosens et al. 2017: 142). So stellte China 2014 den Zangmu-Staudamm am Oberlauf des Brahmaputra fertig. Obwohl die indischen Nachfragen über chinesische Staudammbauaktivitäten am Brahmaputra auf die Jahrtausendwende zurückreichen, da Indiens Fischereiindustrie und sein Ökosystem von der chinesischen Entwicklung am Fluss betroffen sind, kündigte Beijing den Bau des Zangmu-Staudamms erst 2010 an (Den Hague Institute for Global Justice 2017: 30). China sagte zwar zu, dass das Wasser weiterhin flussabwärts fließen würde, jedoch wurde die Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung des Zangmu-Projekts Indien nicht zugänglich gemacht (Wang 2010). Indien bemängelte wiederholt, dass unklar bleibe, welche Folgen der Staudamm mit sich bringen könnte. Das größte Wasserkraftwerk Tibets, Zam, ist seit 2015 vollständig in Betrieb (Xinhuanet 2015). Seitdem wurde der Bau mindestens drei weiterer Dämme in Da Gu, Jiacha und Jie Xu, entlang des Brahmaputra, in Angriff genommen, wie in Abbildung 3 ersichtlich. China hat bis 2019 jedoch keine offizielle Mitteilung über den Bau dieser Dämme veröffentlicht (Palmo 2019).

Die Volksrepublik hat darüber hinaus massive Wasserumleitungsprojekte wie das Süd-Nord-Wassertransferprojekt (SNWTP) in Angriff genommen. Das SNWTP hat zum Ziel, jährlich etwa 45 Milliarden Kubikmeter Wasser aus Zentral- und Südwestchina zu transferieren, um den Durchfluss des Huang He zu erhöhen (International Rivers 2013). Das Projekt ist umstritten, da es den Bau eines Staudamms an der Großen Biegung von Yarlung Ysangpo umfasst, wo der Fluss in die assamesische Ebene Indiens fließt, was die Umleitung von enormen Wassermassen vom Yarlung Ysangpo zum Gelben Fluss bedeuten würde. Die Unsicherheit und der Informationsmangel über die Baupläne dieser Projekte, verbunden mit Überschwemmungsereignissen in Indien und der Sensibilität zwischen den beiden Nationen aufgrund von Grenzstreitigkeiten, haben zwischen 2013 und 2019 zu Misstrauen und Besorgnis im flussabwärts gelegenen Indien geführt. Laut Chellaney (2017) hat sich China zudem in 2017, während der Doklamkrise,[2] geweigert, hochwasserbezogene hydrologische Daten an Indien weiterzugeben. Obwohl der Austausch von hydrologischen Daten 2018 wieder aufgenommen wurde, demonstrierte die Doklam-Konfrontation, wie China Wasser als politisches Druckmittel einsetzen kann (Climate Diplomacy 2018).



Abb. 3 Brahmaputra River in Tibet and hydropower dams (Tibet Policy Institute 2019) Daguaiwan

China als dominanter Hydro-Hegemon

China hat bilaterale MoUs mit Indien über Aspekte der Nutzung des Brahmaputra unterzeichnet, was als ein Zeichen für positive hegemoniale Führung gewertet werden kann. Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden Großmächten konzentriert sich auf den technischen Datenaustausch und auf Expertentreffen. Allerdings teilt China hydrologische Daten über den Brahmaputra nur während der Hochwassersaison mit Indien. Der Datenaustausch findet nicht das ganze Jahr über statt, insbesondere nicht während der trockenen Monate. Das MoU von 2013 enthält laut Liu (2015: 364) keinen Mechanismus zur Beilegung von Streitigkeiten im Zusammenhang mit dem Datenaustausch. Obwohl seit 2013 ein Mechanismus auf Expertenebene zwischen Indien und China eingerichtet wurde, um grenzüberschreitende Flussprobleme zu behandeln, ist immer noch unklar, wie er funktioniert oder welche Fortschritte erzielt wurden (Liu 2015: 362).

Insgesamt zeigt die Bilanz eine negative Form des hegemonialen Verhaltens Chinas. So scheint die Volksrepublik sich in Bezug auf die gemeinsamen Wasserressourcen auf eine Politik der absoluten Souveränität besonnen zu haben – auf Kosten einer Politik der Integrität des flussabwärtsgelegenen Indiens. Chellaney (2011) macht darauf aufmerksam, dass das Land der Mitte in seiner Geschichte mehr Staudämme an seinen Flüssen gebaut hat als der Rest der Welt zusammengenommen und dennoch kaum institutionelle Mechanismen über die gemeinsame Nutzung von Wasser mit seinen Nachbarn eingerichtet hat. Wie bereits erwähnt, hat Beijing die UN-Gewässer-Konvention nicht ratifiziert, die einen Rahmen für die multilaterale Zusammenarbeit im Wasserbereich bietet. Artikel 11 dieser UN-Konvention erwähnt die Notwendigkeit, dass Staaten Informationen über die Nutzung internationaler Wasserläufe austauschen; Artikel 21 und 23 gehen auf Verschmutzung, Verhütung und Schutz der Meeresumwelt ein (UN 1997). Beijing ist der Ansicht, dass die Konvention die Interessen der flussaufwärts gelegenen Staaten nicht angemessen berücksichtigt. Darüber hinaus befasst sich nur ein Artikel im Wassergesetz der Volkrepublik China mit internationalem Wasser (People's Republic of China 2002), was als Hinweis auf die geringe Relevanz, die das Land der Mitte dem internationalen Verlauf seiner Flüsse beimisst, gewertet werden kann. Der Gesamtumfang der Integration Indiens ins Wassermanagement hält sich somit in Grenzen. Im folgenden Teil wird erläutert, wie Chinas dominantes hydro-hegemoniales Verhalten unter Einsatz von Strategien und Taktiken bewertet werden kann.

Chinas Strategien und Taktiken als Hydro-Hegmon

Die vorliegende Analyse lässt darauf schließen, dass China in seinem bilateralen Engagement mit Indien zwischen 2013 und 2019 hauptsächlich eine dominante Strategie des resource capture und des containment, anstelle von integration angewandt hat, um seine Kontrolle über die Wasserressource auszuüben. Im Rahmen der resource capture wandte China Taktiken eines aktiven Unilateralismus an und trieb in Abwesenheit formaler Absprachen Projekte voran, die Indien als Flussanrainer beeinflussen. China hat seit 2013, als dominanter Hydro-Hegemon, unilateral Wasserumleitungsprojekte und den Bau von Staudämmen und Flussverbindungen geplant und umgesetzt.

Ein Ausdruck, der allgemein den Aufstieg des Landes der Mitte und das entsprechende internationale Verhalten seit 2013 erfasst, ist der der „non-confrontational assertiveness“ (Mingjiang 2012). Tatsächlich waren die versteckten, non-konfrontativen und zugleich auf Zwang beruhenden Wege, durch die chinesische Ziele im besagten Wasserkonflikt sichergestellt wurden, zentral in der vorliegenden Analyse. Sie zeigten sich sowohl in Chinas alleingängiger Wassernutzung, sprich der Unterlassung einer gemeinsamen Nutzung hydrologischer Daten und dem Bau von Dämmen, als auch in seiner unverbindlichen Haltung gegenüber Indien, reflektiert in der Abneigung, ein Abkommen zu schließen. Durch die Verweigerung der Weitergabe von Bauinformationen und Daten, die nicht zuletzt für den Hochwasserschutz und die Planung während der Monsunzeit in Indien von entscheidender Bedeutung sind, zeigte die chinesische Regierung während des Doklam-Konflikts, dass sie nicht abgeneigt ist, Wasser als Druckmittel und damit als politische Waffe einzusetzen, um seinen flussabwärts gelegenen Nachbarn zu kontrollieren und dessen politisches Handeln zu erzwingen. Der mangelnde Austausch hydrologischer Daten mit Indien manifestierte sich in durch Überschwemmungen verursachten menschlichen Opfern und in schweren Schäden an indischer Infrastruktur. Dieses Verhalten lässt sich in Chinas außenpolitischen Ansatz einordnen, seinen freundlichen Aufstieg zu beteuern und sich zugleich bei Grenzansprüchen aggressiv zu zeigen (Sundaramurthy 2020:

177). Die Strategie und Taktiken des resource capture gingen einher mit einer containment-Strategie. Hinsichtlich dieser hat sich China seit 2013 augenscheinlich bemüht, Indien bilateral in seine Wasserpolitik einzubeziehen, aber durch sein unilaterales Verhalten gezielt seine asymmetrische Position sichergestellt.

4.3 Ergebnisse der Interaktion und Intensität des Konflikts

Zeitouns und Warners (2006: 440) Konzept der Hydro-Hegemonie geht davon aus, dass die Machtdynamik zwischen Anrainern in einem Flussbecken letztendlich die Intensität eines Wasserkonflikts bestimmt. Im Fall des Brahmaputra zwischen 2013 und 2019 lässt sich grundsätzlich sagen, dass die Abwesenheit von Krieg oder das Vorhandensein einer Form der Zusammenarbeit nicht die Abwesenheit von Konflikt zwischen den Flussanrainerstaaten bedeutet hat. Wasserbezogene Spannungen gingen in erster Linie auf die einseitigen Aktivitäten zurück, mit denen China flussaufwärts seine Kontrolle ausübte.

Obwohl der Datenaustausch in einem allgemeinen grenzüberschreitenden Kontext als ein Anfang und ein Mittel zur Vertrauensbildung zwischen den Anrainerstaaten betrachtet wird, hat im speziellen Fall des Brahmaputras das Fehlen eines hoch entwickelten Datenaustauschverfahrens auf der Ebene des Einzugsgebiets das Misstrauen zwischen den Anrainerstaaten gefördert und die regionale Zusammenarbeit behindert (Liu 2015: 360).

Mit Blick auf die Wasserverteilung steht Indien vor großen Herausforderungen im Zusammenhang mit Überschwemmungen und Dürren, der Entwicklung von Infrastruktur, dem wachsenden Misstrauen und der mangelnden offenen Kommunikation seitens Chinas. Beijings Agenda für den Bau von Staudämmen hat in Indien Besorgnis über die Gefahr von Sturzfluten, Erdrutschen, Umweltverschmutzung und zukünftigen Wassermangel verschärft, von denen Millionen Menschen flussabwärts betroffen sind (Khadka 2016).

Die Spannungen um die Aktivitäten am grenzüberschreitenden Fluss werden nicht zuletzt durch die anhaltenden Grenz- und Landstreitigkeiten zwischen Indien und China verkompliziert. Ausgehend von Zeitouns und Warners Konzept, konsolidierte China seine Kontrolle über die Wasserressource somit zwischen 2013 und 2019 durch eine negative/dominante Form der Hydro-Hegemonie und eine resource-capture- und containment- Kontrollstrategie. Diese Dynamik hat einen „kalten“ Konflikt zum Ergebnis und liegt im negativen Bereich nach dem Maßstab der Water Event Intensity Scale (Yoffe et al. 2001). Indiens ausgesprochene Kritik an Chinas unilateralem Verhalten kann als eine Tendenz zur „contested control“ gewertet werden, wobei die Machtasymmetrie zwischen den Ländern eine bilaterale militärische Auseinandersetzung um die Wasserressource unwahrscheinlich erscheinen lässt.

Fazit

Die vorliegende Arbeit hat die Auswirkung von Machtasymmetrie zwischen China und Indien auf die Dynamik des Wasserkonflikts am Brahmaputra-Becken zwischen 2013 und 2019 untersucht. Die Untersuchung macht deutlich, wie die Kontrolle über Wasser in Abwesenheit von Krieg und in Anwesenheit von formaler Zusammenarbeit zu einem anhaltenden und sich verschärfenden Konflikt geführt hat und situativ als politische Waffe eingesetzte wurde. Die Untersuchung des Fallbeispiels brachte drei wichtige Erkenntnisse: Erstens genießt China gegenüber Indien seit 2013 einen offensichtlichen Machtvorteil in allen drei Dimensionen von Macht. Zweitens hat diese Machtasymmetrie zwischen 2013 und 2019 zu einem Verhalten der dominanten Kontrolle Chinas über das Brahmaputra-Becken geführt, die durch resource-capture- und containment-Strategien ausgeübt wurde. Zwar gibt es eine gewisse Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Anrainerstaaten in Form von MoUs, doch ist diese im Wesentlichen unilateral und hängt vom politischen Kalkül Chinas als Hydro-Hegemonen ab. Die dritte Erkenntnis ist, dass das Fehlen eines soliden, institutionellen Datenaustauschs und mangelnde Transparenz chinesischer Staudamm-Aktivitäten derzeit maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die wachsende Konfliktintensität haben.

Über den Mehrwert hinaus, den diese Arbeit zur Fallstudienforschung von Hydro-Hegemonie leistet, lassen sich im Zusammenhang dieses Beitrags hegemoniale Tendenzen der aufsteigenden Volksrepublik innerhalb des internationalen Systems ableiten. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse sollen auch das Potenzial haben, einen Beitrag zur Arbeit von Analysten und Politikberatern zu leisten, da sie auf das Risiko hinweisen, dass die chinesische Hydro-Hegemonie auch zukünftig die betroffenen Regionen in Indien bedroht. Während der Analyserahmen Wege für das Verständnis internationaler Wasserpolitik eröffnet, kann er zugleich einschränkend sein, da er wesentliche Dynamiken, die zwischen nichtstaatlichen Akteuren über internationale Grenzen stattfinden, unbeleuchtet lässt.

Darüber hinaus bietet das Konzept nur eine oberflächliche Antwort auf die Frage, unter welchen Umständen sich ein Hydro-Hegemon für eine bestimmte Verhaltensform entscheidet. Es sollte untersucht werden, welche politischen Faktoren hierfür am entscheidendsten sind. In dem Zusammenhang könnten die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit mit Chinas hydro-hegemonem Verhalten gegenüber anderen Anrainerstaaten verglichen werden. Um einer Eskalation des Konflikts vorzubeugen, sollte auch untersucht werden, unter welchen Umständen sich Beijing – trotz anhaltender Machtasymmetrie – möglicherweise für einen Richtungswechsel hin zu einer positiven Form der Hydro-Hegemonie wenden würde.

Indien steht vor der gewaltigen Herausforderung, China verstärkt in einen nachhaltigen Dialog einzubinden, um das Misstrauen zu beseitigen, was langfristig notwendig ist. Aspekte der Machtasymmetrie müssen in Zukunft von beteiligten Akteuren berücksichtigt werden, wenn diese den Konflikt, seine Wurzeln und seinen bisherigen Verlauf verstehen und deeskalieren wollen. Wenn Indien und China nicht zu einer dauerhaften Einigung gelangen, die über den derzeitigen Modus Operandi hinausgeht, könnte sich der momentan noch kalte Konflikt im Laufe der Jahre zu einem heißen Konflikt wandeln.

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Footnotes:

[1] Der Wirtschaftsgürtel der Seidenstraße wurde vom chinesischen Präsidenten Xi Jinping im September 2013 vorge stellt. Die Kombination eines Land- und Seeverkehrsnetzes soll die sogenannte „Belt and Road Initiative" ergeben. Die BRI umspannt ungefähr 80 Länder und verbindet innerhalb eines Netzes von Straßen, Schienen, Seewegen und Luftbrücken die Region Südostasien mit Mittel- und Nordeuropa. Mit der Initiative möchte China mit massiven Investitionen in Asien, Afrika und Europa neue Handelsrouten, Märkte und Energiequellen erschließen (Merics 2020).

[2] Die Doklamkrise zwischen China und Indien bezeichnet die militärische Grenzkonfrontation zwischen den beiden Ländern wegen des chinesischen Baus einer Straße in Doklam in der Nähe eines Dreiländergrenzbereichs. Im Juni 2017 begannen chinesische Truppen mit Baufahrzeugen und Straßenbauausrüstung mit dem Ausbau einer bestehenden Straße in Doklam in südlicher Richtung, einem Gebiet, das sowohl von China als auch von Indiens Verbündetem Bhutan beansprucht wird. Am 18. Juni 2017 überquerten etwa 270 indische Truppen die Grenze nach Doklam, um die chinesischen Truppen am Bau der Straße zu hindern.

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06

07

The Technopolitics of Desalination in Saudi Arabia

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Abstract

Despite its location in one of the most arid regions worldwide, Saudi Arabia is the third largest water consumer per capita. Desalination technology turns seawater into the main source for drinking water, fuelled by petroleum in order to provide its population with water. Besides, control over water infrastructure contributes to the state's distributive power within the Saudi Arabian rentier economy. However, increasing demand for water on the one hand and scarcity of and declining demand for oil on the other hand urge the government to reconceptualise its water and energy policies as illustrated in the reform program Vision 2030. With reference to the concept of technopolitics, it will be illustrated how Saudi Arabia attempts to maintain the power while its commitment to environmentally friendly water supply remains rather superficial.

Keywords: desalination, technopolitics, Saudi-Arabia, Vision 2030, water scarcity

Introduction

Saudi Arabia is located in one of the most arid areas worldwide. Concurrently, the oil-based economy is booming, and the daily water consumption peaked at 263 litres per capita in 2019 (Water Politics 2019). Today, desalination plants situated along the Saudi's coastline provide 50% of the country's water requirements and 70% of its drinking water, making Saudi Arabia the largest producer of desalinated water (Ouda 2014: 347). Given the global climate crisis, the extraordinary high amount of water use is alarming. As a growing population demands increasing amounts of the resources water and oil, the government presented several political readjustments in their development program Vision 2030. It aims, broadly speaking, for the diversification of the Saudi Arabian economy in order to terminate the oil dependency and to engage in the renewable energy market. Desalination technology gains importance in the country's non-conventional water sources, thereby playing a crucial role at the intersection of water and energy supply. Its management exemplifies how Saudi Arabia intends to tackle water scarcity and its dependency on hydrocarbon. The following analysis will explore how the water policies of the Saudi state reflect its strategies to maintain power in times of scarcity and climate change. Additionally, I will point to the limits of the rentier state whose legitimacy is based on the unrestricted availability of oil and other natural resources.

With respect to a more comprehensive understanding of Saudi Arabia's water and desalination policies, the concept of technopolitics provides an analytical tool considering the intersection of technology and political power. I argue that technopolitics not only helps to understand the intersection between desalination and political power. It also reveals strategies of the Saudi Arabian rentier economy to address economic and environmental pressures in times of scarcity and climate change.

First, I will discuss the concept of technopolitics in light of the Saudi rentier economy. Second, I will outline the emergence of desalination technology in the country in order to contextualise the water policies in Vision 2030. Third, it will be examined how Vision 2030 facilitates the commodification of water against the background of growing privatisation and diversification of the national economy. Finally, environmental consequences of desalination and shortcomings of water policies will be discussed. In short, desalination technology underpins the legitimacy of the Saudi Arabian state which attempts to alleviate growing pressure to reform as well as environmental damage through technopolitical short-term solutions.

Technopolitics in Saudi Arabia

The term technopolitics describes how technology is used to pursue political goals and to express the manifestation of power (von Schnitzler 2016: 10). Referring to water infrastructure, Obertreis et al. state that "the main thrust in the neoliberal era is the use of market mechanisms and technological fixes as a solution to environmental problems." (Obertreis et al. 2016: 171). As a result, infrastructure policies may not only reflect the developmental needs of a country but also include cultural norms, governance patterns, or funding mechanisms (Obertreis et al. 2016: 172). In the case of Saudi Arabia, water supply and the control over resources define political authority as governing and policing of the nation-state's territory strengthen the sovereignty and power of the Saudi state (Jones 2010: 10).

These features are echoed in the rentier state theory that was formulated by Hossein Mahdavy in the 1970s and remains prominent to describe state-society relations in oil states. The social contract demands obedience and political passivity from the population in exchange for wide-ranging subsidies and the redistribution of wealth that is accumulated through rents of export revenues (Faudot 2019: 95). However, a major criticism emerges out of the simplistic dichotomy between the state as political, and civil society as private realm. As Hanieh points out, the theory misses the interconnection between the ruler – in this case the Saudi royal family – and a bourgeoisie with exclusive access to oil rents (Hanieh 2015: 2-3). Consequently, this elite profits from client-patron relationships that channel distribution and depict the power base of the authoritarian state (ibid). Given the insufficient data available on how clientelism shapes the desalination industry, I will rather focus on how scarcity impacts both state-society and state-market relations.

Most importantly, the rentier state theory does not only ignore other socio-economic factors but also loses ground in times of declining oil demand. As I will show with reference to the technopolitics of water, Saudi

Arabia exhibits the internal complexity and dilemmas of rentier economies in the 21st century.

To begin with, the state's power foremost depends on the ability to provide basic resources such as water which is heavily subsidised and integrated in the welfare state services. Following the revenues of the oil boom, the state was able to subsidise water generously when the demand increased due to intensive wheat cultivation (Jones 2010: 229). As a so-called technostate (Jones 2010: 14), the social contract between ruler and ruled is based on technology, science and expertise: the state improves the living conditions through technical innovation and the citizens accept the constraints of the authoritarian system. Beginning in the early period of Saudi Arabian statehood, rulers have used scientific knowledge and technology for nation-building purposes and the establishment of social order (ibid.). Information has been generated by foreign, mainly American scientists such as the geologist Karl Twitchell and resulted in administrational and infrastructural structures spread across the country in order to achieve a strong power base for the Saudi Arabian government (Jones 2014: 35).

Turning to desalination, Jones points out: "it [desalination] was, foremost, a political enterprise, one that served to secure political authority. In the heyday of the oil boom, finding, making, and providing water came to serve as a form of political patronage" (Jones 2010: 5). It becomes evident that water resources were embedded in the rentier economy, thereby complexifying the access to power that does not exclusively rely on the oil industry. However, the Saudi Arabian government not only aims at managing and distributing water as a crucial resource in an arid region, but also at controlling its population, preventing upheavals, and maintaining the authoritarian system.

Water infrastructure, therefore, serves as an important instrument to legitimise power and to reproduce the self-image of a state (Obertreis et al. 2016: 171). The latter will be examined later by analysing the goals of Vision 2030. Furthermore, the multidimensionality of this resource provokes different perspectives on water. Not only does water sustain the population but it can also be treated as a tradable commodity (Obertreis et al. 2016: 170-71). Given that Saudi Arabia has, to a limited extent, implemented neo-liberal policies including the privatisation of public goods which is being enforced in Vision 2030, the market value of water plays a crucial role. This aspect gains importance given the prospective declining demand of oil resources and the pressure on the regime to maintain the costly Saudi lifestyle. In addition, water is linked to ecology and environmental issues as Saudi Arabia's water reservoirs are limited, and the high demand threatens a sustainable and environmentally friendly supply. The upcoming global discourse around ecological sustainability also affects desalination technology. However, the approaches to environmentalism remain minimal and are tied to economic interests as the following chapter will demonstrate.

Desalination

The modern desalination industry in Saudi Arabia launched in 1965 when the Saline Water Conversion Company (SWCC) was established as a branch of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water (Ouda 2014: 3). One of the first major plants was planned in Jeddah in 1969 by the United States' Department of Interior's Office of Saline Water and constructed by a subsidiary of Coca-Cola (Jones 2010: 3). The trend to involve foreign companies as well as the functional differentiation between the planning and construction process remain in place today. For instance, the Al-Khair plant in Jubail was built between 2011 and 2014 by two Greek firms and supervised by the Finnish company Poyry (Water Technology 2020). This suggests that Saudi Arabia is dependent on foreign expertise and business, as asserted by Jones. However, the ownership often lies either within the SWCC as a national agency or with Saudi companies. In 2014, most desalination plants were state-owned, but new projects such as the first solar plant in Al Khafji or the Rabigh plant reflect the ongoing privatisation trend of water supply (Smart Water Magazine 2019). While the overall control over water remains, the pressure on the national revenue demands a mixed approach of outsourcing and state management which illustrates that the conventional rentier economy is descending.

Today, thirty-one plants are operating in seventeen locations as shown in the map below (Al-Ghalayini 2018 & Fig. 1). Based on a network of pumping stations and pipes, desalinated water is transported to the cities where the water is mostly consumed for domestic use. The largest plant in Jubail was commissioned in 2009 and serves to supply the Saudi capital Riyadh with water.

In the aftermath of the 1980s oil boom, the Ministry of Agriculture built several new desalination plants and ordered the decommissioning of old, less efficient plants. In contrast, the date of decommissioning was put backward due to the rapid growth of both the economy and the population, which contributed to increased water demand (Ouda 2014: 4). Desalination was, therefore, seen as a solution for Saudi Arabia's limited natural water resources, and the public regarded its development and management a political responsibility (Jones 2010: 5).

Given that seawater will remain available in nearly unlimited amounts, it is tempting to classify desalinated water as a renewable water resource without considering environmental consequences. Still, desalination technology is not only costly but also environmentally problematic as the preferred osmosis technology requires high amounts of energy the majority of which is generated out of petroleum. Facing the declining demand of oil resources and the growing awareness of potential ecological consequences, solar power slowly becomes more important on the Saudi energy market.

As a result, the first solar plant was Al Khafji, constructed in 2015 by the Spanish company Abengoa and



Fig. 1: desalination plants on Saudi coasts (Abdul Latif Jameel 2019).

Advanced Water Technology (AWT), the commercial branch of the Saudi King Abdulaziz City Science and Technology (KACST) and was supposed to produce 60,000m3 of water a day. Interestingly, the original contractor failed to combine the reverse osmosis approach with photovoltaics (PV) solar panels and nearly went bankrupt. Consequently, SWCC hired two different contractors for each the desalination and the solar-PV, not guaranteeing that the plant will rely on solar instead of the grid. Because of the delay, Al-Khafji plant is unlikely to be in operation before 2021 or 2022 (Laursen 2018).

To sum up, the brief overview of desalination in Saudi Arabia underlines how technology has been used to support the political and economic goals of the government. On the one hand, water supply is perceived as a welfare duty of the state that uses the control over infrastructure as a power asset. The state commands the associated network of distribution and can therefore regulate who receives how much water. On the other hand, growing pressure on the national revenue due to scarce resources forces the government to outsource the management of some desalination plants to private companies, as reflected in the reforms of Vision 2030. The turn towards renewables like solar energy, however, is deficient, slow, and closely tied to economic profit, as the closer examination of Vision 2030's premises will delineate.

Vision 2030

The drop of oil revenues has accelerated the development plan Vision 2030 that Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman presented in 2016. This reform program is supposed to enable a controlled transition to a diversified economy that depends to a lesser extent on oil. The rationale behind seeks to prevent future loans and rigid changes of living standard (Faudot 2019: 99). Under the three pillars that refer to the Saudi self-image ("[recognising] the status as the heart of Arab and Islamic worlds", "become a global investment powerhouse" and the transformation into a "global hub connecting three continents" (Vision 2030a: 6)), the plan combines policies of privatisation, liberalisation and self-proclaimed improvement of lifestyle of Saudi citizens. At the same time, there are only a few general references to protect natural resources (see Vision 2030a: 23).

The diversification of the Saudi Arabian economy also encompasses the extension of the energy market. Aramco, the national oil company, will be transformed into "a global industrial conglomerate" (Vision 2030: 7) and 60% of the GDP should be provided by the private sector (Khashan 2017). Water and electricity are supposed to be privatised in order to reduce public spending (ibid.). SWCC, as a major regulator of desalinated water supply, is included in the privatisation trend and an

increased production capacity of 5 million cubic meter per day is forecasted (Al-Ghalayini 2018). Given the decreased share of SWCC to only 60% of the national water supply in 2013, firms such as Jubail Water and Power or Shuaibah Water and Electricity are ready to step in (Water Politics 2017). Furthermore, 92% of the population is supposed to get access to water services as part of the measure to guarantee the "sustainability of vital resources" (Vision 2030b). The following examples of Vision 2030's water policies illustrate the understanding and framing of sustainability by the Saudi government.

For instance, the measures to tackle water scarcity can be categorised in two ways: the first aim is to reduce the water consumption, as Saudi Arabia is the third largest water consumer per capita worldwide after the United States and Canada (Water World 2019). Accordingly, the Qatrah programme, launched in March 2019, seeks citizens to decrease their water use to 200 litres per person per day by 2020 and 150 litres by 2030 (Water Politics 2019). Furthermore, agriculture should be limited to areas with natural and renewable resources, inverting the water-demanding agricultural policies of the 1970s as mentioned above. Given the fact that 80% of water is consumed by the agricultural sector, the government starts to expand the regulation and prefers to depend on food import instead of domestic production (DeNicola et al. 2015: 346).

Second, a more efficient use of renewable water sources and treated water is planned. For this purpose, the Saline Water Desalination Research Institute (SWDRI) was established by SWCC, cooperating with national and international companies in order to optimise the desalination process and enhance the investment in renewable energy sources (Ouda 2014: 8). Against the background of the fact that 15% of Saudi Arabian oil production is used for desalination, it can be concluded that the economic well-being of the country rather than environmental concerns drives the reliance on alternative energy resources. This is also apparent in the framing of the renewable energy sector as an investment opportunity, enhanced through public-private partnerships and liberalisation (Vision 2030a: 49). The gradual opening of the rentier economy is grounded in the belief that "free market prices shall, in the long term, stimulate productivity and competitiveness among utility companies and open the door to investment and diversification of the energy mix in the Kingdom" (Vision 2030a: 51). Given the extension of desalination technology that involved foreign private companies over the recent years, they might well be included in this calculation.

Turning to the relation between state and energy market, the outsourcing of water supply to private companies can be observed through regulated competition on the one hand and reduced administration on the other. Aiming for an increase in competitiveness, eligibility criteria for subsidies in the energy and water sector should be established (Vision 2030a: 51). Vision 2030 seeks to downscale the total number of ministries, subsuming the Ministry of Water and Electricity with the Ministry of Agriculture into the Ministry of Environment, Water and Agriculture (Vision 2030b). This measure implies not only a changed perception of the interplay of these three variables but also a less direct involvement of the state.

To conclude, the initiatives of Vision 2030 reveal a mixture of deregulation and the privatisation of the water and energy sectors. Sustainability is linked to economic growth and less to ecological responsibility and environmentally friendly water consumption as no coherent and ambitious projects tackle the risks of climate change and shrinking water sources. The Saudi Arabian government rather relies on the improvement of a sparsely modified status quo through the optimisation of desalination, as expressed by the founding of ECRA. Therefore, a technological solution is preferred over the fundamental reconsideration of natural resources. Following the multidimensionality of water defined by Obertreis et al., Saudi Arabia increasingly discerns water as an economic asset which is provided by the market instead of a public good distributed by the state. As the three pillars imply, the government foremost aims to maintain and increase investment opportunities in order for the economy to thrive. Consequently, the current living conditions and its legitimacy towards the Saudi Arabian population are supposed to be sustained. At the same time, damaging long-term consequences of water policies in general and desalination in particular are neglected for the sake of stability as the following chapter illustrates.

Environmental Risks and Discussion

The reforms of Vision 2030 react to the consequences of decades of mismanagement and unsustainable water use in the Kingdom, especially in the agricultural sector (DeNicola et al. 2015: 346). The growing pressure on natural resources – and the government – can be traced back to wasteful consumption but also to the consequences of climate change that threatens to provoke heavy droughts more frequently (Bodetti 2019). As most of the region and neighbouring countries will face similar challenges, Saudi Arabia turns to desalination for several reasons: in one of the most arid places in the world it is a priority (one might assume even a raison d'état) to guarantee the access to water across the country given the limited natural resources. Moreover, the associated technology needs to be improved through greater investments in renewable energy sources such as solar power in order to replace the shrinking oil resources. The regional hegemony of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East relies on its economic power that it aspires to maintain. Besides, water is linked to national security in Saudia Arabia because a lack of water is likely to lead to social turmoil and, consequently, endanger the authoritarian regime. Finally, desalinated water can potentially contribute to the Saudi Arabian export revenues as a result of the water scarcity in neighbouring countries who cannot afford the expensive and energy-intensive production process (Bodetti 2019).

However, desalination comes with environmental risks of which high-energy consumption is just one. Different stages in the process jeopardise the ecological balance in the Gulf in various ways. At the beginning, water is transported from the sea to the plant via intake pumps that absorb small animals such as algae that are important for a functioning marine ecosystem (DeNicola 2015: 347). After the reverse osmosis of seawater, the desalinated product is transported to the cities, whereas the chemical-laced brine gets disposed of into the sea. Tirone highlights: "For every litre of potable water produced, the UN estimates about 1.5 litres of liquid polluted with chlorine and copper are created. When pumped back into the ocean, the toxic brine depletes oxygen and impacts organisms along the food chain" (Tirone 2019). Every day, 31.5 million cubic meters of contaminated water re-enter the ocean (ibid.). The increased salinity in coastal areas does not only affect the ecological balance but also raises the energy consumption as more effort is required to remove salt from the seawater (Wiedmann 2012: 263). In addition, the emissions of oil-fired plants contribute to air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, exacerbating climate change (DeNicola 2015: 348).

Referring to the idea that technopolitical actions are supposed to tackle challenges of political significance such as water scarcity, desalination technology can barely be described as a meaningful short-term solution. Even if the shift to solar power is pursued seriously, desalination aggravates water scarcity in the country and the wider Middle East due to its negative impact on the environment and the reinforcement of climate change. The current performance of a greener energy production is deficient, as demonstrated in the temporal failure of the solar-powered plant Al-Khafji and the exceeded decommissioning date of fossil-fired power plants.

Despite a certain awareness about environmental risks – as plant Al Khafji exemplifies – there are only loose commitments to environmental preservation and sustainability in Vision 2030 (Vision 2030a: 23). This can be traced back to the inherent power structure in the Saudi state. Its model is built on a rentier economy that upholds authority through the maintenance of a high living standard that prioritises comfort over environmental responsibility. Moreover, regulations in favour of comprehensive environmentalism would oppose the self-image of an investor's paradise as proclaimed by the Vision 2030. The high pressure to privatise and diversify the economy to secure revenues is grounded in the imminent loss of power and stability. Consequently, the economy is prioritised over environmental concerns.

The example of desalination in Saudi Arabia helps to understand the broad significance of technopolitics as a theoretical concept to understand complex intersections between political power and water supply. Vision 2030 exemplifies the prioritisation of the Saudi government to maintain the social contract based on consumerism and unsustainability. It may be countered that current trends reflect an increased awareness and willingness to preserve natural resources. However, these plans remain modifications on the surface and do not generally question the way water and energy are handled. Still, the firing of the Minister of Water and Electricity in 2016 who cut subsidies on water and thereby caused public objection, illustrates the dilemma and domestic pressure on the Saudi government (Wang et al. 2019). The social contract of providing good living conditions as a quid pro quo for obedience and loyalty dates back to the time of the oil boom in the 1980s. The social contract's requirements the current Crown Prince needs to balance with prospective challenges.

Conclusion

In an arid country such as Saudi Arabia with hardly any rainfall and shrinking groundwater supplies but two stretched coasts, desalination of seawater seems to be a reasonable solution to provide (drinking) water. This article presented a more critical approach to current trends in Saudi Arabian water supply as exemplified in the national development program Vision 2030. The application of the technopolitics concept highlighted the significance of water infrastructure for regime stability. Furthermore, it helped to deconstruct socio-economic and environmental shortcomings of desalination technology that can be traced back to the growing pressure on the declining rentier economy. Therefore, desalination and its management are a useful lens to analyse elementary goals of the Saudi Arabian government.

This can be extended to foreign policy objectives such as the export of desalinated water or national security. I decided to focus on Vision 2030 because it provides insights to the inner reorganisation of a state that faces a fundamental threat to its socio-economic order as the country was built on oil resources whose demand is now declining. The situation reveals the emerging contradictories in the self-understanding of the Saudi government: On the one hand, regulation and control of water sources have been centralised for decades and, thus, have been sustaining the authoritarian power model. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia starts to surrender or, at least, loosen its power over desalination plants by privatising the water supplies. This tension is reflected in the self-image of being an important "economic powerhouse" that seeks to expand and invest in substitutes of oil. The profit and diversification of the national economy conversely may help to maintain the living conditions of the population and stabilise the social order.

Given the fact that the state prioritises an economic perspective on desalination, the environmental sustainability of this infrastructure is widely neglected. Due to the massive energy consumption of the desalination process, attempts to fuel them with solar power

remain a challenge as the Al-Khafji project indicates. Notwithstanding the rising awareness of alternative, greener energy resources, desalination heavily affects the marine ecosystem by increased salinity and chemical pollution caused by disposed brine. Combined with the imminent consequences of climate change, desalination rather “technologises” and compounds the complex problem of water scarcity. An innovative and truly sustainable reform of water supply is impeded by reluctant actions of the Saudi Arabian government and the resistance of the population against a less wasteful consumption. Instead, environmental risks are subordinated to a steady water supply for the sake of political stability. However, the long-term survival of the modern Saudi Arabian state will depend on its ability to deal with both socio-economic and environmental challenges. The example of water policies illustrates the limits of flexibility of an authoritarian state whose power mainly relies on finite resources.tions between political power and water supply. Vision 2030 exemplifies the prioritisation of the Saudi government to maintain the social contract based on consumerism and unsustainability. It may be countered that current trends reflect an increased awareness and willingness to preserve natural resources. However, these plans remain modifications on the surface and do not generally question the way water and energy are handled. Still, the firing of the Minister of Water and Electricity in 2016 who cut subsidies on water and thereby caused public objection, illustrates the dilemma and domestic pressure on the Saudi government (Wang et al. 2019). The social contract of providing good living conditions as a quid pro quo for obedience and loyalty dates back to the time of the oil boom in the 1980s. The social contract’s requirements the current Crown Prince needs to balance with prospective challenges.

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08

Imperial Legacies in the Discourse on the Establishment of the Humboldt Forum

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Abstract

Moving the ethnological collections to the newly reconstructed Berlin Palace inspired heated international discussions over the ethnological collections and the remembrance of the German Empire. The Humboldt Forum is intended as a place of national identification and aims to open a dialogue on the imperial past of Germany, but the form and substance this discussion took is also subject to criticism. Based on the concept of imperial practices, as described by Burbank and Cooper, this paper argues that the legacy of empires impacts the discourse on the Humboldt Forum today. A discourse analysis reveals that imperial imaginaries and practices of imperial knowledge production are still in place, constructing a distorted narrative of the history of the German Empire, which marginalizes the participation of the source communities of the objects displayed, making the debate around the Humboldt Forum unequal.

Keywords: Humboldt Forum, imperialism, ethnology, knowledge production, discourse analysis

Introduction

The reconstruction of the Berlin Palace as the new location of the Ethnological Museum and the Museum of Asian Art has involved the German public and the respective scientific communities for more than two decades. As of Summer 2020, the new building already stands: three sides of its facade mimic the original palace as it looked before 1945, crowned by a widely criticized Christian cross on the top of the cupola. The palace has a modern interior and contains the Humboldt Forum, a cultural institution (named after Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt), as well as the two museums mentioned above. An exhibition on the history of Berlin and research units for the Humboldt University are also situated in the building. The expert committee which initially laid out the project imagined the Palace as a "place of dialogue" between different cultures, the sciences and the public (Internationale Expertenkommission Historische Mitte Berlins 2001: 18). The idea of establishing the Forum was presented as an opportunity to engage with the complex and troubling history of the ethnological collections (Lehmann 2002). Meanwhile, scholars and activists criticize the project for excluding certain actors from the design and planning process, such as experts from the communities where many of the objects originated from, as well as post-colonial activists in Germany (Friedrichs and Jana 2017: 75).

Current discussions on racism and the colonial heritage of Germany make one wonder about the nature of this "place of dialogue". Under which circumstances was this institution designed and how is this dialogue supposed to take place? The Humboldt Forum constitutes a re-imagination and re-settlement of the ethnological collections, but does it do the artifacts justice placing them into the Berlin Palace, a reconstructed symbol of German Imperialism? Does the public (and expert) debate on the Humboldt Forum allow for a just and equal "dialogue between cultures" as it aspires to, or will it lead to a reinforcement of the already existing power structures?

This paper argues that the debate surrounding the Humboldt Forum shows how empires have a long-lasting impact, even after they cease to exist and how their practices have far-reaching consequences and can be traced to the present day. Like other ethnological museums, the Humboldt Forum also tries to critically assess its collection by offering a "dialogue". I argue that while attempting to offer a dialogue, it reinforces patterns of imperial differentiation between cultures. Moreover, the name of the project, named after the Humboldt brothers, places it in a legacy of imperial knowledge production. Scientific discourses, research and categorization of the "other" were constitutive in forming relationships between the core and the periphery of empires. Western knowledge is still built on insights created from within imperial contexts (Tilley 2011). Critically assessing the foundations of knowledge production therefore allows one to not only contribute to the decolonisation of museum exhibitions but also to the notion and understanding of culture, heritage and race, as they are understood in Germany today. There is an ever-increasing need for an integrated understanding of heritage and its influences on the integration of society today, replacing a "dialogue" between "different" cultures, which perpetuates colonial patterns of othering. Decolonizing the social construction of knowledge allows us to problematize the understanding of Germany as a "facilitator of the dialogue" and to reconsider its role in the international community.

A discourse analysis in the tradition of the "sociology of knowledge" will be employed as the analytical framework to understand how the impact of imperial legacies is still present today. In the following chapter, I provide the theoretical foundation of the analysis, basing it on the ideas of Burbank and Cooper on 'imperial practices', showing how these practices were utilized by the German Empire. Recognizing that these practices apply power by impacting discourses, I show how discourse theory can be operationalized to critique the debate on the Humboldt Forum. Following the steps proposed by Diaz-Bone, I introduce my sample and show how a qualitative coding connected to the theoretical literature on imperial practices uncovers the impact on the discourse done by the rule of difference, imperial imaginaries and Western knowledge production.

2. Tracing the Legacies of Empires through Discourse Analysis

2.1 Current Debates

Empires played a crucial role in the construction of the social and political order of the world as we know it today. Their practices of conquering and incorporating vast and diverse groups of people in different territories under one rule created unequal social and economic networks which still have an impact in defining international relations today. For this analysis, I rely on the theoretical framework by Burbank and Cooper (2010) to describe and understand imperial practices. In this subchapter I review the five features of imperial governing. While Burbank and Cooper consider these to be universal practices, used by various empires in different eras, I provide examples how these practices shaped the German Empire, mostly in the 19th Century, illustrating why these features are crucial to understanding the discourse on the Humboldt Forum.

First, empires rely on incorporating territories but at the same time constructing difference between them (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 13). The metropolitan core serves as the political and economic centre and profits from the unequal political economy of the empire. The political incorporation is connected to the spread of the empire's dominant culture. At the same time, the imperial administration upholds the difference between the colonizer and the colonized: the empire's territories are distinct political entities and people living in different places are subject to different jurisdictions. The distinction between populations relies not only on a territorial, but also on a racial basis, as the example of German colonial history shows: White settlers were understood to be superior to Africans, creating a caste-based society in the colonies (Gründer 2004: 27).

Second, the core stabilizes its rule with help of imperial intermediaries. Burbank and Cooper argue that imperial practices cannot be understood as a relationship between two groups: the colonizer and the colonized. Imperial governments often relied on private actors from the core, such as settlers, farmers, industry, researchers and merchants to establish influence over a certain territory (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 14). On the other hand, they also co-operated with indigenous elites and used their networks to establish power. In the German Empire (like in most 19th Century European empires), it meant that the incorporation of territories was primarily based on unequal legal contracts between German merchants and the local elites which were later violently enforced by the empire (Zimmerer 2004: 3f.).

Third, empires are governed in relation to each other, and exist in an international system which is constructed by other empires, which Burbank and Cooper call "imperial intersections" (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 15). Their relationships lead to competition, the exchange of practices by ways of imitation and innovation, allowing them to keep up and develop new practices of domination. One empire's ability to conquer and incorporate was legitimized and enabled by others, for example through international treaties.

Fourth, imperial governance also operates on the instrumentalization of imagination and knowledge. When establishing and popularizing concepts like "civilisation", the core dictated the social norms and forms of living (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 16). Spreading language, culture, theories of race, gender and law were all parts of the imperial repertoire (Cooper and Stoler 2001: 12). The production of knowledge is initiated in the core through institutions like universities, but it is in the periphery of empires where the research was often carried out, under unequal terms. Ethnological collections were central to the colonial production of knowledge. Exhibitions were put on display in the metropolitan cores, Berlin had the biggest ethnological collection of the late 19th century (Penny 2002: 2). These museums were used to underline the otherness and difference of the colonized people to the colonizers and to construct an unequal relationship between cultures (Penny 2002: 10f). Even if ethnology cannot be considered as a solely colonial endeavor, ethnological museums played a crucial role in securing the power of the empire.

Fifth, Burbank and Cooper argue that the repertoires of power which empires rely on are multiple and variable in different territories: they are able to adjust and modify them to ensure the continuance of their rule (Cooper and Stoler 2001: 16). Therefore, the history of empires should be understood through forms of sovereignty, which were "shared out, layered and overlapped" (Cooper and Stoler 2001: 17). To analyse the legacies of empires, this assumption helps understand the multiplicity of experiences people living under empires had and provides an explanation as to how different patterns of remembrance of the German Empire can be present at the same time. There are two radically different narratives on this area: the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century are both remembered as the Belle Époque of culture and 'progress' but also as the heyday of colonialism, when the most brutal act of the empire took place, the genocide of Herero and Namaqua in 1904-1908.

2.2 The Method of Discourse Analysis and the Sample

Burbank's and Cooper's concepts show how empires rely on a variety of practices and that most techniques of domination operate not through military action but rather through an imperial discourse, which assigns difference along colonial and racial lines by penetrating and shaping people's imagination of the world. Michel Foucault argued that a discourse arises out of a system of knowledge at a given place and time. There is always only one system of knowledge, which defines the "mode of being" and provides a basis of knowledge for various subjects for a specific moment in time (Foucault 2006 [1966]: xxiii).

This underlying assumption helps us understand that the Belle Époque of the core and the simultaneous genocide enacted in the periphery arose from the same epistemic foundations. Accordingly, the discourse surrounding the Humboldt Forum with all its arguments is a product of our current system of knowledge, which can be traced to the same epistemic foundations. Foucault argued that knowledge systems are subject of transformations, where the change of concepts and knowledge items can be traced from one system to the other (Foucault 2006 [1966]: 11ff). Based on this assumption, analysing the current discourse can lead us to find legacies of imperialism.

Foucault´s ideas have a complex reception in the social sciences, as he never developed an explicit operationalization of discourse analysis and there are contesting traditions on how his work should be understood and utilized (Kerchner and Schneider 2006). The use of discourse analysis in this paper is based on the sociology of knowledge approach (Wissenssoziologie) (Keller 2006). This operationalization focuses on the "social construction of knowledge" (Keller 2006: 227), aiming to capture social processes and interactions unlike some other, more language-based approaches. By placing knowledge production into the centre of this analysis, it captures the educational nature of the museological project and its aim to facilitate "a dialogue between cultures". Looking at it as a social process allows us to thematize the crucial role of actors. In a debate like that surrounding the Forum, where there are clear in imbalances of power regarding race, heritage and access to the project, it is especially crucial not only to look at the discourse as a "collection of statements" as more linguistic approaches do, but to include the speakers into the analysis to understand that the statements come from different positions of power.

For the concrete application of discourse analysis, I follow the analytical steps proposed by Diaz-Bone, who conceptualizes statements as the primary category of analysis. These statements are constructive, as they articulate knowledge and reproduce practices (Diaz-Bone 2017: 132). The aim of discourse analysis is to understand the rules under which the statements are organized. These rules, however, are not designed by the actors articulating statements, but produced through historical processes (Diaz-Bone 2017: 133), and actors obey these rules in a way comparable to how we speak a language without entirely understanding its grammar. Organizational elements in discourses can be understood as collective symbols (Diaz-Bone 2017: 134). These are symbols which are understandable to a significant number of actors and provide context for concepts. Different positions in a discourse can be identified, for example, by the usage of collective symbols.

This paper relies on three types of material to map the discourse on the Humboldt Forum. The sampling process aimed to capture the wide variety of the actors participating and their respective statements. The first group of material contains the official documents by the expert committee on the Berlin Palace and other self-representations of the Forum. The second group consists of the expert literature on the issue of moving the Ethnological Museum into the Palace, including both academic and activist literature. Actors of these two groups are relevant stakeholders and can claim expertise on the topic, but they are differentiated regarding their access to the planning process. In these first two groups I have included material that was produced since the recommendation of the first expert committee in 2001 until the present day.

The third group of material is the reporting on the case in mass media. To gain a sufficient representation of the discourse, but also to reduce the amount of material and keep it manageable for this analysis, I have decided to focus on print media. The selection aimed to capture a wide variety of statements on the topic. Therefore, the analysis draws on two national papers, with opposing political orientation: the more liberal weekly Die Zeit and the more conservative daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as well as one local daily, the Berliner Morgenpost. A keyword search for the term "Humboldt Forum" between the 1st of January 2001 and the 1st of March 2020 shows how frequently this issue was discussed and provides a clue to its relevance. For this analysis I have decided to reduce the sample and only analyse articles published between the 1st of January 2019 and the 1st of March 2020. (See the appendix for a full list of articles analysed.) Discourse theory argues that the underlying system of knowledge is subject to slow change and therefore the most relevant statements should be present in the chosen time period as well.

	Die Zeit	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	Berliner Morgenpost
2001 - 2020	226	490	2167
2019 - 2020	22	61	216

Table 1: Number of articles published on the Humboldt Forum

A superficial analysis (after Diaz-Bone), meaning a survey of all three types of material, showed that the statements can be organized in the following categories:



Figure 1: Thematical categories of statements made on the Humboldt Forum; the selection represents the focus of this analysis

Figure 1 shows how the statements on the Humboldt Forum can be clustered around a wide variety of themes. In order to analyse the impact of imperial legacies, I have decided to concentrate only on the most relevant topics, meaning on statements concerning the reconstruction of the Berlin Palace, the move of the two museums from Dahlem, the origin of the objects in their collections, German colonialism and the new location for their exhibitions. This thematic reduction lead to a reduction of the sample-size: 12 articles were taken from Die Zeit, 18 from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 78 from the Berliner Morgenpost. In order to analyse this amount of qualitative data I have used the software MAXQDA[1].

3. The Discourse on the Humboldt Forum

3.1 Statements in the three Areas of the Discourse

3.1.1 The Official Representation

As of June 2020, the construction on the Humboldt Forum is almost finished, but the exhibitions have not opened yet. There is a small exhibition placed in front of the building, designed to inform visitors about the project. Here, volunteers inform about the reconstruction of the palace, telling the story of how the German Democratic Republic (GDR) destroyed the original building and replaced it with the “Palast der Republik” which “obstructed the landscape of the city”, as well as being poisonous due to the asbestos used in its construction. For this reason, it had to be demolished to make room for the reconstructed Berlin Palace[2].

The story presented by the volunteers and the small exhibition focuses solely on the architecture of the Berlin Palace, containing nostalgic sentiments towards the state of Prussia. They distribute promotional material that celebrates the architectural achievement of the reconstruction of the palace and place the focus on the historical beauty of the building. One of these is a free-of-charge publication, the Berliner Extrablatt, published by the Association for the Berlin Palace (Förderverein Berliner Schloss e.V. 2019) which features pictures of the Palace from different time periods, showing its destruction in the Second World War and comparisons of the Palast der Republik and the Berlin Palace and their respective place in the cityscape of the Museum Island, thus trying to prove how much better the Palace will fit in the city landscape when finished. It does not offer any information on the future exhibitions to be hosted in the Palace, which is surprising especially in the light of the vivid discussions held on the Forum and its future contents

This absence of details on the content of the future exhibitions is also striking when compared to other representations of the Humboldt Forum. The website opens with the announcement: “In an area covering more than 30,000 square meters, you can experience world-famous collections featuring more than 20,000 exhibits from Asia, Africa, the Americas and Oceania. Bringing together contemporary research and science with Berlin’s history…”, by connecting both the artifacts and the history of Berlin (Humboldt Forum 2020). This description mirrors the idea of a dialogue between cultures, presented in the recommendations of the expert committee on the Berlin Palace. The document argues that the aim of the project should be the “integration of the arts and cultures of the world, science, defined by a broad scope of events and programs” (Internationale Expertenkommission Historische Mitte Berlins 2001: 18). This report imagines the Humboldt Forum as a place of “dialogue” and “civil participation” (Internationale Expertenkommission Historische Mitte Berlins 2001: 18). The dialogue is to be achieved through an exhibition of “non-European cultures” placed in the direct neighborhood of other rooms in the museum representing “European culture” in the tradition of the Humboldt Brothers (Internationale Expertenkommission Historische Mitte Berlins 2001: 22). This conceptualization the difference between cultures by focusing on a dialogue between two imaginary poles, instead of an integration or exchange.

Lehmann, president of the Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, also argued that Germany has an important role to play in the world as an “intermediary” between cultures, which must be represented in the new palace (Lehmann 2002: 17). Responding to the critiques that the ethnological collections are a product of colonialism and imperial domination, he argued that this was only partially true and that these collections have to be seen as the result of the “meticulous scientific discoveries of German researchers since the middle of the 18th century” (Lehmann 2002: 19). Lehmann argues that ethnological collections are not reinforcing colonial narratives as the critiques say, but that they are a place, a place where issues like racism could be thematized (Lehmann 2002: 19). Lehmann is responding to the longstanding critique of ethnological exhibitions, which is by no means unique to Germany, but is a global discussion on dealing with the cultural heritage of colonialism.

3.1.2 Expert Criticism

In the last 20 years, various experts have produced a large volume of criticism on this self-representation. Binder argued that the project constructs a “great history of Prussia” and celebrates its achievements in culture and education, contributing to the production of a collective identity. (Binder 2009: 294). She states that the Humboldt Forum itself became a place of identity construction for Germany, with its intentions to balance between the local, national and the cosmopolitan, a place of discussion on the “future of the nation” (Binder 2013: 107). Von Bose observed the planning process of the move of the Ethnological Museum and argues that it became the focal point for not only a national, but an international discussion on ethnological practices and collections (Bose 2016: 35). These statements underline the importance of the Humboldt Forum project and extend the problem beyond the question of the shape of future exhibitions.

In the case of the Forum, the construction of an overly positive remembrance of Prussia meets a long-time neglect of the reconciliation with its colonial past, which Zimmerer calls “the colonial amnesia” (Zimmerer 2015: 22). Zimmerer argues that for a long time the remembrance of national socialism and the Second World War overshadowed the attention given to colonialism, which has only gained more attention in the recent years (Zimmerer 2015: 23). As Apoh (2020) points out, the topic of the German colonialism in Africa is under-researched, especially when compared to British and French colonial legacies, and argues that more research and a tighter cooperation between academics and activists both in Europe and Africa is essential for reconciliation (Apoh 2020: 41). Apoh suggests the use of the “sankofatization paradigm”, a term derived from an Akan word meaning that “recalling or going back for something is not an abomination”. This will help develop ways in dealing with the colonial past (Apoh 2020: 30). This concept achieved little or no attention in the German discourse so far. In fact, the conceptualization of the Humboldt Forum still seems to be lagging behind the ongoing discussions on decolonization, in comparison to other museums in Europe, such as the Tropenmuseum in Amsterdam (Huis 2019), as well as the German Historical Museum, which, by being pressured by both academics and activists, offered an exhibition

titled “German Colonialism” in 2016.

Many academics articulated strong criticisms of the project of the Humboldt Forum, most notably art historian Bénédicte Savoy, whose resignation from the scientific council of the project caused upheaval both among experts and in the media. She criticized the project for being anachronistic, not transparent and not delivering its promise of a critical assessment of the artifacts. In an interview she called the whole project an unsolvable paradox: the reconstruction of the Palace symbolizes a “turning back in time” but at the same time the ethnological museum is reluctant to give up its artifacts, claiming that “history cannot be undone” (Häntzschel 2017). Savoy polemically compared the Humboldt Forum to Chernobyl, claiming both the scale of the project as anachronistic and criticizing the process of its decision making. These statements inspired other critical assessments, von Bose arguing that the planners of the Humboldt Forum are unable to reflect and draw on the post-colonial debate for ways on how to handle the ethnological collection (Bose 2017).

Experts of the group Berlin-Postkolonial argue that the idea of the Humboldt Forum carries colonial implications in itself, as it places stolen artifacts into the Palace of the “mass murderer Emperor Wilhelm II” (Friedrichs and Jana 2017: 75). The group No Humboldt21! argues along similar lines. They demand that “the work on the Humboldt Forum in the Berlin Palace be ceased and that a public debate is to be held” (No Humboldt21! 2013: 1). The reasons behind these demands are: The museums are not the legitimate owners of these collections and their objects, the project redeems Berlin’s colonial past, it marks the cultures represented as “other” and “strange”, the research done in the museum is not problematized and the exhibition of the objects in Berlin means that they remain in the possession of people of the global North and are not accessible for descendants of cultures that they originated in. (No Humboldt21! 2013). Another group called Africavenir has similar demands and aims to “scandalize the museum”, calling it “eurocentric and restorative” (Africavenir 2013). They are planning to introduce alternative tours in the Forum to showcase its colonial heritage.

3.1.3 Mass Media

The statements discussed in the mass media rely predominantly on the official representation of the project, as well as some academic criticism such as that of Bénédicte Savoy. The more radical critique, like that of No Humboldt21!, has not been reported on (neither in the sample period nor before). An overwhelming majority of the coverage of the Berliner Morgenpost concerns the history of the Berlin Palace. The paper launched a series titled “Ausflüge in die Geschichte des Schlosses” [Excursions into the history of the Palace] where a variety of topics were discussed, such as everyday life in the palace and the lives of Prussian rulers. They offer a sympathetic depiction of the life of “great men” and occasionally that of some women, concentrating overwhelmingly on the elites. The articles offer a romanticizing view on the Palace and celebrate its return to the “heart” of Berlin. In this series, there is only a single article concerning colonialism, which does not talk about the late 19th century but about Brandenburg-Prussia’s involvement in the slave trade in the 18th century (Kulke 2019a). This article downplays the role of Prussia in the global slave trade and shifts the question of responsibility by claiming that African leaders “willingly extradited” those sold into slavery. The focus of the article lies on the economic aspects of trade, the imperial assumption that human beings can be traded as goods is not criticized.

In connection to the Humboldt Forum, the historical role of the Humboldt brothers is discussed, most notably that of Alexander von Humboldt. His research provides the foundation for the current ethnological collection. He is represented as a mostly positive figure, emphasizing his scientific achievements. In response to critiques of von Humboldt, the historical series in the Berliner Morgenpost argues that he had an ambivalent relationship to the rulers and cannot be regarded as an “agent of the crown” (Kulke 2019b). In most articles concerning Humboldt’s involvement in colonialism, his collection practices are criticized, but the focus lies on his scientific achievements, and the newspapers are mostly sympathetic towards the “challenge” of exhibiting the artifacts with an imperial past. In an article on the brutal ethnological practices of German researchers in Eastern Africa, the tone of journalists is rather sympathetic towards the current challenges of tackling the issue of colonialist science and welcomes the fact that these collections will be exhibited to achieve “further resonance” (Radano 2019). The articles in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung are also mostly sympathetic towards the challenges of researching the past of the artifacts and not critical towards the way this research is conducted. There is little reporting on the question of returning the objects to the source communities. And there is a rather extreme counter-example, in an article concerning the throne Njoya (which will be exhibited in the Humboldt Forum), where the German colonizers are characterized as “adventurers” who built schools in Cameroon and had a good relationship with the local elites and, as the article argues, therefore legitimately received the throne as a present (Hermann 2020).

3.2 The Impact of Imperial Practices

As a result of a partly deductive (based on the concepts by Burbank and Cooper presented above) and partly inductive coding of statements the following code system emerged:

- **Colonialism**
  - Continuity of imperial collection practices
  - Impact of legacies, presence of colonial practices
  - Remembrance of the German Empire
- **Remembrance of Prussian History**
  - Excursion to the history of the Palace
  - German historical figures
  - Heart (of the city landscape)
- **Dialogue**
- **Exhibits / objects**
- **The location for the collections**
- **World**

The statements from all three groups of material can be grouped into these categories. Considering the concept of imperial practices as outlined by Burbank and Cooper, we can group these codes around two practices: the construction of difference and imperial knowledge production. A cluster like this shows that these statements in the discourse are connected to imperial practices: the statements discuss the clusters, relate to them or criticize them, the presence of imperial practices is felt, and actors react to them. Legacies of empires are therefore constitutive elements of the underlining knowledge system. The use of collective symbols, such as the “heart of the city”; “Alexander von Humboldt”; “colonial heritage”; “stolen art” [Raubkunst] also operate within the impact of these legacies.



Figure 2: The schematic map of imperial practices constitutive for the system of knowledge

What kind of knowledge system do these statements indicate? The short collection of statements above shows how the issue of the Humboldt Forum is tied to questions of the politics of history and the remembrance of the German Empire. The overarching theme which emerges is the question of the positioning of the history of Prussia and colonialism in relationship to each other. The statements of the discourse have shown that these two issues are separated, and that this separation is not based on events, as historians like Andreas Eckert argue, but rather on the current culture of remembrance (Eckert and Wirz 2002). German colonialism, following Eckert, cannot be framed as a brief phenomenon between 1878 and 1918. Colonial thinking and imperial practices were present way before that, as Brandenburg-Prussia taking part in the Atlantic slave trade shows. The Humboldt brothers were part of a global Europe-dominated imperial knowledge production of the 18th century. As we have seen, these facts circulate in the discourse on the Humboldt Forum, but there is still a clear separation on what is regarded as German or European History and what is "World" history, and the history of colonialism clearly belongs to the latter.

It is striking that the press articles all have a clear theme: an article is either concerned with colonialism, or the history of Prussia. These two rarely ever mix and, when addressed at the same time, the complexity and the paradoxes are immediately pointed out as if the system of knowledge does not allow for a consistent narrative when combining these two aspects. The impact of this othering can also be observed in the actors who play a role in the debate: the experts are all German or European, representatives of "World" history are only able to speak when they are invited to participate in the dialogue (for example for an interview), but they are not part of the planning process of the Humboldt Forum. This impact is further deepened by the clear separation of the discursive strains. While academics are present in mass media and scholars were involved in the planning process of the Humboldt Forum, the official representation of Forum seems to be dissociated from the current academic discussions around decolonization. Sticking to the notion of the "dialogue between cultures", the official representation is not addressing the issue of the existing "colonial amnesia" as pointed out by Zimmerer, nor do the curators engage with the concept of "sankofatization" as suggested by Apoh. Furthermore, activists are not even present in the mass media reporting.

The second complex of practices can be observed surrounding the question of knowledge production. Non-European actors are not part of the planning process, the objects are only interpreted through agents of the core (meaning German experts). Even German majority society is better suited to participate (as the project stresses its interactive nature) than the source communities of the artifacts displayed. There is the claim that the project enables a dialogue between cultures, but this dialogue is not equal if only one party can dictate the rules. Even after this critique was articulated by the No Humboldt21! group, there has been no equal involvement. Statements like that of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which suggest that the objects were gifted by the source communities, only draw attention to the practice of imperial intermediaries. Imperial imaginations are not only transmitted through the conceptualization of the ethnological exhibition, but also by the representation of the project to the public. The palace is often referred to as the "heart" of the city, so that the artifacts are to be placed in the middle of the core, and that Germany is to play the role of the mediator between cultures, as described above. This description implies that "Germany" as a collective is the main active player in the knowledge production.

4. Conclusion

This paper has argued that the discourse on the Humboldt Forum reveals the legacy of imperial practices in Germany. The impacts of the rule of difference are recognizable as there are still two historical narratives of the German Empire. That narrative of the imperial core, the process culminating in the German unification of 1871, and the Belle Époque following it are represented in the German Historical Museum. The other history, that of colonialization and exploitation are to be placed in the Humboldt Forum. This house is imagined as place of dialogue. These two histories, which will be placed in two different houses, that of Germany and that of the "World", should be in dialogue with each other but they shall not mix or integrate. The traces of imperial imaginaries and knowledge production can be observed in the planning process, in the unequal, hegemonic role of the core in leading said "dialogue". The sampling of material has shown how the official representation of the project, even though it has come under heavy criticism, still dictates the rules of the discourse.

This discursive impact of imperial legacies should not be overlooked but considered as a factor in the debate on ethnological collections. When aiming to create a dialogue, European scientists and intellectuals should reflect that such a dialogue is inherently unequal, unless they directly counteract it. An active counteraction against imperial legacies should deconstruct the rule of difference, by presenting a picture of a common, interwoven history rather than drawing on the differences between cultures. Furthermore, imperial patterns of knowledge production should be broken up by incorporating source communities into the study and presentation of artifacts.

The analysis has some limitations regarding its scope, as Figure 1 has shown, there are multiple themes in the discourse which were not considered here but would be fruitful as the subject of a further analysis, especially regarding the contested remembrance of the GDR and the German Empire. Still, identifying imperial legacies in today's discourse offers a valuable lens to analyse and reflect on its impact on issues like racism and international inequality. The debate around the Humboldt Forum gave occasion to engage with multiple issues regarding heritage and societal integration in Germany. In order to tackle these issues, the impact of imperial legacies has to be recognized and counteracted.

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Footnotes:

[1] Using this software supports the development of an inductive code-system for the analysis and does not interfere with the foundations of discourse theory as laid down by Diaz-Bone and Schneider (2003).

[2] This description is based on my visit to the Berlin Palace on the 20th of February 2020.

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Appendix

Datum	Ressort	Titel	Zeitung
03.01.2019	Kultur	Ich bin für die Tropen geboren	Berliner Morgenpost
03.01.2019	Feuilleton	War Humboldt Kolonialist?	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
04.01.2019	Feuilleton	Halbe Fahne	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
06.01.2019	Berlin	Kultursenator: Kolonialgeschichte aufarbeiten	Berliner Morgenpost
06.01.2019	BIZ	Ein Keim von Berlin	Berliner Morgenpost
08.01.2019	Berlin	Mittes Bürgermeister findet das Berliner Schloss „grausig“	Berliner Morgenpost
20.01.2019	BIZ	Todesurteile im Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
27.01.2019	BIZ	Der Kurfürst und die Musik	Berliner Morgenpost
30.01.2019	Kutur	Dahlem wird das Schaufenster zum Humboldt Forum	Berliner Morgenpost
03.02.2019	Berlin	Neuer Schlösser-Direktor gegen „Blattgold-Tourismus“	Berliner Morgenpost
10.02.2019	BIZ	Mehr Pracht fürs Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
12.02.2019	Geschichte	Geraubte Stimmen	Die ZEIT
14.02.2019	Feuilleton	Einfach mal durch den Körper denken	Die ZEIT
17.02.2019	BIZ	Der Traum vom Gold	Berliner Morgenpost
24.02.2019	BIZ	Der Baumeister aus Italien	Berliner Morgenpost
27.02.2019	Titel	Humboldt Forum: Eröffnung 2019 ohne die geplante Berlin-Ausstellung	Berliner Morgenpost
28.02.2019	Feuilleton	Not kennt keinen Kulturgutschutz	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
03.03.2019	BIZ	Am Tisch des Fürsten	Berliner Morgenpost
24.03.2019	BIZ	Ein Garten für alle	Berliner Morgenpost
26.03.2019	Feuilleton	Sammeln, Sammeln, Sammeln!	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
04.04.2019	Kultur	Fraktionen fordern Verantwortung für Kolonialismus	Berliner Morgenpost
05.04.2019	Feuilleton	Haltet die Lügner!	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
07.04.2019	BIZ	Giftige Gerüchte im Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
14.04.2019	Berlin	Das Humboldt Forum – Berlin und die Welt	Berliner Morgenpost
14.04.2019	BIZ	Die Festung in der Fremde	Berliner Morgenpost
18.04.2019	Kultur	Mit Cinderella und Sindbad um die Welt	Berliner Morgenpost
21.04.2019	BIZ	Der Baumeister des Königs	Berliner Morgenpost
28.04.2019	BIZ	Das Schloss der Intriganten	Berliner Morgenpost
10.05.2019	Neue Sachbücher	Wer nicht tauscht ist ein Kannibale	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
12.05.2019	BIZ	Ein neuer König im Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
13.05.2019	Kultur	Forscher untersuchen Herkunft umstrittener Benin-Bronzen	Berliner Morgenpost
19.05.2019	BIZ	Zucht und Ordnung	Berliner Morgenpost
26.05.2019	BIZ	Das Schloss der Frauen	Berliner Morgenpost

Appendix

Datum	Ressort	Titel	Zeitung
29.05.2019	Feuilleton	Weltkunst in Ost-Berlin	Die ZEIT
02.06.2019	BIZ	Das Gespenst im Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
06.06.2019	Kultur	Die Objekte der Omaha	Berliner Morgenpost
07.06.2019	Feuilleton	Leere	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
09.06.2019	BIZ	Ein tierisches Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
13.06.2019	Feuilleton	Das ist ein Skandal!	DIE ZEIT
16.06.2019	BIZ	Das ungeliebte Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
19.06.2019	Feuilleton	Was genau geschah in den Kolonien?	DIE ZEIT
19.06.2019	Feuilleton	Durch die Metropole in fünfundvierzig Minuten	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
19.06.2019	Kultur	Eine alte Tür fürs neue Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
23.06.2019	BIZ	Ein neuer König	Berliner Morgenpost
23.06.2019	BIZ	Gute Aussichten	Berliner Morgenpost
26.06.2019	Feuilleton	Gewurstel im Barock	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
27.06.2019	Hamburg	„Das waren in Hamburg geplante Raubzüge“	DIE ZEIT
27.06.2019	Titel	Humboldt Forum soll ab Herbst 2020 schrittweise öffnen	Berliner Morgenpost
30.06.2019	BIZ	Die Kammern des Königs	Berliner Morgenpost
07.07.2019	BIZ	Der König und sein toter Sohn	Berliner Morgenpost
10.07.2019	Kultur	Humboldt Forum erhält Segelboot aus Fidschi	Berliner Morgenpost
14.07.2019	Kulturbesitz	Bachs Spurn führen ins Berliner Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
14.07.2019	BIZ	Ein Schloss für Kinder und Gäste	Berliner Morgenpost
21.07.2019	BIZ	Der Berater der Könige	Berliner Morgenpost
25.07.2019	ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT	Humboldts Welt	DIE ZEIT
25.07.2019	Feuilleton	„Geschehen ist fast nichts“	DIE ZEIT
01.08.2019	Geschichte	Schluss mit Heia Safari	DIE ZEIT
01.08.2019	BIZ	Schüsse aufs Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
04.08.2019	Politik	Herr über 28 Schlösser	Berliner Morgenpost
04.08.2019	BIZ	Scharaden im Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
08.08.2019	Feuilleton	„Das fand ich unangemessen“	Die ZEIT
11.08.2019	BIZ	Bilder für den König	Berliner Morgenpost
18.08.2019	BIZ	Der König und das Volk	Berliner Morgenpost
24.08.2019	Vermischtes	Berlins Herz für Berliner öffnen	Berliner Morgenpost
25.08.2019	BIZ	Wie die Könige speisten	Berliner Morgenpost
01.09.2019	BIZ	Ein Schloss stellt sich aus	Berliner Morgenpost
02.09.2019	Berlin&Brandenburg	Leseforum zur Kultur in Berlin	Berliner Morgenpost

Appendix

Datum	Ressort	Titel	Zeitung
08.09.2019	BIZ	Das Schloss wird kaiserlich	Berliner Morgenpost
08.09.2019	BIZ	Ein Berliner mit Fernweh	Berliner Morgenpost
11.09.2019	Berlin	„Die Freiheit der Kunst ist das größte Geschenk“	Berliner Morgenpost
14.09.2019	Kultur	Das Humboldt Forum feiert einen Geburtstag	Berliner Morgenpost
15.09.2019	BIZ	Dem Entdecker zum Geburtstag	Berliner Morgenpost
15.09.2019	BIZ	Die Schönheit mit den Feenflügeln	Berliner Morgenpost
15.09.2019	Berlin	Die verborgenen Schätze der Berliner Museen	Berliner Morgenpost
15.09.2019	Titel	Festakt zu Humboldts 250. Geburtstag auf der Schlossbaustelle	Berliner Morgenpost
16.09.2019	Feuilleton	Murx der Europäer	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
22.09.2019	BIZ	Die Hofgesellschaft am Buffet	Berliner Morgenpost
04.10.2019	Politik	Kulturmittlerin	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
06.10.2019	BIZ	Die Kuppel über der Stadt	Berliner Morgenpost
13.10.2019	BIZ	Wie der Kaiser feierte	Berliner Morgenpost
20.10.2019	BIZ	Die zweitbeste Adresse der Stadt	Berliner Morgenpost
27.10.2019	BIZ	Ein Wettstreit mit dem Papst	Berliner Morgenpost
30.10.2019	Feuilleton	Sammeln und beherrschen	DIE ZEIT
03.11.2019	BIZ	Ein letztes Mal preußischer Prunk	Berliner Morgenpost
10.11.2019	BIZ	Das Schloss wird umgebaut	Berliner Morgenpost
15.11.2019	Neue Sachbücher	Kuratierte Erinnerung	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
15.11.2019	Berlin	Neues Teehaus im Humboldt Forum	Berliner Morgenpost
16.11.2019	Briefe an den Herausgeber	Zuerst die Zweckbestimmung	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
22.11.2019	Feuilleton	Odyssee im Weltwissensraum	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
24.11.2019	BIZ	Mit Jubel in den Abgrund	Berliner Morgenpost
01.12.2019	Titel	Berlin entwickelt sich zur „Food-Metropole“	Berliner Morgenpost
01.12.2019	BIZ	Eine rätselhafte Rede	Berliner Morgenpost
03.12.2019	Feuilleton	Preußische Planspiele	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
17.12.2019	Meinung	Manchmal helfen nur drastische Schritte	Berliner Morgenpost
21.12.2019	Feuilleton	Sperrige Wiedergänger	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
22.12.2019	BIZ	Vom alten zum neuen Schloss	Berliner Morgenpost
31.12.2019	Kultur	Bricht in Mitte auf	Berliner Morgenpost
31.12.2019	Meinung	Vorfreude auf 2020	Berliner Morgenpost
06.01.2020	Berlin	Stiftungschef: „Wer Nofretete sehen will, wird hingehen	Berliner Morgenpost
09.01.2020	Berlin	Zu Besuch: Paul Spies	Berliner Morgenpost
17.01.2020	Politik	Den Thron behielt der deutsche Kaiser	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

Appendix

Datum	Ressort	Titel	Zeitung
19.01.2020	Berlin	„Die Touristen werden in Scharen kommen“	Berliner Morgenpost
26.01.2020	Kultur	Parzinger: Kolonialer Schuld mehr Aufmerksamkeit schenken	Berliner Morgenpost
28.01.2020	Berlin	Raus aus dem Elfenbeinturm, rein ins Leben	Berliner Morgenpost
13.02.2020	LITERATUR	Die Afrikaner fragt wieder keiner	DIE ZEIT
16.02.2020	Kultur	Der legendäre große Kurfürst und sein Berlin	Berliner Morgenpost
23.02.2020	BIZ	Der Thron des Kaisers	Berliner Morgenpost
29.02.2020	Feuilleton	Kraft und Charisma	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

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Many thanks to all creators

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